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Abstract
Text World Theory: A Critical Exposition and Development in Relation to 
Absurd Prose Fiction
Joanna Gavins PhD Thesis
This thesis presents a unified and systematic Text World Theory, tested and refined 
under practical application. It draws on a variety of linguistic, psychological, critical 
theoretical and cognitive scientific models, principally the cognitive discourse grammar 
originally developed by Paul Werth. The thesis delineates the critical and philosophical 
inheritance out of which Text World Theory evolved, in order to evaluate and engage 
critically with the theoretical framework in the light of recent developments in literary 
linguistics and cognitive poetics. This inheritance includes the fields of possible worlds 
semantics and narratology, artificial intelligence research and cognitive psychology. 
Essential modifications, revisions and crucial adjustments are made to Werth’s 
approach in order to produce a refined model of Text World Theory.
The augmented framework is tested through several practical and inter-related analyses. 
These centre around Absurd prose fiction, selected in order to highlight the adaptability 
of the new Text World Theory especially in the context of literary environments that are 
often judged to be challenging on a cognitive dimension. Extensive analyses of Paul 
Auster’s The Music o f  Chance, Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman, Emmanuel 
Carrere’s The Mustache, Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five, and Donald 
Barthelme’s Snow White are undertaken over the course of the thesis. Further 
adaptations to the model are proposed as a result of these applications.
The thesis aims primarily to be a contribution to the field of cognitive discourse study. 
However, incidental contributions are also made to the areas of the critical study of 
Absurd prose fiction, pragmatics and semantics, cognitive poetics and literary critical 
theory in general.
‘The m ost incom prehensible thing about the w orld  is that 
it is a t a ll com prehensible . '
A lbert Einstein
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Chapter One Preliminaries
1.0 Aims and Parameters
The central focus of this thesis is the text world approach to discourse study conceived 
by the late Professor Paul Werth and outlined both in his 1999 monograph, Text Worlds: 
Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse, and in numerous preceding articles and 
essays (Werth 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 1997b and ms.). 
Throughout this body of work, Werth claims to have devised a methodological 
framework capable of accounting for the cognitive processes behind the production and 
interpretation of all forms of human communication; from telephone conversations to 
dramatic performance, from church sermons to newspaper reports. Rarely are such 
ambitious theoretical objectives encountered within the field of linguistic study. Werth’s 
development of his all-encompassing model, however, was sadly cut short by his 
untimely death in 1995. By that time, Werth had set down only the basic foundations of 
Text World Theory in published form, though he had also managed to complete a 
manuscript for his monograph on text worlds prior to his death. Although not in the 
camera-ready form that had been requested by the publishers (Longman) on their 
original acceptance of the text, Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in 
Discourse was felt to be of such academic importance as to warrant the extensive 
further editing work needed to bring the volume to a publishable state.
This task was undertaken by Professor Mick Short at the University o f Lancaster 
between 1995 and 1998 and involved a number o f changes to Werth’s draft. Alongside 
numerous missing and inaccurate references, some of the examples Werth had used for
analysis (including an unreferenced satirical extract on former President of the United 
States, Ronald Reagan) were deemed potentially libellous and were duly removed and 
replaced with similar, though less legally problematic, extracts of Professor Short’s 
devising (see, for example, Werth 1999: 151). Several o f Werth’s diagrams were also 
removed in order to reduce costs. These discrepancies have been borne in mind 
throughout the course of this study and close comparison has consistently been made 
between the final volume, eventually published in 1999, and its original manuscript. 
This comparison has shown, however, that little significant difference exists between 
the two texts at the theoretical level and that the majority of changes made to Werth’s 
original version of the book have been largely cosmetic.
Although the account o f Text World Theory presented in the 1999 monograph may be 
far more extensive than those offered in earlier essays (e.g. Werth 1994, 1995a, 1995b), 
no further exploration of the validity of the considerable claims contained in that text 
(see Chapter Three for further detail) has yet been attempted. As I have already 
mentioned, the potential for the application of Text World Theory to a broad range of 
discourse situations is stressed throughout Werth’s work. Furthermore, Werth 
emphasises that he believes his fundamental responsibility as a discourse linguist to be 
the formulation of a methodological framework that will enable the systematic 
examination, not only of entire texts, but also of the contexts surrounding their 
production and interpretation (see Werth 1999: Chapter 1). Indeed, Werth admits that, 
consequently, his central subject matter is no less than ‘all the furniture of the earth and 
heavens’ (Werth 1999: 17). Whether Werth actually achieved his aim of producing a 
fully context-sensitive discourse model, capable of explaining the vast data o f all human 
communication, is yet to be tested and established. Although selected areas of Werth’s
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text worlds framework have been discussed and put into use in a number o f recent 
discourse studies (e.g. Emmott 1997, Hidalgo Downing 2000), no extended critical 
evaluation or development of the model yet exists.
This thesis constitutes just such a project. It is the first step towards an exhaustive 
testing of the benefits and boundaries of Text World Theory. Indeed, that very term is 
coined in this thesis for the first time, as a means of referring to the expanded and 
refined version of Werth’s text world framework presented throughout the course of the 
coming chapters. In his own work on text worlds, Werth did not refer to his approach to 
discourse study as an identifiable unified ‘theory’ of human communication in this 
sense. Although, in his 1999 monograph, Werth does claim to be working towards the 
formulation of a ‘Cognitive Discourse Grammar’ (Werth 1999: 50), he does so as a 
means of relating his text world model to other discourse frameworks (e.g. Fauconnier 
1994 and 1997, Langacker 1987, 1990 and 1991) previously put forward within the 
field of cognitive linguistics (see sections 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 3.2.2 for further discussion of 
these correlations). Werth’s somewhat tentative classification of his methodology, then, 
can be seen as appropriate to the status of his project as a ‘work-in-progress’ at that 
time. The retrospective schematisation and development of the central principles of the 
text world approach undertaken in the current thesis, however, reveals a discrete and 
cohesive system of discourse analysis to which the ‘Text World Theory’ label may now 
be confidently applied.
It is important to stress, however, that, due to the standard constraints of time and scope, 
the present thesis is not intended as a comprehensive investigation of all aspects of 
Werth’s framework. Indeed, the all-embracing nature of Text World Theory necessarily
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means that only selected areas of the model can be fully explored in an investigation of 
this size. A corresponding restriction of data for analysis must also be made for the 
same reasons. Therefore, since this thesis constitutes the first detailed exploration of 
Text World Theory attempted since Werth’s death, it seems appropriate to begin the 
evaluation and development of the framework at the precise point at which it was left by 
its creator. This means that the viability of using the text worlds approach to examine 
face-to-face communication, for example, will not be assessed in these pages (see 
Chapter Five, however, for some further discussion of the possibilities of such a 
project). Rather, the further advancement of Text World Theory will start with an 
exploration into that mode of discourse which formed the central focus of Werth’s own 
work, namely the discourse of prose fiction.
A number of shortcomings can immediately be identified in the analyses o f literary 
discourse carried out by Werth during his development of Text World Theory. Firstly, 
despite repeated gestures towards the examination of real, extended discourse, Werth’s 
own use of his framework was limited to the analysis of relatively short literary extracts, 
aimed at exemplifying rather than assessing the text world approach (Werth 1999: 10 
provides a typical example). This thesis, on the other hand, studies the text world 
structures of a series of entire novels in order to investigate fully Text World Theory’s 
capacity for dealing with complete texts. Werth’s choice of examples for analysis was 
also often further restricted to the work of realist novelists from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Extracts from William Thackeray, Henry Fielding, John Steinbeck 
and Charles Dickens feature prominently throughout Werth’s work, with Ernest 
Hemingway and E.M. Forster emerging as particular favourites for investigation (see, 
for example, Werth’s use of Hemingway in Werth 1993: 82, 1995b: 202, 1995b: 203-
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204, 1999: 10, 1999: 52, 1999: 217, 1999: 220, and his use of Forster in Werth 1994: 
84-85, 1995b: 190-191, 1999: 8, 1999: 254, 1999: 318-319). The present purposes of 
exploring both the advantages and the absolute limits of Text World Theory as a 
methodological tool for stylistic analysis, however, demand a more challenging 
selection of literary texts. Section 1.1 below, therefore, explains the rationale behind the 
application of Text World Theory to a series of Absurd novels, which forms the core of 
this thesis.
1.1 The Literature of the Absurd
Absurd adj. and n.
A. adj. ... Out o f  harmony with reason or propriety; incongruous, unreasonable, illogical. In 
modem use, esp. plainly opposed to reason, and hence, ridiculous, silly ...
B. n. An unreasonable thing, act or statement. Obs. exc. as a rendering o f  Fr. Vabsurde 
(Cam us)... 1962 Listener 13 Dec 1027/1 The theatre o f  the absurd, whose master remains 
Camus.
(The Oxford English D ictionary, 1989) 
Although The Oxford English Dictionary here acknowledges the work of Albert Camus
as a central influence on much contemporary use of the term ‘absurd’, its choice of
citation can be seen to present a somewhat misleading picture of the historical
development o f the notion of the Absurd in both philosophy and literary criticism. The
quotation from The Listener in 1962 above would appear to suggest that Camus was in
some way responsible for, or at least involved in, the twentieth century dramatic
tradition which has come to be known as the ‘Theatre of the Absurd’. In actual fact,
although the use of ‘absurd’ to refer to both a literary work and a general state of human
existence can be traced back to Camus’ 1942 text Le Mythe de Sisyphe (Camus 1975),
Camus himself never used the term to refer to either his own or other authors’ dramatic
work. Rather, Le Mythe de Sisyphe is made up of a series o f philosophical essays in
which Camus questions whether life has meaning in order to explore the further
question of the legitimacy of suicide. He evokes the Greek myth o f Sisyphus as an
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allegory for the ‘absurd’ human condition. Sisyphus, of course, having angered the 
gods, was condemned to ceaselessly rolling a huge stone to the top of a mountain, only 
to have to watch it roll back down again under the force of its own weight. Camus 
explains:
Sisyphus is the absurd hero. He is as much through his passions as through his torture. His 
scorn o f  the gods, his hatred o f  death, and his passion for life won him that unspeakable 
penalty in which the whole being is exerted towards accomplishing nothing. This is the 
price that must be paid for the passions o f  this earth.
(Camus 1975: 108)
During the course of his existential deliberations, Camus also mentions a number of 
other fictional works, including Franz Kafka’s (1925) The Trial and The Castle (1926), 
and Herman Melville’s (1851) Moby Dick, which, he argues, share the ‘absurd 
sensitivity’ (Camus 1975: 10) of Sisyphus’ tale. These brief observations, however, 
remain secondary to his central philosophical purpose.
The phrase ‘Theatre of the Absurd’ was coined much later by Martin Esslin (1980) in 
his seminal text of the same name, originally published in 1961. Esslin draws upon 
Camus’ original depiction o f the absurdity of human existence in order to describe the 
dramatic works of, primarily, Samuel Beckett, Arthur Adamov, Eugene Ionesco, Jean 
Genet and Harold Pinter. Esslin explains:
A term like Theatre o f  the Absurd is a working hypothesis, a device to make certain 
fundamental traits which seem to be present in the works o f  a number o f  dramatists 
accessible to discussion by tracing the features they have in common.
(Esslin 1991: 12)
Unfortunately, Esslin fails to specify what these fundamental traits actually are, offering 
only a highly impressionistic description of the works o f each of his chosen authors 
without any reference to the stylistic features the texts may share. However, Esslin does 
provide slightly more rigorous detail in his differentiation between those writers he 
considers to be dramatists of the Absurd and those, including Jean Giraudaux, Jean-Paul
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Sartre and Camus himself, whom he identifies as belonging to an earlier tradition of 
‘Existentialist theatre’ (Esslin 1980: 25). He argues that
these writers differ from the dramatists o f  the Absurd in an important respect: they present 
their sense o f  the irrationality o f  the human condition in the form o f  highly lucid and 
logically constructed reasoning, while the Theatre o f  the Absurd strives to express its sense 
o f  the senselessness o f  the human condition and the inadequacy o f  the rational approach by 
the open abandonment o f  rational devices and discursive thought. While Sartre or Camus 
express the new content in the old convention, the Theatre o f  the Absurd goes one step 
further in trying to achieve a unity between its basic assumptions and the form in which 
these are expressed.
(Esslin 1980: 24)
Sartre, Camus, and their contemporaries, then, can be seen to be expressing the same 
metaphysical anguish as Beckett, Pinter, and the rest of Esslin’s Absurdist writers, only 
in a more conventional, realist form. Indeed, Esslin goes on to describe Camus’ writing 
as displaying ‘the elegantly rationalistic and discursive style of an eighteenth century 
moralist’ (Esslin 1980: 24), while he claims that Sartre’s plays are ‘based on brilliantly 
drawn characters who remain wholly consistent and thus reflect the old convention that 
each human being has a core of immutable, unchanging essence’ (Esslin 1980: 24).
The ‘Theatre of the Absurd’, by contrast, is characterised by its deliberate violation of 
such literary and dramatic norms, displaying numerous features which can be seen to 
defy those conventions which had previously defined the qualitative boundaries of the 
literary canon. As Esslin explains:
If a good play must have a cleverly constructed story, these have no story or plot to speak 
of; if  a good play is judged by subtlety o f  characterization and motivation, these are often 
without recognizable character and present the audience with almost mechanical puppets; if  
a good play has to have a fully explained theme, which is neatly exposed and finally solved, 
these have neither a beginning nor an end; if  a good play is to hold up the mirror to nature 
and portray the manners and mannerisms o f  the age in finely observed sketches, these seem  
to be reflections o f  dreams and nightmares; if  a good play relies on witty repartee and 
pointed dialogue, these often consist o f  incoherent babblings.
(Esslin 1980:21-22)
However, Esslin is also quick to point out the speed and readiness with which such 
initially incomprehensible avant-garde work was embraced by its audience and 
transformed into the ‘all too easily understood modem classic’ (Esslin 1980: 11).
7
Indeed, Esslin’s own terminology enjoyed a similar rush of popularity following the 
publication of The Theatre o f  the Absurd, as the phrase swiftly became a widely used, 
but often ill-defined, umbrella term applied to numerous disparate plays and playwrights 
of the mid to late twentieth century.
As a consequence, Esslin made several attempts, both in later editions of his initial 
monograph and in other subsequent studies of Absurd drama (e.g. Esslin 1965), to re­
draw and re-emphasise the boundaries of his ‘Theatre of the Absurd’, describing the 
term as having become a ‘catchphrase, much used and much abused’ (Esslin 1965: 7). 
He argues that
the term, coined to describe certain features o f  certain plays in order to bring out certain 
underlying similarities has been treated as though it corresponded to an organized 
movement, like a political party or a hockey team, which made its members carry badges 
and banners... The artists o f  an epoch have certain traits in common, but they are not 
necessarily conscious o f  them. Nor does the fact that they have these traits preclude them 
from being widely different in other respects.
(Esslin 1980: 12)
Esslin seems tom, then, between the need to demarcate and differentiate the Theatre of 
Absurd from other literary forms and the desire to broaden his grouping to encompass 
numerous stylistically and historically diverse texts. More recent developments in 
literary criticism would appear to suggest that the latter of these forces ultimately 
prevailed, as the term ‘Absurd’ has continued to be employed as a means of describing a 
vast array of both drama and prose fiction (see, for example, Brothers (1977) on Henry 
Green; Galloway (1970) on John Updike, Saul Bellow, J.D. Salinger and William 
Styron; Hauck (1971) on Herman Melville, Mark Twain, William Faulkner and John 
Barth; Hilfer (1992) on Joseph Heller, Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, John Barth 
and Vladimir Nabakov; Hinchliffe (1969) on, among others, Samuel Beckett, John 
Osbome, Tom Stoppard and Edward Albee; Ketterer (1978) on Kurt Vonnegut and 
Philip K. Dick; Miller (1967) on William Faulkner, Walt Whitman and Emily
Dickinson; Paolucci (1980) on Luigi Pirandello; Penner (1978) on Vladimir Nabakov; 
Safer (1983, 1989 and 1990) on Thomas Pynchon, Ken Kesey and John Barth; and 
Weinberg (1970) on, among others, Franz Kafka, John Hawkes and Joseph Heller). As 
the above list shows, in many of these latter studies of novels and short stories, the line 
drawn by Esslin between Existentialist and Absurdist forms becomes blurred, with 
realist texts such as Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962), for 
example, often being categorised as ‘Absurd’ alongside more stylistically experimental 
works, such as Thomas Pynchon’s V (1963) (see, for example, Safer 1989).
Weinberg (1970), however, offers a useful formalisation of such apparent academic 
inconsistencies. Like Esslin, she distinguishes between those novels which convey 
Existentialist concerns through a conventional narrative structure and those which strive 
to achieve a more innovative expression of the absurdity of the human condition. In the 
former, realist category she includes Camus’ (1942) L ’Etranger and Sartre’s (1938) La 
Nausee, as well as later works such as J.D. Salinger’s (1951) The Catcher in the Rye 
and Bruce Friedman’s Stern (1963). Weinberg goes on to explain:
These novels are informed by a vision o f  absurdity and have at their centre a passive, 
rationalistic, or hopelessly ineffectual victim-hero, dominated by his situation rather than 
creating or acting to change it. They have a more or less realistic surface, with somewhat 
surrealistic elements. Realism o f  detail, rather, underscores the madness o f  the world, its 
grotesque comedy.
(Weinberg 1970: 10)
Weinberg claims that, by contrast, in novels like Thomas Pynchon’s (1963) V, Joseph 
Heller’s (1961) Catch-22 and John Barth’s (1958) The End o f  the Road, the same 
philosophical themes that form the focus of the realist texts listed above are made 
manifest through what she terms a ‘stylized absurd surface’ (Weinberg 1970: 11). She 
goes on to explain:
The absurd surface exaggerates. Through exaggeration and repetitions; grotesqueries; 
unique, exotic, bizarre or strange sym bols... the absurdity found in life is transcribed 
through surreal descriptions. Special surrealistic situations, too, are created to embody the
inexplicable; and somewhat common situations, such as those o f  war, are exaggerated and 
distorted to produce a heightened effect o f  the sort experienced in dreams.
(Weinberg 1970: 11)
Despite the somewhat incongruous description of war as a ‘common situation’ here, 
Weinberg’s separation of Absurd prose fiction into two distinct categories, one realist 
and one non-realist, nevertheless provides a positive development of Esslin’s original 
classification of Existentialist and Absurdist drama.
In particular, Weinberg’s approach allows us to further differentiate between Absurd 
prose fiction and numerous other twentieth century novels which may also make use of 
a non-realist narrative structure. Although many novels of the last one hundred years or 
so may, for example, display a disrupted chronology, or contain surrealistic elements 
and situations, not all of them communicate the Existentialist unease which, according 
to Weinberg, must be present in order for a text to be considered truly Absurd. The 
novels selected for analysis in this thesis, then, each conform to the basic requirements 
of Weinberg’s categories, although they display varying degrees of ‘surface’ 
Absurdism. Paul Auster’s (1992) The Music o f  Chance, for example, examined in 
Chapter 3, can be seen to explore the possible futility of human existence within the 
constraints o f a chronologically structured, realist narrative. The analysis of Emmanuel 
Carrere’s (1998) novel The Mustache in Chapter 4, on the other hand, reveals a text 
which initially appears to be similarly mimetic, but becomes increasingly populated 
with surrealistic situations as the novel progresses. Flann O ’Brien’s (1993) The Third 
Policeman and Kurt Vonnegut’s (1991) Slaughterhouse-Five (originally published in 
1967 and 1969, respectively) present yet further significant challenges to the 
conventional literary forms described by Esslin (1980: 24). Both of these novels are also 
examined in Chapter 4. Finally, closing that chapter’s series o f detailed analyses is the 
novel with perhaps the most ‘stylized absurd surface’ (Weinberg 1980: 11) of all those
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examined during the course of the thesis, Donald Barthelme’s (1996) Snow White, 
originally published in 1967.
Together, these five texts represent a broad spectrum of Absurd prose fiction, not only 
in stylistic terms, but also in terms of the historical (from 1967 to 1992) and cultural 
(French, Irish and American) traditions they cover. As such, their selection enables the 
viability of Text World Theory as a stylistic methodology to be thoroughly tested 
against what can be seen as a gradually developing cline of literary experimentalism. 
Perhaps more than any other identifiable genre of contemporary prose fiction, the 
literature of the Absurd allows the development of Text World Theory to be pursued 
from its original application to realist texts through to the very limits of the novelistic 
form. Thus, within the necessarily limited scope of the current thesis, the texts chosen 
for detailed examination provide the most wide-ranging, yet systematically selected 
literary data possible through which the benefits and drawbacks o f Werth’s text world 
approach may finally be established.
1.2 The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of five chapters. Following the present preliminary discussion of the 
aims and parameters of the study, Chapter Two goes on to examine a range of academic 
disciplines and sub-disciplines which can be seen to have influenced the initial 
development of Text World Theory. The origins of Werth’s framework are, firstly, 
traced to the field of possible worlds semantics, with a particular focus on the historical 
evolution of the notion of a ‘world’ in the traditions of both linguistics and philosophy. 
The later use of possible worlds in literary theory is also examined in order to establish 
the degree to which Werth’s approach can be seen to correspond with, or indeed differ
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from, those of other linguists and literary theorists working within the same worlds- 
based parameters. Chapter Two considers the field within which Werth saw his Text 
World Theory as being most firmly based: cognitive linguistics. More specifically, the 
notion of a ‘world’, both in that tradition and in the related field of cognitive 
psychology, is examined and discussed. The varying terminology used by a wide-range 
of cognitivists to refer to conceptual worlds, including ‘mental representations’, ‘scripts’ 
and ‘schemata’, ‘cognitive models’ and ‘mental spaces’, are all analysed in order to gain 
a detailed understanding of the fundamentally cognitive basis of Text World Theory.
With the central influences that inform Werth’s framework thus established, Chapter 
Three of the thesis provides a comprehensive exposition of the main tenets of Text 
World Theory itself. Each of the three separate levels into which Werth’s model is 
divided is examined in turn; from the discourse world, to the text world and, finally, the 
sub-world. Werth’s own typical use of Text World Theory is also explained and 
exemplified in Chapter Three, with a discussion of Werth’s notion of extended 
metaphor followed by a corresponding analysis o f Paul Auster’s The Music o f  Chance, 
already mentioned in section 1.1 above. As well as presenting a detailed overview of 
Text World Theory as a whole, Chapter Three also begins the critical evaluation of the 
model which forms the main focus of the present study. In particular, certain problems 
in Werth’s account o f co-operation in discourse, spatial and temporal shifts in narrative, 
modality, and the representation of speech and thought in fiction are identified. Werth’s 
relatively limited application of Text World Theory to short textual extracts, already 
briefly mentioned in section 1.0 above, along with the problems arising from his 
approach to extended metaphor, are also further discussed. Finally, possible solutions to
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each of these flaws are put forward throughout Chapter Three for further testing and 
development in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.
Chapter Four forms the main bulk of the thesis, consisting o f a series of detailed 
analyses o f the text world structures of four entire Absurd novels. As already explained 
in section 1.1 above, these novels can be seen to provide the challenging literary data 
necessary to test the advantages and limits of the Text World Theory approach to 
discourse analysis in full. The chapter begins with an examination of Flann O ’Brien’s 
The Third Policeman, which focuses, in particular, on the numerous difficulties caused 
by the somewhat unreliable narrator of that text. The focalised nature of the narration 
also reveals further inconsistencies within Werth’s framework. The application of Text 
World Theory to Emmanuel Carrere’s The Mustache in section 4.2.0 continues the 
discussion of the problems raised in the preceding analysis and suggests certain 
modifications to Text World Theory as a possible solution. These modifications are then 
further tested and developed in section 4.3.0, in the analysis o f Kurt Vonnegut’s 
Slaughterhouse-Five. That section also addresses the questions surrounding Werth’s 
notion of co-operation in discourse, raised earlier in Chapter Three o f the thesis. The 
analysis of Donald Bartheleme’s Snow White, in section 4.4.0, can be seen to bring each 
of the methodological issues raised throughout the chapter together in one final 
application of Text World Theory.
It is important to emphasise, at this point, that the limited scope of the present study 
means that, once again, certain methodological constraints have necessarily been placed 
on the text world applications which make up both the latter portion o f Chapter Three 
and the whole of Chapter Four. For example, one possible approach towards the
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validation of Text World Theory’s claims to account for the way that real readers 
process real texts would have been to design a large-scale empirical reader-response 
survey. This could have involved comparing the results of ‘thinking out loud’ (TOL) 
protocols produced as a large number of readers read through the same literary text (see 
Steen 1994). These protocols could then be examined for key similarities and 
differences in terms of text world construction and development, in order to compare 
multiple responses and avoid the single subjectivity o f just one reading. However, this 
particular methodological procedure need not necessarily be invoked in order to 
establish the validity of the central tenets of Text World Theory.
Although the readings contained in Chapter Three and Chapter Four are my own 
readings, they are produced not simply intuitively or impressionistically but as the end 
result o f the analytical process of systematically applying the principles o f Text World 
Theory. Furthermore, as is explained in section 2.2.2 o f this thesis, these principles are 
to a great extent founded on those of cognitive psychology; an extensively empirically- 
tested discipline, discrete from literary study. My readings, then, are not the self- 
referential products of introspective speculation, but are directly derived from the 
established methodological authenticity of cognitive science. O f course, I fully 
recognise the existence of variant readings of the same texts and, where appropriate, 
give some discussion of their possible implications for Text World Theory. However, 
the analytical grounding of my own readings, and the detailed explication of my text 
world methodology which precedes them, allows a transparency of evidence to be 
achieved in this instance. It is, therefore, left to the reader of this thesis to confirm (or 
refute) the plausibility and centrality of my responses to the chosen texts according to
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their own relative personal and cultural experiences (see section 3.1.2 for a further 
exposition of these ideas).
This statement, o f course, implies a scale of possible readings. Indeed, my own response 
to the texts has already been identified as one of many central or likely readings. 
Relative to that category it is also possible to distinguish less likely readings, as well as 
those which are eccentric and, eventually, even unsupportable according to current 
psychological understanding. In effect, then, my readings can be seen to occupy the 
position of ‘ideal reader’ (Eco 1976 and 1981), or ‘super-reader’ to use Riffaterre’s 
(1956 and 1959) terminology, with the added proviso, stated above, that they are 
analytically derived. Furthermore, unlike the ideal or super-reader I do not claim access 
to and use all human knowledge, but specify precisely what knowledge informs my 
eventual conclusions (again, see section 3.1.2 for further discussion). In this sense, my 
readings, although not by any means objective, are not simplistically subjective either. 
As Verdonk and Weber (1995) argue:
... the text world will be different for the writer and for each reader (since we all use 
different assumptions, values, beliefs and expectations in the processing o f  the text). This 
by the way is not exclusive to literary discourse, but applies to both literary and non-literary 
texts, simply because all representation through language is a constructive process. Nor can 
stylistics nullify the indeterminacy o f meaning. What is important, however, is that with a 
stylistic methodology, this indeterminacy is neither ignored nor allowed to go wild but it is 
contained, for the stylistic methodology ensures that our reading is both explicit and 
replicable. It thus allows us to achieve in our reading, not scientific objectivity, but an 
intersubjective validity.
(Verdonk and Weber 1995: 2-3)
Many of the issues raised in this extract, such as the use of individual values and beliefs
in the construction of a text world (see section 3.1.2), are discussed elsewhere in this
thesis. For the moment, however, Verdonk and Weber’s comments are useful as a
means of further emphasising the systematic basis of the text world applications and
readings presented during the course of this study. Specifically, their essential
foundations in an ‘explicit and replicable’ stylistic methodology, as Verdonk and Weber
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put it, secure their position as intersubjective, rather than subjective, readings; fully 
transparent and available for inspection from any number o f possible critical 
perspectives.
Chapter Five concludes the thesis with a complete overview of the problems within 
Werth’s original framework that have been identified and addressed over the course of 
the preceding chapters. It also provides a detailed synopsis of each of the modifications 
that have been made to Text World Theory during this study. The essential elements of 
the resulting revised and developed model are then summarised and presented in a 
simplified form. Chapter Five also assesses the potential impact of the thesis on a range 
of academic disciplines, including linguistics, stylistics, cognitive science and literary 
theory. Some of the possible directions in which the present work may be expanded and 
developed in the future are also explored.
1.3 Further Implications
The central aims and parameters of this thesis, to provide a critical exposition and 
development of Text World Theory through the application of the framework to a series 
of Absurd novels, have been clearly established over the course of the preceding 
paragraphs. However, it is also possible to identify a number of what might be termed 
‘academic by-products’ arising from the present work which are worthy of further 
explication at this point. Perhaps most significant of these is the original contribution to 
literary criticism on Absurd prose fiction which results from the applications of Text 
World Theory in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. As already mentioned in section 1.2 
above, abundant critical material developing Esslin’s (1980) initial classification of 
drama into a means of describing certain narrative fiction already exists. However, none
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of these existing studies approach their central subject matter from a linguistic 
standpoint. Indeed, those works that do make some degree of critical engagement with 
the language of Absurd prose fiction often do so in an ill-informed and unsystematic 
manner (Tanner’s (1971: 81) discussion of language as ‘another structure in which man 
can become trapped’ provides a typical example). Even Weinberg’s (1970) promising 
remodelling of Esslin’s distinction between Existentialist and Absurdist drama falls 
short of a full explanation of the linguistic features of a typical ‘stylized absurd surface’ 
(Weinberg 1980: 11), remaining steadfastly fixed within the same impressionistic 
parameters which constrained Esslin’s own account.
Furthermore, although a number of existing stylistic analyses have offered a more 
rigorous linguistic examination of certain Absurd novels than those presented in the 
literary criticism mentioned above (see, for example, Hidalgo Downing 2000, Simpson 
1993 and 1997), these analyses are nevertheless limited to an examination of single 
works in isolation, rather than as part of a wider literary genre. The application of 
Werth’s discourse model to a collection of Absurd works in the latter sections of this 
thesis can therefore be seen as the first instance of an extended analysis of the linguistic 
structure of Absurd narratives. Although by no means comprehensive, the observations 
made about the text world composition of each of the chosen texts constitute the first 
step towards a deeper understanding of the poetics of Absurdism as a whole. The use of 
Text World Theory, an essentially cognitive framework, to achieve that progression of 
our literary understanding can also be seen as a significant contribution to the emerging 
field of cognitive poetics.
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This recent and highly innovative advance in the field of literary study has been 
developing at the interface between cognitive linguistics and literary theory since the 
early 1990s. Its practitioners are concerned with the application of cognitive theory to a 
range of literary subjects; from metaphor (e.g. Freeman, D. 1995, Freeman, M. 1997, 
Gibbs 1994, Steen 1994) to poetic structure (e.g. Tsur 1992, Semino 1997), from 
literary affect (e.g. Kuiken and Miall 1994, Miall 1989, Oatley 1994) to narrativity (e.g. 
Bridgeman 2001, Emmott 1997, Gerrig 1993, Stockwell 2000). Each of these highly 
individual studies can nevertheless be seen to be built on a common basic assumption 
that the thought properties central to the processing of literary texts also form the 
principal building-blocks of our understanding of the everyday world (see Stockwell 
2002, and Gavins and Steen 2002, for a detailed overview of the discipline of cognitive 
poetics as a whole). As Mark Turner explains:
Although literary texts may be special, the instruments o f  thought used to invent and 
interpret them are basic to everyday thought. Written works called narratives or stories may 
be shelved in a special section o f  the bookstore, but the mental instrument I call narrative or 
story is basic to human thinking.
(Turner 1996: 7)
The present thesis is also constructed according to these basic cognitive poetic 
convictions, the origins of which are explored in further detail in section 2.2.3 of this 
study. As such, the exploration of the text world structures o f complex literary texts 
which follows should also be considered as an investigation into the conceptual 
processes by which we negotiate our everyday lives.
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Chapter Two Origins and Influences
2.0 Preview
This chapter examines the origins of and influences on Werth’s initial development of 
Text World Theory. It examines a number of academic disciplines and sub-disciplines 
in order to establish the extent to which particular preceding frameworks and 
methodologies can be seen to have informed Werth’s own approach to discourse study. 
More specifically, it focuses on the notion of a ‘world’, the primary component of 
Werth’s model:
We all know what the world is, or we think we do. But are there other worlds? Are they the 
science-fiction writer’s dream, or do they exist? And what about such expressions as ‘the 
world o f  high finance’, ‘the world o f  the drug addict’, ‘the dream world’, and so on? It 
seems that a world, even in day to day language, isn’t just a ball o f  rock, gas and liquid 
spinning round some star somewhere, but is also used to refer to some complex state o f  
affairs. We perceive some o f the states o f  affairs as existing outside ourselves, and others 
as being entirely imaginary, cooked up in our heads, or in someone else’s head... all these 
worlds are the product o f  our mental processes, even those which we think o f  as very real 
and concrete.
(Werth 1995a: 49)
As Werth points out here, the term ‘world’ is not only used to refer to the planet on 
which we live and those which surround us, but is also frequently employed as a 
convenient locational metaphor to enable us to talk about particular states of affairs. 
These states of affairs may be real or imagined, factual or hypothetical but, in either 
case, they will basically constitute a set of entities at a certain time and place and in 
certain relationships with one another. Werth’s own employment o f the ‘worlds’ 
metaphor to discuss these states of affairs can be more fully understood by first 
examining its presence in a number of other fields of study.
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Firstly, Werth (1995b: 53, 1999: 68) acknowledges that any theory of ‘text worlds’ 
inevitably refers, however indirectly, to the theories o f ‘possible worlds’ adopted by 
philosophers and logicians in the latter half of the twentieth century to help solve a 
number of logical and ontological problems. The initial sections of this chapter examine 
that relationship, with the aim of establishing the degree to which an understanding of 
the logic of possible worlds can provide an illuminating perspective on the mechanics 
of Text World Theory. Section 2.1.0 provides a brief overview of the origins and later 
development of the notion of ‘possible worlds’ in the fields of logic and philosophy. 
The more recent adaptation of possible worlds philosophy as a means of discussing 
literary fiction are then discussed in more detail in section 2.1.1. Werth’s own use of the 
‘worlds’ metaphor in his discourse model is thus fully contextualised in relation to 
preceding applications of the ‘text as world’ analogy in the associated fields of 
narratology and literary theory.
Although Werth recognises the significant influence of possible worlds models on the 
logical structure of his and other ‘worlds’ frameworks, we have already seen in section
1.0 above that he explicitly situates Text World Theory within the discipline of 
cognitive linguistics (see also Werth 1999: 50). It is Werth’s central concern with 
human conceptual processes that sets his approach apart from those of possible worlds 
philosophers. The latter part of section 2.1.1 explores Werth’s eventual rejection o f the 
possible worlds approach on the grounds of its inability to account for the complexity of 
human cognition and discourse processing. Section 2.2.0 then goes on to examine the 
alternative notion of ‘worlds’ presented within the tradition of cognitive science and 
linguistics. The precursors of contemporary cognitive linguistics are examined in 
sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, while the work of Werth’s contemporaries is evaluated and
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discussed in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4. The chapter as a whole can thus be seen to provide 
an initial reference point for numerous diverse concepts and their related terminology 
which recur throughout this thesis.
2.1.0 Possible Worlds
The primary hypothesis of all possible worlds theories is that our actual world is only 
one of a number of possible worlds. The roots of this concept can be traced back as far 
as eighteenth century philosophical theology and the work o f Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz in particular. In his text The Monadology (Leibniz 1985), originally written in 
1713, Leibniz states:
Now, as in the Ideas o f  God there is an infinite number o f  possible universes, and as only 
one o f  them can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice o f  God, which 
leads Him to decide upon one rather than another. And this reason can be found only in the 
fitness, or in the degrees o f  perfection, that these worlds possess, since each possible thing 
has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to the amount o f  perfection it contains in 
germ. Thus the actual existence o f  the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, 
that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it.
(Leibniz 1985: 33-34)
According to Leibniz, then, God’s mind eternally contains the ideas of infinite worlds 
which He could have chosen to create. However, since God chose to make this world 
actual, and since God is good, this must mean that the actual world, although there is 
much evil and suffering within it, is nonetheless the best of all possible worlds. More 
recently, Leibniz’s concept of ‘possible worlds’ has been given a semantic, rather than 
theological, application. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, 
philosophers such as Jaako Hintikka (1967, 1979, 1989), Saul Kripke (1972, 1985), 
David Lewis (1972, 1973, 1983, 1986), Alvin Plantinga (1974, 1979) and Nicholas 
Rescher (1975, 1979) developed Leibniz’s initial notion of ‘possible worlds’ as a means 
of solving a number of logical and ontological problems concerning, among other 
subjects, reference, denotation, modal properties and proper names.
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A brief reconsideration of Russell’s (1905) theory of descriptions, and his discussion of 
the clause 'the present King o f  France is bald’ in particular, reveals just one example of 
the importance o f possible worlds semantics for the advancement of the philosophy of 
language. Russell points out that the clause contains a denoting phrase, ‘the present 
King o f  France’, which has no referent in the actual world. As such, he argues, the 
phrase denotes nothing and any predication made about it (i.e. 'is bald') must 
consequently be considered false. However, if  we take an alternative possible worlds 
approach, accepting the notion that the actual world is only one of a multitude of 
possible worlds, we can easily imagine that 'the King o f  France’ might exist in one of 
them. Thus, the truth value of the predication made about him (i.e. that he is bald) may
be assessed in relation to that world, rather than being immediately dismissed as
necessarily false. Where traditional logic does not allow for the human ability to 
speculate and hypothesise, the multiple-world perspective proposed by possible worlds 
semantics accommodates the existence o f non-actualised possible states o f affairs and 
enables the extension of truth values to hypothetical entities and situations.
This extension is constrained by a number of logical conditions, however, a succinct 
explanation of which is provided by Semino (1997), based on the following 
propositions:
1. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.
2. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1989.
3. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 or it is not the case that Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.
4. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and it is not the case that Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.
(Semino 1997: 58)
In relation to the actual world (1) and (2) can be said to be true and false respectively. 
The same can also be said of (3) and (4) respectively, only in these cases we do not 
need to refer to our knowledge of the actual world in order to make that distinction. 
Logic tells us that (3) will always be necessarily true and (4) will always be necessarily
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false. Indeed, possible worlds semantics can be seen to provide a means of fully 
explicating the previously undefinable modal abstraction of ‘truth’. A proposition that is 
necessarily true can now be defined as true in all possible worlds and a proposition that 
is necessarily false can be defined as false in all possible worlds.
By the same reasoning, a proposition may also be true in at least one possible world but 
may not be true in all worlds. Sentence (1) above, then, is possibly true, since it is true 
at least in the actual world but may not be true in all worlds. The same applies to 
sentence (2), which is possibly false, since it is false in at least one world (the actual 
world) but may be true in another possible world. For a world to be possible it must also 
adhere to the rule of the ‘excluded middle’ (see Ronen 1994: 54 for a detailed 
explication). In essence, this constraint means that in any possible world, given a 
proposition p, either p  or its opposite, not-p, must be the case. There can be no ‘middle 
ground’ in which neither p  nor not-p obtains. In terms of our initial example clause 
taken from Russell, this means that, in a possible world in which the King o f France 
exists, he must either be bald or not bald. A situation in which neither o f these 
predications could be said to be true would constitute an impossible state of affairs.
The diverse philosophical approaches of the possible worlds theorists who make use of 
this basic logical machinery can be roughly divided into two main categories, according 
to the degree of realism they assign to the non-actualised states of affairs under 
discussion (see Ronen 1994: 21-24). The first o f these categories, ‘modal realism’ (also 
known as ‘extreme realism’), is a radical philosophy of which David Lewis (1972, 
1973, 1983, 1986) can be seen to be the central proponent. Lewis argues that every way 
in which a world could possibly be is a way that some world is, and conversely that no
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world is any way that a world could not possibly be. The ‘ontological extravagance’ 
(Ronen 1994: 22) of Lewis’ approach, however, is apparent in his insistence that all 
these possible worlds are realised in some alternative logical space:
There are countless other worlds, other very inclusive things. Our world consists o f  all o f  
us and all our surroundings, however remote in time and space; just as it is one big thing 
having lesser things as parts. The worlds are something like remote planets; except that 
most o f  them are much bigger than mere planets, and they are not remote.
(Lewis 1986: 2)
Lewis attributes physical existence to all possible states o f affairs, both actual and non­
actual. The term ‘actual world’ itself becomes highly subjective under this perspective, 
as the inhabitants o f each possible world view their own world as the ‘actual’ one:
I suggest that ‘actual’ and its cognates should be analyzed as indexical terms: terms whose 
reference varies, depending on relevant features o f  the context o f  utterance. The relevant 
feature o f  context, for the term ‘actual’, is the world at which a given utterance occurs.
(Lewis 1983: 184-5)
When Lewis uses the term ‘actual world’, then, he does so as a means of specifying the 
deictic particulars of the world of which he considers himself to be a part and all other 
parts of it (his ‘worldmates’, as Lewis (1986: 92) puts it). When someone else uses the 
term, Lewis argues, whether that person be a worldmate of Lewis or an unactualised 
entity, then the term ‘actual world’ likewise applies to his or her own subjective view of 
the world and all its parts.
Lewis acknowledges that an acceptance of modal realist philosophy, or the entry into ‘a 
philosopher’s paradise’ as he puts it (Lewis 1986: 4), involves a considerable 
suspension of disbelief:
Modal realism does disagree, to a certain extent, with firm common sense opinion about 
what there is... When modal realism tells you -  as it does -  that there are uncountable 
infinities o f  donkeys and protons and puddles and stars, and planets very like Earth, and o f  
cities very like Melbourne, and o f  people very like yourself, small wonder you are reluctant 
to believe it. And if  entry into a philosopher’s paradise requires that you believe it, small 
wonder you find the price too high.
(Lewis 1986: 133)
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He maintains, however, that, while his approach to possible worlds has been met with 
many incredulous stares, he has yet to encounter any convincingly argued objections to 
his perspective (Lewis 1973: 86, 1986: 133-134). According to Lewis’ reasoning, then, 
the King of France may not only be imagined to exist, he actually does exist, physically, 
in another possible world. Indeed, to pursue Lewis’ approach to its logical conclusion, 
countless kings of France must be attributed physical existence in countless other 
possible worlds. Some of these kings may be bald and some of them may not, some of 
them may be married and some may not, some of them like butter and some of them do 
not, and so on, and so on, since each of these separate states of affairs is perfectly 
possible.
In complete contrast to Lewis’ radical views on the ontological status of possible 
worlds, however, ‘moderate realism’ (often also known as ‘actualism’) views possible 
worlds as existing only within the confines of the actual world. According to the 
proponents of this approach (including Kripke 1972 and 1985; Plantinga 1974 and 
1979; and Rescher 1975 and 1979), the actual world is a complex structure containing 
both actual elements and non-actual possibilities. As Kripke states:
A possible world isn’t a distant country that we are coming across, or viewing through a 
telescope. Generally speaking, another possible world is too far away. Even if  we travel 
faster than light, we w on’t get to it. A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions 
we associate with it ...
(Kripke 1972: 44)
Kripke and his fellow ‘moderate realists’, then, can be grouped together under that term 
according to their common assertion that possible worlds are not in fact actualised 
parallel entities, but exist only as the products of rational human behaviour. As Ronen 
explains:
The moderate realist, rejecting speculation about what happens in worlds unattached to our 
own, hence attributes possibilities to our world. Possible worlds yet produce explanations 
in modal contexts because they can be employed, for instance, to account for the meaning
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o f  modal propositions as propositions true in possible worlds: modal propositions do not 
impose quantifying over nonexistents; they only require that we quantify over things 
similar to actualities.
(Ronen 1994: 22)
The rationalistic approach of moderate realism prevents an admission of the material 
existence of possibilities disconnected from the spatial and temporal parameters of our 
own actuality. According to this reasoning, possible alternative states of affairs can only 
exist as components of the actual world. McCawley (1981: 326), for example, suggests 
that such components may arise as the abstract constructs resulting from ‘world- 
creating predicates’, including verbs such as to imagine, to believe, to dream and to 
suppose. The use of any one of these examples in ordinary discourse can be seen to 
stipulate a possible world which, though it may differ in a number of ways from the 
state of affairs in the actual world, at the same time remains essentially connected to it.
Possible worlds philosophers in the moderate realist tradition can thus be seen to have 
focused their attention on the differences and similarities between possible worlds and 
the actualised state of affairs from which they originate, rather than on ‘the way things 
are’ in some physically realised, but unattached, possible world. With the basic logical 
machinery of possible worlds semantics thus established, alongside the key 
philosophical differences which set its various proponents apart, section 2.1.1 below 
examines more recent developments of possible worlds philosophy in the field of 
contemporary literary theory. Werth’s adoption of the ‘worlds’ metaphor as a means of 
discussing both literary and non-literary texts can thus be fully contextualised and 
understood through its comparison with related applications of the notion of possible 
worlds as a framework for literary semantic analysis.
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2.1.1 Possible Worlds in Literary Theory
Following the initial development of Leibniz’s notion of possible worlds in 1970s’ logic 
and philosophy, possible worlds semantics can be seen to have undergone a further 
dramatic revitalisation in the late 1980s and 1990s, resulting from the adoption of its 
methods and terminology by a number of literary theorists and narratologists (see, for 
example, Dolezel 1988, 1989 and 1995; Eco 1989; Hintikka 1989; Maitre 1983; Pavel 
1986; Ronen 1994; Ryan 1980, 1991 and 1998; Semino 1997). Ryan (1998) argues that 
the reasons behind, and further implications of, this apparent academic trend are best
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understood by its comparison with a contrasting but equally popular metaphor for the 
literary experience: ‘the text as game’ (Ryan 1998: 137). The use of this metaphor in 
postmodern aesthetics, Ryan explains, presupposes a model o f literary texts as 
analogous either to the structured rules and activities of board games (a view favoured 
in structuralist poetics, see Culler 1975), or to the relatively unstructured forms of 
behaviour associated with playing, for example, with dolls or construction sets (see, for 
example, Derrida 1970).
However, Ryan argues that, while the ‘textual-game’ metaphor might provide a useful 
account of readers’ desires for chaos and transgression in their experience of literature, 
the equally fundamental need for order and security remains unexplained under this 
perspective. She goes on to explain:
The world metaphor restores the legitimacy o f  such desires as gaining a comprehensive 
overview o f  the text, finding stable structures, experiencing the text as a welcoming space 
and habitable environment, feeling able to orient oneself in its landscape, being transported 
to the scene o f  the narrated events, and achieving intimacy with its inhabitants.
(Ryan 1998: 138)
For Ryan, then, an alternative view of literary texts as creating ‘worlds’, rather than 
‘games’, is a more accurate analogy for the reading experience, which she describes 
elsewhere as the sense of becoming completely ‘immersed in a fiction’ (Ryan 1991: 21)
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(see also Gerrig 1993 for a similar view, although expressed from the perspective of 
cognitive psychology). Possible worlds semantics, of course, provides just such a 
metaphor, by which the reader’s apparent transportation into an alternative time and 
space might be more systematically discussed.
Indeed, Ryan’s emphasis on the highly realistic nature of the readerly experience might 
seem, on first encounter, to fit quite neatly into Lewis’ modal realist approach to 
possible worlds semantics, described in section 2.1.0 above. A more detailed 
examination, however, reveals Ryan’s careful maintenance of the link between the 
actual world and the fictional alternatives created from within its boundaries:
To speak o f  a textual world means to draw a distinction between a realm o f  language, made 
o f  names, definite descriptions, sentences and propositions, and an extra-linguistic realm o f  
characters, objects, facts and states o f  affairs serving as a referent to the linguistic 
expressions.
(Ryan 1998: 139)
Although Ryan stresses the all-engrossing qualities of literary fiction, then, the objects 
and entities contained within the fictional world nevertheless exist only as the abstract 
mental constructs of linguistic reference in the actual world. This attitude to the 
ontological status of possible worlds is, o f course, far more in keeping with the 
moderate realist approach of Kripke, Plantinga and colleagues than with Lewis’ radical 
perspective. According to Ryan, fictional worlds instigate a ‘recentring’ (Ryan 1991: 
22) of the reader’s notions of possibility and actuality into the sphere of an alternative 
possible world, which the narrator presents as the actual world for the duration of our 
submergence in the text. The real actual world, however, continues to constitute the 
central reference point in relation to which the possibility of all other worlds is 
determined. The main focus of Ryan’s attention is the degree of accessibility between 
these separate worlds. This is a notion which is difficult to detach from that of 
possibility; indeed, Kripke (1972) introduces accessibility and possibility as equivalent
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concepts (see also Lewis 1973: 52-56 and Van Dijk 1977: 30). Accessibility can, 
however, be more specifically defined in logic as relative possibility.
Ryan’s (1980, 1991) own schematisation of the degree of accessibility between the 
actual world and fictional worlds, for example, is carried out according to certain 
correspondence factors. These include known physical objects, chronology, natural laws 
and language. The more of these factors a fictional world shares in common with the 
actual world, the more accessible it will be. Furthermore, Ryan introduces a ‘principle 
of minimal departure’ (Ryan 1991: 48) to limit the divergence of the fictional possible 
world from the state o f affairs in the actual world to those differences actually specified 
by the text:
We construe the world o f  fiction and o f  counterfactuals as being the closest possible to the 
reality we know. This means that we will project upon the world o f  the statement 
everything w e know about the real world, and that we w ill only make those adjustments 
which we cannot avoid.
(Ryan 1980: 406)
This principle is most easily explained through its application to a fictional text. 
Consider the following extracts, from John Irving’s A Prayer fo r  Owen Meany and 
George Orwell’s 1984, respectively:
(1) The closest that Owen Meany and I could get to love was a front-row seat at The Idaho.
That Christmas o f  ’57, Owen and I were fifteen; we told each other that w e’d fallen in 
love with Audrey Hepburn, the shy bookstore clerk in Funny Face, but we wanted  
Hester. What we were left with was a sense o f  how little, in the area o f  love, we must be 
worth. We felt more foolish than Fred Astaire, dancing with his own raincoat.
(Irving 1989: 293)
(2) It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen. Winston Smith, 
his chin nuzzled into his breast in an effort to escape the vile wind, slipped quickly 
through the doors o f  Victory mansions, though not quickly enough to prevent a swirl o f  
gritty dust from entering along with him.
(Orwell 1949: 7)
Text (1) specifies the existence of several non-actual entities in the fictional world, 
including the characters of the narrator, Owen Meany, and Hester, as well as the cinema 
The Idaho. The reader may still assume, however, that the rest of the fictional world
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remains identical to the actual world, as no other points of departure are mentioned. 
Indeed, such an intuition is reinforced by the mention of Audrey Hepburn and Fred 
Astaire, whose names may be assumed to refer to the same film stars with whom we are 
familiar in the actual world. The fictional world of text (2) also contains a non-actual 
entity, Winston Smith, but, in Ryan’s terms, is less accessible from the actual world 
than the fictional world of text (1) as it does not share the same time system; as is 
textually-specified in the line ‘and the clocks were striking thirteen’.
It is possible, however, to identify a number of flaws in Ryan’s typology of fictional 
worlds. From within the wider field of possible worlds semantics, Eco (1989) argues 
that the majority o f Ryan’s work is based on a naively unproblematic view of the 
ontological status of the actual world. For Eco, attributing ontological stability to the 
actual world is highly problematical and he points out that the identification of this 
conflict has resulted in a long-running pre-occupation for many philosophers with 
questions such as what determines the relation of one world being possible relative to 
another, and according to what criteria is this relative possibility settled? (See also 
Goodman 1978.) It is possible, then, to identify a significant split between those literary 
theorists whose interest in possible worlds centres mainly around the question of the 
ontological status of fictional entities and the worlds they inhabit (e.g. Dolezel 1988, 
1989 and 1995; Eco 1989; Hintikka 1989; Pavel 1986), and those whose more selective 
use of possible worlds forms part of a wider theory of narratology (e.g. Maitre 1983; 
Ryan 1980, 1991 and 1998; Semino 1997). Indeed, Ronen (1994: 69) observes that, 
despite their ardent criticisms of traditional logic and equally enthusiastic advocation of 
a multiple-world approach, the vast majority of literary theorists of fictionality who
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purport to employ the logic of possible worlds make use of the discipline’s terminology, 
while ignoring many of its more problematic philosophical concerns.
Even overlooking her lack of engagement with the deeper questions facing possible 
worlds philosophy, further problems can be identified within Ryan’s specifications for 
her ‘principle of minimal departure’. The assertion that all readers will construe the 
world of fiction as ‘being the closest possible to the world we know’ (Ryan 1980: 406) 
until any further departure is mentioned, disregards the possibility that readers may 
operate according to a modified set of world-rules when encountering fictional texts. Is 
it really the case that practised twenty-first century readers, accustomed to the quite 
frequently non-realist tradition of contemporary fiction in particular, will nevertheless 
approach each text expecting a high level of convergence with the real world? What 
about the readers of science-fiction and fantasy, for example? Surely it is conceivable 
that prior knowledge of the genre of the literary text at hand might alter one’s realist 
world-assumptions at least to some degree. Some of Werth’s own criticisms of possible 
worlds semantics in general would also seem to apply to Ryan’s typology of narrative 
fiction, with both the motivation for, and the end-products of, her analyses being 
particularly questionable. Discussing Lewis, Werth argues that the specification of the 
degree of accessibility between possible worlds ‘amounts to a justification for being 
able to designate a world as being closer or farther away from another world, without 
providing anything like an explanation of what this would imply psychologically or 
functionally’ (Werth 1999: 70). Ryan’s application of possible worlds semantics to 
narrative fiction appears to be similarly inconsequential, since she at no time elaborates 
on the wider implications of identifying one particular narrative world as being more or 
less accessible from the actual world than any other.
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In terms of possible worlds semantics as a whole, although Werth acknowledges the 
usefulness of the ‘worlds’ metaphor which lies at the heart of its philosophy, he takes 
issue with the general failure of the approach to extend its definition of a world beyond 
‘an arrangement of objects, individuals or things having various properties and standing 
in various relations to one another’ (Bradley and Swartz 1979: 7). Even Ryan develops 
her notion of what actually constitutes a world little beyond her list o f ‘characters, 
objects, facts and states of affairs’ (Ryan 1998: 139). Literary theorists’ adoption of the 
minimalistic definition of ‘worlds’ offered by possible worlds semantics can therefore 
be seen to result in what Werth argues is ‘a simplification of the notion of a situation’ 
(Werth 1999: 79-80). As Kripke points out, ‘possible worlds are stipulated’ (Kripke 
1972: 44), and for a specific reason, as Werth explains:
Possible worlds contain just those elements which will make the truth-conditions under 
scrutiny come out right. This means that they are both over-specific and under-specified.
They are over-specific because they are ‘tailormade’ to a single proposition; they are 
under-specified because as worlds go, they are minimalistic, containing none o f  the 
complexity o f  anything speakers would recognise as a world.
(Werth 1999: 70)
Werth (1981: 19) compares the structure of possible worlds to those of mathematical 
sets, pointing out that their contents are nominated for the purposes of analysis and that 
the conditions placed upon them are the ordinary conditions of logic (i.e. that possible 
worlds cannot be self-contradictory). Werth also claims that a fundamental difference 
exists between a logician’s motivation for invoking the concept o f ‘worlds’ and his 
own. He argues that possible worlds semantics
is claiming nothing more than to be able to study the logical relationships obtaining, given 
a tightly defined model. What it does not do is to look at the assessment o f  actual truth in 
that world... I think this is where people who are interested in language and people who are 
interested in logic part company. Non-logicians tend to be interested in actual truth, i.e. 
what is true in an actual situation, rather than what might in theory be true.
(Werth 1999: 72)
Since he claims that Text World Theory is intended to provide a model of real language, 
involving real people, in real situations, producing and processing real discourse, Werth
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necessarily finds himself at odds with the basic aims and interests of the majority of 
possible worlds philosophers. He adds:
The principal problem... is that... [possible worlds philosophers] simplify by reducing the 
content o f  their basic units in order to be able to formalise them rigorously. They are, thus, 
content-free by comparison with what people normally experience as situations and have 
no more contact with real situations than an algebraic formula.
(Werth 1999: 80)
He also argues that his own text world framework succeeds in producing a similarly 
rigorous formalisation, without restricting the world-content beyond what people do 
normally recognise and experience as a real situation.
Werth regards the strictly defined and rigorous nature of the possible worlds approach 
to both logic and narratology to be both its strength and its weakness. The minimalistic 
notion of worlds presented by modal and moderate realists, as well as by literary 
theorists who adopt their methods and terminology, may render the objects under 
scrutiny transparent and manageable, but the resulting model has nothing of the 
complexity of a real situation and, as such, is of limited use within a theory of discourse 
processing. Werth states:
... when non-logicians are faced with... [possible worlds semantics’] description o f  a 
‘world’ or a ‘m odel’, they find it trivial, because it is so minimal... what we actually need, 
rather than a minimal world, or model, like that, is what has been called a rich model. We 
need a way o f  talking about states o f  affairs in something like their normal richness and 
complexity.
(Werth 1999: 72)
The rest of this chapter turns to an investigation of cognitive science and linguistics in 
order to discern whether Werth was able to find the methodological tools necessary for 
the construction of this ‘rich model’ of real language situations within the conceptual 
models its proponents offer.
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2.2.0 Conceptual Worlds
The crucial point at which Text World Theory and possible worlds semantics diverge 
has been identified, in section 2.1.1 above, as the fundamental difference between what 
possible worlds and Werthian worlds contain. While the situations presented and 
analysed by possible worlds semanticists are strictly defined, and primarily non- 
epistemic in nature, Werth’s central concern is with the conceptual worlds that speakers 
and listeners, and writers and readers, are responsible for creating during the production 
and reception of discourse. As far as Werth is concerned, these worlds are mental 
representations which are as richly detailed as our direct experience of, and interaction 
with, the real world. As Werth explains:
... conceptual space is modelled upon physical space. Most directly, this concerns our 
mental representations o f  places and routes: finding our way through the physical world 
reported by our senses must depend on mental maps. Mental maps, in turn, are built up not 
only from what we can perceive on any single occasion, but also on our memory o f  
previous occasions, our knowledge o f  similar situations, and inferences we can draw 
between all o f  these sources.
(Werth 1999: 7)
The remainder of this chapter examines the cognitivist disciplines which inform the 
essentially conceptual nature of Werth’s worlds, and to which Werth explicitly attaches 
his own text world framework. O f particular interest are those notions of conceptual 
space, reasoning and understanding, and the storage and retrieval of knowledge, 
presented in both contemporary cognitive linguistics and its precursors and described by 
Werth above.
In order to begin the investigation into cognitive models of human understanding at 
their point of origin, the knowledge structures suggested within both Artificial 
Intelligence research and the related field of schema theory are examined in section 
2.2.1. The theories of mental representations emerging from within cognitive 
psychology are then explored in section 2.2.2. There, a particular focus is placed on the
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work of Philip Johnson-Laird (1983, 1988), whose ‘mental models’, Werth (1999: 74) 
claims, are most closely related to his own text worlds. The ideas presented in each of 
these fields are then traced through to their more recent development in cognitive 
linguistics, the central proponents and approaches o f which are discussed in sections 
2.2.3 and 2.2.4. The remainder of this chapter thus provides a detailed exposition of the 
conceptual models from which Werth draws the greatest influence for his text world 
framework.
2.2.1 Scripts and Schemata
Schema theory has its origins in the Gestalt psychology of the 1920s and ’30s. Its basic 
assertion is that new experiences, both sensory and linguistic, are understood by means 
of comparison to a stereotypical model, based on similar experiences and held in 
memory. New experience is evaluated in terms of its conformity to, or deviation from, 
that model or schema. A concise definition of schemata is provided by Rumelhart and 
Ortony:
Schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. They 
exist for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences o f  events, 
and sequences o f  actions.
(Rumelhart and Ortony 1977: 101) 
Schema theory, in its contemporary form, is most frequently cited as deriving from the
work of British psychologist Frederick Bartlett and his seminal text Remembering
(1932) in particular.
In a series of experiments, Bartlett asked a number of subjects to recall visual and 
textual material after longer and longer periods of time. Observing the changes made to 
a North American folk tale during this process, Bartlett noted that the majority of his 
subjects tended to omit or rationalise events and details which did not fit their personal
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expectations o f the story. Many only remembered those parts of the story most relevant 
to their own life experiences and connections not stated in the text were explicitly made 
in his subjects’ reproductions, along with added details often showing similarities with 
other stories more familiar to the reader. The results of Bartlett’s tests supported the 
Gestalt hypothesis that human text processing is based on discourse schemata, which 
allow only important details to be selected while default elements are filled in 
automatically. However, Bartlett’s approach to the study of mental processing relied 
heavily on introspection and his discoveries were soon to be eclipsed in the late 1930s 
by behaviourism, the central doctrine of which is described by J.B. Watson (1913):
Psychology as the behaviourist views it is a purely objective natural science. Its theoretical 
goal is the prediction and control o f  behaviour. Introspection forms no essential part o f  its 
method nor is the scientific value o f  its data dependent upon the readiness with which they 
lend themselves to interpretation in terms o f  consciousness.
(Watson 1913: 158)
The development of research into Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the 1970s, however, 
instigated a massive revival of interest in schema theory. The origins of AI are usually 
traced back to Alan Turing, who first proposed a test for determining the ‘intelligence’ 
of a machine based on its responses to random questions from a human being. In the AI 
boom which followed, it quickly became evident that a computer would need a vast 
store of knowledge in order to be able to replicate human cognition. Just how this 
knowledge store would be organised and deployed presented AI scientists with a 
considerable problem. The most promising solution to this, the knowledge ‘frame’, was 
suggested first by Marvin Minsky (1963, 1975) and later developed by Roger Schank 
and Robert Abelson (1977) in their work on ‘scripts’, ‘plans’ and ‘goals’. Numerous 
other explorations into schema-based cognition were carried out throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, most notably by David Rumelhart (Rumelhart 1975, Rumelhart and Ortony 
1977, Rumelhart 1980), Robert de Beaugrande (1980) and Teun van Dijk (1980).
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However, Schank and Abelson’s framework remains the most influential investigation 
of its era and, as such, will be the main focus of this section.
According to Schank and Abelson, human cognition is structured around ‘scripts’: 
knowledge stores corresponding with Minsky’s notion of frames, containing 
information about familiar types of events and situations. They further define a script as
a structure that describes appropriate sequences o f  events in a particular context. A script is 
made up o f  slots and requirements about what can fill those slots... Scripts handle stylized 
everyday situations... a script is a predetermined, stereotyped sequence o f  actions that 
defines a well-known situation.
(Schank and Abelson 1977: 41)
These stereotyped sequences, Schank and Abelson argue, are what allow us to
understand texts such as:
John went into the restaurant. He asked the waitress for a coq au vin. He paid the check and 
left.
(Schank and Abelson 1977: 38)
The narrator of the above story need not describe every minute detail of the situation, 
but assumes instead that his or her listener or reader is familiar with the script to which 
the story makes reference and will understand the narrative as long as crucial details are 
mentioned. The referenced script in this case is that which has become famously known 
as the r e s t a u r a n t  script, which contains our expectations of service, ordering, paying, 
and so on. The frequent use of the definite article in the example above {the waitress, 
the check) shows that these elements are implicitly introduced as soon as the script is 
initiated.
Schank and Abelson (1977: 61-66) detail three different types o f script: ‘situational’, 
‘personal’, and ‘instrumental’. The r e s t a u r a n t  script falls under the situational 
heading, as would going to the pub, taking the bus or going to a football match. 
Personal scripts tend to have character roles which people adopt as the occasion arises,
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and include such examples as j e a l o u s  s p o u s e , f l ir t , g o o d  Sa m a r i t a n , and so on. 
Some examples o f instrumental scripts are l ig h t in g  a  c ig a r e t t e , s t a r t in g  a  c a r , 
b u t t e r in g  b r e a d , and any other action which requires knowledge of how to achieve a 
particular physical objective. Each of these three types of script is activated by a 
‘header’, or direct reference to an entity or action associated with the script. Schank and 
Abelson (1977: 48-50) specify four types of header as follows:
• Precondition headers -  references to a precondition necessary for the application of a 
script, e.g. John was hungry.
• Instrumental headers -  references to actions that are a means towards the realisation 
of a script, e.g. John took the bus to the restaurant.
• Locale headers -  references to a location normally associated with a script, e.g. John 
went to the football ground.
• Internal Conceptualisation headers -  references to an action or role from a script, e.g. 
The waitress came over to the table.
In order for a script to be fully instantiated, Schank and Abelson (1977: 47) argue that at 
least two elements associated with it must occur, specifically a header and one other 
element. For example, in the story quoted above, the need for the r e s t a u r a n t  script is 
initially indicated with the Locale header ‘restaurant’. The script is then fully 
instantiated with the Internal Conceptualisation header ‘waitress’, from which point the 
reader can proceed in making sense of the story by relating it to his or her knowledge of 
typical restaurant scenarios. However, had the story read, ‘John went into the restaurant 
and later to the park’, the r e s t a u r a n t  script would not have been fully instantiated as 
the lack of a second header indicates that background knowledge of restaurants is not of
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central importance in understanding this particular text. Schank and Abelson refer to 
such instances as ‘fleeting scripts’(Schank and Abelson 1977: 46).
The theoretical notion of a ‘plan’ is introduced in Schank and Abelson’s model to
account for how people make sense of seemingly unconnected sentences when
processing discourse. They explain:
By finding a plan, an understander can make guesses about the intentions o f  an action in an 
unfolding story and use these guesses to make sense o f  the story.
(Schank and Abelson 1977: 70)
Plans, then, are more generalised than scripts and enable us to connect a particular goal 
state with the possible actions necessary to achieve it. Furthermore,
plans are where scripts come from. They compete for the same role in the understanding 
process, namely as explanations o f  sequences o f  actions that are intended to achieve a goal.
The difference is that scripts are specific and plans are general. Both are necessary in any 
functioning system.
(Schank and Abelson 1977: 72) 
‘Goals’, on the other hand, provide an explanation for aims and objectives themselves.
They are schemata containing knowledge of people’s possible motivations for the
behaviour enacted through scripts and plans. In our initial story, for example, John
follows his r e s t a u r a n t  script with the aim of satisfying his hunger. Further possible
goals are identified by Schank and Abelson (1977: 112-117), including enjoyment,
achievement and preservation.
Schank and Abelson’s framework was originally formulated solely for the purpose of 
providing AI research with a working model of human knowledge structures on which 
to base their experiments. More recently, however, schema theory has been adopted as a 
means of analysing literary texts, most notably by Guy Cook (1994) (see also Cockcroft 
2002, Culpeper 2001, and Semino 1997). Cook proposes a shift in focus in literary 
theory, from analysis restricted to textual structure to a consideration of the interaction
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between the text and the reader’s knowledge of the world. He attempts to define 
literariness as the process by which a text presents such a challenge to the reader’s 
expectations that he or she is forced to abandon established schemata in favour o f new, 
‘refreshed’ ones. Cook further argues that the schema ‘disruption’ and ‘refreshment’ 
caused by literary texts differs from the effects o f other often textually deviant 
discourse, such as advertising. He claims that advertising relies on the shared world­
view of its audience which it actively seeks to reinforce rather than disrupt.
There are numerous striking flaws in Cook’s argument. As has been pointed out by
Semino (1997), his approach tends towards the assumption that all literary texts are
innovative and challenging:
A high degree o f  discourse deviation... may well be the distinguishing feature o f  works that 
are considered prototypically literary (although this is probably more true o f  poems than o f 
novels or plays). On the other hand, it is also true that discourse deviation is not limited to 
literature, and that not all texts that are considered to be literary display discourse 
deviation.
(Semino 1997: 154)
For Cook, the boundaries between the literary and non-literary seem all too clear and 
appear to be drawn along medium-specific lines. He takes no account o f the conceptual 
blur between the discourse o f advertising, literature, music, and the internet, pervasive 
in consumer-driven Western society. Semino proposes an alternative view, in which 
texts regarded as literary range on a continuum, from schema reinforcement at one end 
to schema refreshment at the other. This adaptation, however, does not address some o f 
the more fundamental problems involved in a schema theory approach to literary 
analysis.
Many o f the flaws in both Cook’s work and in Semino’s own application o f schema 
theory to poetry stem from the understated difference between the agenda o f AI
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researchers on the one hand and that o f literary theorists on the other. As I have already 
pointed out above, Schank and Abelson’s model o f human cognition was not intended 
as a psychological account o f neurological activity, but rather as a working model on 
which to base a particular computer program. This fact alone renders any wholesale, 
unquestioned adoption o f the theory as a means o f explaining real-life human discourse 
processing theoretically unstable to say the least. Some attempt has been made to prove 
the existence o f schematic processing patterns in discourse, most notably by Derek 
Edwards (1997), in his assessment of extracts o f real talk. However, empirical studies o f 
schema-based language processing remain somewhat rare.
Even if  one accepts the hypothesis that human cognition is schema-driven, the model 
proposed by Schank and Abelson is not sufficiently detailed to explain why, for 
example, when following a RESTAURANT script, an actor may use any number of 
different ways of, say, greeting a waitress, or ordering roast chicken. Choice o f 
utterance is not accounted for in any AI framework or in subsequent applications o f the 
theory to discourse. Furthermore, in a dyadic exchange (diner-waitress, for example) 
schema theory can only account for the process experienced by either one or the other 
participant. It does not explain their interaction, let alone why and how they might share 
the same schemata. Finally, both in AI and in literary theory, the labelling o f schemata 
appropriate to individual situations is apparently carried out on an entirely ad hoc basis. 
In a manner similar to that employed by possible worlds theorists, schemata are 
plucked, seemingly from thin air, to suit the discourse under scrutiny. This practice is 
apparent in its most exaggerated form in Jonathan Culpeper’s (2001: 265-285) analysis 
o f schema refreshment in Shakespeare’s The Taming o f  the Shrew. Culpeper argues that 
the reader has a SHREW schema, which is challenged by the development o f Katherina’s
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character, forcing an eventual re-evaluation not only o f Katherina’s perceived 
personality but o f the reader’s own stereotyped mental image o f shrews. The idea that 
every reader has had enough encounters with shrews in order to form such a knowledge 
structure is questionable in itself, not to mention the consequent differences that are 
inferred to exist between one’s s h r e w  schema and one’s r a t , m o l e , or MOUSE 
schemata (see also Fodor 1975 and 1981 for a related discussion). Culpeper’s analysis 
can be seen to typify a wider tendency in literary theory to use schemata to add apparent 
scientific weight to what are actually little more than highly subjective readings o f texts. 
Schema labels are attached after the fact, and, indeed, schema theorists themselves seem 
unable to formalise the model beyond this point. This raises a fundamental question: if 
schema theory is not predictive, what exactly is it a theory of?
Despite schema theory’s numerous psychological and methodological flaws, however, 
its equivalent notions o f frames, scripts and schemata have been enormously influential 
in the fields o f cognitive science and linguistics. They continue to provide a common- 
sense framework for the discussion of the structures and processes o f human knowledge 
storage and retrieval, for which, as Edwards (1997) has shown, there appears to be 
significant evidence in natural language. The influence o f AI and schema theory’s 
concepts o f scripts and schemata on W erth’s work is particularly evident in his attempts 
to systematise speakers’ and hearers’ (as well as w riters’ and readers’) deployment of 
previously stored, wider knowledge during the discourse process. This area o f Text 
World Theory is discussed in detail in section 3.1.2 o f this thesis. The next section of 
this chapter, however, moves on to examine the related field o f cognitive psychology 
and the importance o f the conceptual models it proposes for W erth’s own formulation 
of his text world approach.
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2.2.2 M ental Representations
Cognitive psychology can be seen to have developed almost in parallel to AI research 
and schema theory, emerging from the shadows o f behaviourism at around the same 
time. There are many crossovers between the disciplines, yet I have chosen to examine 
them separately because of their fundamentally differing aims and emphases. While 
schema theorists have concentrated on the study o f knowledge systems with the explicit 
aim o f replicating human behaviour, cognitive psychologists, while employing many of 
the same metaphors and methodologies as their AI counterparts, have something o f a 
reverse objective. This is most easily explained through an examination o f some o f the 
main tenets o f cognitive psychology.
Cognitive psychology, according to Glass et al (1979: 2), ‘is the study o f knowledge 
and how people use it’. However, rather than attempting to understand cognition solely 
in order to create a computer program with processes and reactions identical to those of 
a human being, cognitive psychologists have also used knowledge o f computer systems 
in order to try and understand human cognition. Werth explains the fruitfulness o f the 
computer as a metaphor for the human mind:
... minds are not computers, but both minds and com puters are examples o f  something
more general: inform ation-processing systems.
(W erth 1999: 28)
The relationship between cognitive psychology and computer science is reciprocally 
productive. In particular, comparisons have been made between human cognition and 
the computer processing system known as ‘parallel distributed processing’ (see 
Johnson-Laird 1988, Lindsay and Norman 1972, Martindale 1991), which is also 
sometimes referred to as ‘connectionism’.
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As Werth himself notes (Werth 1999: 28), in recent years computer technology has 
developed at a startling rate, with central processing capacity doubling approximately 
every twelve months. As a result, a number of problems with serial processing have 
become increasingly evident. In a serial processing system, all information has to pass 
through a central processing unit, which can result in a bottleneck effect, slowing the 
computer down. A number of methods have been tried to counteract the problem, for 
the most part concentrating on the production of faster central processors to cope with 
demand. An alternative structure has been suggested, however, in which the processing 
load is spread across a great number of smaller chips, each performing a simple task. As 
Johnson-Laird (1988: 174) points out, ‘The power o f the system comes from how the 
units are connected’. The parallel distributed structure, it is argued, is similar to that of 
the neural networks of the brain, with the separate simple processors being ‘a little like 
idealized brain cells’ (Johnson-Laird 1988: 174), and the connections between them 
bearing resemblance to human synapses (see Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988 for an opposing 
view).
The connectionist model has proven particularly useful to psychologists attempting to 
explain the process of knowledge retrieval (e.g. Lindsay and Norman 1972, Johnson- 
Laird 1988, Rumelhart 1998). Lindsay and Norman (1972: 142) use, as an example, the 
word ‘red’, partly obscured by ink blots. The human brain, they argue, is still able to 
recognise the word, even though it is not receiving complete information from external 
senses. According to the connectionist model, then,
cues can be matched simultaneously to all the contents o f  memory, like sticking knitting 
needles through a pack o f  punched cards... each possible word is represented by a separate 
processing unit. Likewise, each letter at each position in a word is represented by a separate 
unit. The units are small-scale processors that are connected to each other and that compute 
in parallel.
(Johnson-Laird 1988: 176)
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The unit representing the word ‘red’ will be excited by those units representing ‘r ’ in 
the first position, ‘e ’ in the second, and ‘d ’ in the third. Although other units will 
respond to those letters in similar positions (e.g. rag, rod, bed, and so on) no word will 
be as active as the appropriate unit ‘red’.
Cognitive psychology is by no means limited to the comparison o f computer processing 
and human thought, however. Throughout the discipline, emphasis is placed firmly on 
human, rather than artificial, perception and experience. O f central interest to cognitive 
psychologists is how the human mind stores the knowledge it receives as a result o f 
everyday interactions in the real world. More importantly, unlike schema theory, 
cognitive psychology is concerned with exactly how that knowledge is represented. A 
differentiation is made between two modes o f representation: analog and analytic. The 
first o f these, ‘analog representation’, is explained by Glass et al by comparison to a 
common example, a map. They explain:
A map is an essentially analog representation o f  the territory it represents because in some 
important ways the map actually resembles the territory. Consider a map o f  North America.
For every point in North America there is a corresponding point on the map. And for 
certain important relations between points in North America -  direction and distance -  
there are corresponding relations between points on the map.
(Glass et al 1979: 7)
Glass et al also make the point that not all o f the available information will be present in 
an analog representation, but that the representation can be as abstract or as detailed as 
its purpose requires it to be. Analog mental representations are holistic, however. Our 
memories o f faces, locations, sensations, and complex actions are stored as perceptual 
wholes. The best example o f the second type o f mental representation proposed by 
cognitive psychology, ‘analytic code’, is language, and our use o f words as names for 
objects and concepts in particular. Indeed, the majority o f codes are represented in our 
minds analytically. Unlike analog representations, analytic code does not usually bear a
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resemblance to the item it represents. The relationship between the code and the objects 
and concepts to which it relates is arbitrary.
Johnson-Laird (1983) explores the nature of mental representations further in his 
attempt to provide a psychological explanation of syllogistic reasoning. He argues 
against the idea that humans have an internal logic to which they refer in order to 
perform everyday deductive reasoning, as exemplified below:
Any point on which a player serves out o f  turn is a ‘let’.
A player served out o f  turn on this point.
Hence, this point is a ‘let’.
(Johnson-Laird 1983: 72)
According to Johnson-Laird (1983: 10), ‘human beings understand the world by 
constructing working models o f it in their heads’. The implications of this premise are 
best explained through example. Consider the following propositions:
All o f  the artists are beekeepers.
All o f  the beekeepers are chemists.
(Johnson-Laird 1983: 94)
Are all the artists chemists? Johnson-Laird argues that, in order to answer this question, 
human beings construct a mental representation containing elements that stand for the 
members of the sets described above. He explains this construction in terms of actors 
playing particular roles:
... every person acting as an artist is also instructed to play the part o f  a beekeeper, and, 
since the first premise is consistent with there being beekeepers who are not artists, that 
role is assigned to other actors, who are told that it is uncertain whether or not they exist.
(Johnson-Laird 1983: 94-95)
The structure of the resulting mental model can been displayed in tableau form:
artist = beekeeper
artist = beekeeper
artist = beekeeper
(beekeeper)
(beekeeper)
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There are three actors playing joint roles, plus two actors playing beekeepers who are
not artists. The tableau can then be extended to include the second premise, ‘all the
beekeepers are chemists’:
artist = beekeeper = chemist
artist = beekeeper = chemist
artist = beekeeper = chemist
(beekeeper) = (chemist)
(beekeeper) = (chemist)
(chemist)
The actors playing beekeepers are instructed to take on the additional role of chemists 
and an arbitrary number of new actors, just playing chemists, are also introduced. 
Again, this final type may or may not exist. With the mental model complete, it is easy 
to see that all the artists are indeed chemists.
Johnson-Laird claims that all human cognition is based on the same process of mental 
model construction, and he goes on to specify their analog form:
. .. a natural mental model o f  discourse has a structure that corresponds directly to the state 
o f affairs that the discourse describes.
(Johnson-Laird 1983: 125)
He further argues that the psychological processes involved in the comprehension of
both factual and fictional assertions are the same (Johnson-Laird 1983: 430), and he
details the wider significance of the mental models employed throughout natural
discourse:
... mental models play a central and unifying role in representing objects, states o f  affairs, 
sequences o f  events, the way the world is, and the social and psychological actions o f  
everyday life. They enable individuals to make inferences and predictions, to understand 
phenomena, to decide what action to take and to control its execution, and above all to 
experience events by proxy; they allow language to be used to create representations 
comparable to those deriving from direct acquaintance with the world.
(Johnson-Laird 1983: 397)
It is useful, at this point, to compare the final description of mental models given above 
to the minimalistic definition of worlds presented in possible worlds semantics. If 
mental models are ‘comparable to... direct acquaintance with the world’, presumably
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this must mean that they include not only ‘an arrangement of objects, individuals or 
things having various properties and standing in various relations to one another’ 
(Bradley and Swartz 1979: 7), but also the more abstract details associated with our real 
world experiences, including smell, taste, touch, memory, emotion, and so on. It would 
seem that Johnson-Laird’s conceptual models contain exactly the sort of ‘richness’ that 
Werth found so lacking in possible worlds theories. Indeed, Werth makes explicit the 
usefulness of Johnson-Laird’s framework in terms of his own project:
I will assume... that text worlds are in fact mental models constructed in the process o f  a 
given discourse.
(Werth 1999: 74)
While Werth undoubtedly finds the detailed nature of mental models attractive, to the 
extent that he establishes this direct connection between mental models and his own text 
worlds, Werth remains unsatisfied with Johnson-Laird’s failure to apply his framework 
to real texts. Indeed, this is a criticism that has been echoed in relation to cognitive 
psychology in general.
Edwards (1997), for example, identifies a trend within the discipline to restrict analysis 
to, and thus to draw unstable conclusions from, artificial examples of thought and 
language. He explains:
The justifications that psychology has offered for dealing with idealizations o f  thought and 
language include an extension o f  Chomsky’s worries about performance; the world o f  
everyday, ordinary activities is considered much too m essy and inconsistent to model or 
predict.
(Edwards 1997: 4)
Edwards goes on to argue that the idealised language favoured by Chomsky was 
attractive to psychologists mainly because of Chomsky’s own triumph over 
behaviourism, with which the psychologists could greatly identify. He claims that 
cognitive psychology has simplified human language and behaviour in the mistaken 
belief that that is the only way to see how it works. Edwards argues that, although
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dealing with simplifications, its practitioners have not felt the need to worry about the 
gap between their studies and the real world, so long as the real world works on the 
same principles:
It has generally been assumed, outside o f  conversation analysis, that we know what talk is 
like -  and that we know it well enough to invent our own examples o f  it, or simulations o f  
it, and treat those synthetic objects as worthy o f  analysis, or as illustrations o f  theoretical 
models.
(Edwards 1997: 87)
Furthermore, Edwards suggests that the resulting approach, and specifically its 
simplistic notion of ‘human beings and animals as a kind of box with input and output’ 
(Hamlyn 1990: 8), actually bears a striking resemblance to the behaviourism it was 
designed to replace, precisely because it was designed to replace it:
The adoption o f  the input-process-output model o f  cognition was driven not only by the 
available computer metaphor (with its various input and output devices mediated by a 
central information processor running rules and representations software), but by the 
rhetorical requirement that it could handle the kinds o f  perception-and-action problems that 
behaviourism had (according to various arguments) tried and failed to explain.
(Edwards 1997: 28)
For whatever reasons, the majority of cognitive psychology (with Edwards’ own work 
constituting a notable exception) can be seen to continue to make wide-ranging claims 
based on synthetic data and to pursue an oversimplified notion of human cognition and 
behaviour. For these reasons, Werth does not limit his own model of discourse 
processing to the parameters established by Johnson-Laird and his colleagues. Rather, 
he chooses to locate Text World Theory within the discipline of cognitive linguistics, 
the central tenets of which are explored in section 2.2.3 below.
2.2.3 Cognitive Models
The emergence and development of AI research and cognitive psychology in the latter 
half of the last century has been of enormous influence on modem linguistics. The shift 
of focus from behaviourism to the human mind has been mirrored in the rejection of 
generative grammar by the proponents of cognitive linguistics since the late 1970s.
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Generative grammar had, until that time, remained the dominant approach in linguistic 
theory for some twenty-five years or more. Indeed, Werth acknowledges the massively 
revitalising effect Chomsky’s (1955, 1957) endeavour to make linguistics as much like 
the ‘hard sciences’ as possible had on the status of the discipline. He points out that new 
university departments were opened, journals set up, and funding for courses, 
conferences, and doctorates increased tenfold as a direct consequence of Chomsky’s 
influence (Werth 1999: 18-19). However, Werth also comments that
in other terms, Linguistics, led by its flagship the Generative Enterprise, is heading for the 
asteroid belt. It is travelling in ever decreasing circles, using more and more complex 
devices to talk about smaller and smaller fragments o f  language.
(Werth 1999: 19)
While the historical importance of generative grammar should not be underestimated, 
Werth argues, its restriction of focus to syntax alone has meant that substantial areas of 
language study have been neglected for more than a quarter o f a century. Furthermore, 
with mathematical rigour as their new ideal, Werth claims that generativists have 
actively distorted their observations, simplifying or normalising data in order to confirm 
pre-formed hypotheses. Those aspects of language not susceptible to formalist treatment 
have been simply shelved or ignored.
Generative grammar’s treatment of language as ‘an objective system of rules and 
conditions on rules’ (Werth 1999: 20) has resulted in what Werth terms ‘tunnel-vision’ 
(Werth 1999: 19). As an antidote to this, he proposes ‘a more human linguistics’ (Werth 
1999: 18), sharing the same anti-objectivist research commitments as those set out by 
George Lakoff in 1990:
For me, cognitive linguistics is defined by two primary commitments... The generalisation 
commitment is a commitment to characterizing the general principles governing all aspects 
o f  human language... The cognitive commitment is a commitment to make one’s account 
o f human language accord with what is generally known about the mind and brain, from 
other disciplines as well as our own.
(Lakoff 1990: 40)
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These commitments, Werth argues, require that cognitive linguistics ‘attributes primacy 
to human experience, both physical and conceptual’ (Werth 1999: 37). Other advocates 
of this experiential approach to language study include Charles Fillmore and Gilles 
Fauconnier, whose work will be examined in the final section of this chapter.
Arguably the most influential cognitive linguist o f recent years, however, has been 
George Lakoff himself. In Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, Lakoff (1987) cites the 
cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch, and her studies of human categorisation 
processes in particular (e.g. Rosch 1973, 1975, 1978), as his own major influence. 
Rosch developed what has since become known as prototype theory. Her basic 
hypothesis challenges the classical view that all members of a category have equal 
status, each sharing those properties that define the category. On the contrary, Rosch 
argues that there are varying degrees of membership, and that within certain boundaries 
there exist good and bad examples of both semantic and conceptual categories. These 
‘best examples’ of categories, Rosch calls ‘prototypes’. In a series of empirical studies, 
Rosch found, for example, that her subjects considered ‘robin’ and ‘sparrow’ to be more 
representative of the category b ir d  than ‘chicken’ or ‘ostrich’. Similarly, desk chairs 
were judged to be more prototypically ‘chairlike’ than rocking chairs or beanbags.
In her investigations into human categorisation of colours, Rosch (1973) set out to 
disprove the Whorfian (1941) hypothesis that language determines one’s conceptual 
system. She examined the New Guinean language Dani, which has only two basic 
colour categories: mili (dark-cool, including black, green, and blue) and mola (light- 
warm, including red, yellow, and white). She aimed to prove that primary colour 
categories were psychologically real for the Dani, even though they did not have the 
words to express them. One group of native Dani speakers was taught arbitrary names
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tor eight focal, or prototypical, colours, and another group was taught names for eight
nonfocal colours. Rosch found that the names for focal colours were learned more
easily, a common pattern in English, where speakers are better able to remember the
names for such colours as red, blue, and yellow, than nonfocal colours such as purple,
brown, and cyan. The significance of Rosch’s results, Lakoff argues, is that they show
that categories are not objectively external to human beings:
At least some categories are embodied. Color categories, for example, are determined 
jo in tly  by the external physical world, human biology, the human mind, plus cultural 
considerations.
(Lakoff 1987: 56)
It is this notion o f ‘embodied experience’ which is central to L ako ff s approach to 
language study, and which forms the theoretical basis o f his work on conceptual 
metaphor (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff and Johnson 
1999).
Lakoff (1987) argues that human knowledge is organised around structures known as 
‘idealised cognitive m odels’, or ICMs. The structure o f ICMs in essence corresponds to 
that o f the frames and scripts found in AI and schema theory, in the work o f Minsky 
(1963, 1975) and Schank and Abelson (1977) detailed in section 2.2.1 above. ICMs are 
image-schematic, which is to say that they are simplified mental representations o f 
complex physical phenomena (such as pulling, pushing, containers, surfaces, and so on) 
which are essentially visualisable. Like Rosch’s prototypes, ICMs have a radial 
structure, with central and peripheral members. Following Schank and Abelson (1977), 
Lakoff argues that ICMs are the knowledge structures by which we negotiate our way 
through life, evaluating new experiences by means o f comparison to these idealised 
models o f reality. He proposes that new understanding is achieved through a process of
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metaphorical mapping and that, far from being confined to literary discourse, metaphors 
form the very foundations of all human reasoning. As Lakoff and Johnson explain:
... metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action.
Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms o f  which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3) 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim to have discovered the existence of ‘conceptual
metaphors’, which underlie our basic conceptual processes. It is argued that unfamiliar
experiences and abstract concepts are understood in terms of concrete, familiar ones.
New knowledge thus gains its structure from our existing ICMs.
This notion is most easily explained through example, for which I will take the 
conceptual metaphor l if e  IS A CONTAINER from Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 51). In this 
case, our understanding of the abstract concept, or ‘target domain’, l if e  is furthered by 
its comparison to our more concrete ICM, or ‘source domain’, CONTAINER. Relevant 
features from the source are mapped onto the target, creating a new knowledge domain 
with its own image-schematic structure. Evidence for the existence of the conceptual 
metaphor l if e  is  a  c o n t a in e r  in our everyday lives is found in such surface 
expressions as ‘my life is empty', ‘he leads a very fu ll  life’, ‘getting the most out o f  life’, 
and so on. Lakoff and his colleagues (see also Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Turner 1989; 
and Turner 1987, 1991, and 1997) argue that all human reasoning is essentially 
embodied, citing countless examples of conceptual metaphors in which abstract target 
domains are understood through the metaphorical mapping of our physical experience 
(e.g. GOOD is UP, BAD is d o w n , and so on).
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Confidence in the significance and originality of these discoveries is no more assured 
than within the Lakoff camp itself, as is perhaps most evident in the opening paragraph 
to Lakoff and Johnson’s most recent publication:
The mind is inherently embodied.
Thought is mostly unconscious.
Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.
These are the three major findings o f  cognitive science. More than two millennia o f  a 
priori philosophical speculation about these aspects o f  reason are over. Because o f  these 
discoveries, philosophy can never be the same again.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 3) 
However, as far back as 1981, in an article published shortly after Lakoff and Johnson’s
first exploration into conceptual metaphor, Ronald Butters (1981: 116) questioned the
authors’ failure to acknowledge the influence of previous linguistic studies on their own
work. Butters lists Korzbyski (1941), Hayakawa (1943), and Johnson (1946) as similar
investigations into semantic phenomena and thought, as well as Whorf (1941), Kuhn
(1962), Black (1962) and Turbayne (1962) as other possibly unacknowledged sources.
Indeed, the concept of embodied thought and experience has already received
considerable attention in the field of feminist studies (see Grosz 1994 for a concise
overview). Butters examines the conceptual metaphor a r g u m e n t  is  w a r , in particular,
taking issue with Lakoff and Johnson’s assertion:
Even if  you have never fought a fistfight in your life, much less a war... you still conceive 
o f arguments, and execute them , according to the ARGUMENT IS W AR metaphor.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 63-64)
Butters argues that it is impossible that human beings can have learned to conceive of 
an everyday occurrence like ARGUMENT in terms of something as remote from everyday 
experience as WAR. A similar criticism of conceptual metaphor is made by Edwards 
(1997). In this case, Edwards chooses an example offered by Gibbs (1994): LOVE is A 
NUTRIENT. Again, Edwards questions whether the source domain, n u t r i e n t , can really 
be considered to be a more familiar concept than target domain, l o v e :
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‘N utrition’ is arguably a technical abstraction, a generalization about the biology o f 
organism s and diets, no more familiar an idea for most people, I imagine, than ‘love’ itself.
It seems more sensible to talk o f experiencing love than nutrition.
(Edwards 1997: 240)
Furthermore, Edwards argues that the physical, bodily experiences upon which Lakoff 
and colleagues insist metaphorical understanding is based are ‘subjectively different 
experiences’ (1997: 240). He suggests that the assumption that every human being 
experiences life, and thus processes discourse, in the same way is actually a thinly 
veiled form o f objectivism in itself.
W erth’s own criticisms o f recent work on conceptual metaphor are twofold. Firstly, as 
far as Werth (1994, 1995a, 1999) is concerned, there are fundamental differences 
between the metaphorical practices o f everyday language and those o f poetic language. 
He argues that what impels the producer o f a metaphor in ordinary language is not the 
same as that which impels the producer o f a literary text. Werth insists that Lakoff and 
Johnson’s view o f metaphor, as a tool which enables us to express abstract experience 
for which no sui generis language exists, fails to explain a great deal o f poetic 
metaphor. Rejecting the suggestion that a poet’s thoughts are always so ineffable that 
they have to use the language of physical phenomena to express otherwise inexpressible 
concepts, Werth stresses that
there are many cases where the metaphor is used simply to make the expression more 
striking, and still others where using a metaphor allows the topic to be viewed from more 
than a single perspective... M etaphor in such cases is more a question o f poetic  choice , 
then, rather than being forced on the producer because o f  the poverty o f  the language.
(W erth 1999: 318)
Secondly, Werth is dissatisfied with the failure o f Lakoff and colleagues to extend their
investigations beyond sentence-level phenomena. Even in those applications o f the
theory o f conceptual metaphor to entire texts (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989, Turner
1997), the texts chosen are always relatively short poems. Werth (1994), on the other
hand, proposes a model o f the phenomenon o f extended metaphor, whereby a text
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displays a sustained metaphorical undercurrent which, Werth argues, is usually the 
source of a reader’s sense of the ‘gist’ of a literary work (see also Nair, Carter and 
Toolan 1988). He terms these undercurrents ‘megametaphors’, and argues that they can 
only be perceived when a text is examined in its entirety. A detailed exposition of this 
concept is provided in section 3.4.2 below.
2.2.4 Frames and Spaces
Both Lakoff (1987) and Werth (1999) cite the work of Charles Fillmore, and his notion 
of ‘frames’ in particular (see Fillmore 1982, 1985), as a major influence on their own 
theories of human knowledge structures. Fillmore (1985: 223), in turn, acknowledges 
the origins of his terminology in AI research, and in the work of Minsky (1963, 1975) 
and Schank and Abelson (1977) in particular. Like Werth, Fillmore draws a firm 
distinction between those semantic theories based on judgements of relative truth, 
which he terms ‘T-semantics’, and those based on language understanding, termed ‘U- 
semantics’. He sets out the theoretical principles of the latter along similar lines to 
Lakoff s (1990) cognitive commitments:
A U-semantic theory takes as its assignment that o f  providing a general account o f  the 
relation between linguistic texts, the contexts in which they are produced and the process 
and products o f their interpretation. Importantly, such a theory does not begin  with a body 
o f  assumptions about the difference between (1) aspects o f  the interpretation process which 
belong to linguistics proper and (2) whatever might belong to co-operating theories o f  
speaking and reasoning and speaker’s belief systems.
(Fillmore 1985:222)
In his attempt to provide a fully defined semantics of understanding, he introduces the 
notion of frames as those knowledge structures which enable us, for example, to 
identify a link between such words as buy, sell, cost, pay and so on. Fillmore explains:
What holds such word groups together is the fact o f  their being motivated by, founded on, 
and co-structured with, specific unified frameworks o f  knowledge, or coherent 
schematizations o f  experience, for which the general word frame can be used.
(Fillmore 1985: 223)
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Fillmore argues that a frame can be evoked either by the interpreter of a text, in 
situating its content in a pattern independent o f the current discourse, or by the text 
itself, in the occurrence of linguistic forms conventionally associated with a particular 
frame. He also makes a distinction between frames which are innate, i.e. frames which 
are an unavoidable part o f the cognitive development o f every human being (such as 
knowledge o f the features o f the human face), and those which are learned through 
experience, such as knowledge o f social institutions, units o f measurement, calendric 
units, and so on.
The central role o f knowledge in Fillmore’s explanation o f understanding means that he 
views the lexical, grammatical, and semantic material o f a sentence as serving as a kind 
o f ‘blueprint’ from which the interpreter constructs a richer whole. As Fillmore 
explains:
The interpreter accom plishes this by bringing to the ‘blueprint’ a great deal o f  knowledge, 
in particular knowledge o f  the interpretative frames which are evoked by or capable o f 
being invoked for the sentence in question, but also including knowledge o f  the larger 
structure (the ‘tex t’) within which the sentence occurs.
(Fillmore 1985: 233)
Werth (1999: 104) points out, however, that the question as to what exactly constitutes a 
frame is never addressed in Fillmore’s work. He relies, instead, on lexical examples, 
such as the following, to serve as definitions:
The word bachelor has to be understood in the frame o f  the ‘normal marital situation’, 
which contains the following properties: (in Western culture) adults normally get married; 
this happens in their 20 ’s; they normally stay married for life; marriage is exclusively 
heterosexual. Like all frames, this is a ‘folk m odel’, which encapsulates a traditional, 
stereotypical set o f cultural expectations. Within this frame, a bachelor is o f an age from his 
2 0 ’s up to the upper age-limit o f sexual activity; he is unmarried, and has never married; he 
is male and heterosexual; he lives in normal society.
(Fillmore 1982:48)
Werth argues that Fillm ore’s frames remain fuzzy-edged and that, as a result, one can 
only arrive at an intuitive understanding o f what a frame is, based on Fillm ore’s many 
lexical examples. According to Werth, there is so much overlap between frames that
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they come to resemble situations far more than they resemble rigid word-definitions. 
Furthermore, much of Fillmore’s definition of the ‘bachelor’ frame above can be seen to 
be made up of a set o f highly subjective opinions on what being a bachelor entails, 
rather than being based on any universally identifiable, or even culturally-specific, 
factors or traits.
More recently, the theory of conceptual spaces that has proved to be of greatest 
significance to Werth’s text world framework has been that developed by Gilles 
Fauconnier (e.g. 1994, 1996, 1997) under the title of ‘Mental Space Theory’. In 
essence, mental spaces are conceptual domains, set up during the discourse process, 
through which language is conceptualised and understood. Fauconnier argues that these 
domains
are not part o f  the language itself, or o f  its grammars; they are not hidden levels o f
linguistic representation, but language does not come without them.
(Fauconnier 1994: 1)
Thus, mental spaces are constructed according to the guidelines set out by linguistic 
expressions within a given discourse. Fauconnier terms these expressions ‘space 
builders’, and specifies that they may take the form of prepositional phrases, adverbs, 
connectives, or subject-verb combinations, at the linguistic level. Fauconnier states that 
any new space is always set up relative to an existing, or ‘parent’, space. This parent 
space will often, but not always, be the ‘reality space’ of the speaker, which can be seen 
to correspond directly with the notion of the ‘actual world’ in possible worlds 
philosophy and semantics. Fauconnier goes on to specify a number of possible causes 
for the construction of a new ‘projected space’ during any given discourse.
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Firstly, any change in the temporal setting of the parent space, typically indicated by 
temporal adverbials, tense and aspect, will result in the construction of a projected 
space. A change in the parent space’s spatial setting has a similar effect and is typically 
indicated by the use of locative adverbials and verbs o f movement in discourse. 
Hypothetical constructions also create projected mental spaces, as do switches in the 
domain of activity being focused on in the discourse (e.g. the occurrence of such space- 
builders as ‘in American football...’, or ‘in the field o f genetics...’). At any stage in the 
discourse, either the parent space or a projected space will be the ‘Base’ of the system, 
while the other will be the ‘Focus’. Fauconnier explains:
Metaphorically speaking, the discourse participants move through the space lattice; their 
viewpoint and their focus shift as they go from one space to the next.
(Fauconnier 1997: 38)
The Base is thus the starting point for a new space construction, while the Focus is the 
space which is then internally structured in the process of discourse comprehension. 
The ‘Viewpoint’, briefly described by Fauconnier in the quotation above, can then be 
seen as the space from which all other spaces are accessed. To give an example o f this 
system in use, consider the following sentences:
Joanna can 7 fly. She believes she can fly, but she can’t.
BASE VIEWPOINT FOCUS BASE
This sequence begins with a Base space, in which ‘Joanna can 7f l y 9. A projected space 
is then created by the verb construction ‘she believes’, with the resulting space’s 
contents becoming the Focus of the discourse. Joanna’s belief system, described in this 
Focus space, is also the Viewpoint from which the other spaces are accessed: for 
example, in the final shift from the projected space back to the Base.
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The close resemblance between the structure and genesis of Fauconnier’s mental spaces 
and those of Werth’s text worlds is discussed in further detail in section 3.2.1 of this 
thesis. At this point, however, it is important to outline some of the reasons behind 
Werth’s eventual rejection of Fauconnier’s theory as a satisfactory model of discourse 
processing. Once again, Werth takes issue with the sentence-level analysis upon which 
Mental Space Theory is based, echoing his criticisms o f possible worlds semantics, 
cognitive psychology and the cognitive linguistic models discussed above. He argues:
... given the cognitive principles underlying [Mental Space Theory]... one would expect it 
to apply principally  to discourses, and only secondarily to sentences, since the latter are 
merely practical components o f  the former, and in cognitive terms do not occur without the 
deictic terms which make them part o f  discourses.
(Werth 1999: 70)
Werth acknowledges that Fauconnier, at least, does make some gesture towards a 
discourse-level application of his theory, as exemplified below:
There is a long tradition in grammar and in philosophy (o f the non-continental variety) to 
take the sentence, in isolation, as the basic object o f  study... Theories developed for 
fragments seldom extend to the general case, and, what is worse, they lead to improper 
partitioning o f  the data... The study o f  mental space phenomena... attempts to break out o f  
this mold by focusing on linguistic generalization.
(Fauconnier 1994: xix-xxiv) 
However, Werth also points out that, in practice, Fauconnier limits his analysis to
synthetic, single-sentence examples, ‘albeit sometimes with some declared context’
(Werth 1999: 77). These contexts, Werth (1999: 91) argues, bear a striking resemblance
to the sets of repetitious sentences commonly used in EFL exercise books to give a
pseudo-discourse impression. As a result, mental spaces appear to be conjured ‘rather
like rabbits out of a hat’ (Werth 1999: 77).
A typical example of Fauconnier’s construction of such ‘pseudo-discourse’ can be 
found in the following extract:
Suppose a movie is made about Alfred Hitchcock’s life; the main role (Hitchcock) is 
played by Orson W elles, but Hitchcock him self plays a minor role (the man at the bus 
stop).
(Fauconnier 1994: 36)
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In this case, the ‘context’ is nominated solely in order for Fauconnier to be able to 
discuss multiple connectors in the sentence, ‘Hitchcock saw himself in that movie’. It 
could, therefore, be argued that mental spaces are as guilty of being ‘both over-specific 
and under-specified’ (Werth 1999: 70) as possible worlds have been shown to be in 
section 2.1.1 above. In Fauconnier’s defence, it is worth pointing out that, in his own 
use of it, Mental Space Theory functions as a heuristic device for solving logical 
problems, rather than as an all-encompassing explanation of how we process discourse. 
As with possible worlds semantics, then, it is likely that Werth finds Mental Space 
Theory lacking as a result of differing aims and objectives, rather than because of any 
fundamental flaw in the model itself. Even with this possibility in mind, however, one 
puzzling question remains regarding Mental Space Theory. Given the obvious logical 
emphasis of the mental space project, we might ask why Fauconnier invokes the notions 
of discourse and context in the first place?
2.3 Review
This chapter has traced the origins of and influences on Werth’s text world approach to 
discourse study to the notion of ‘possible worlds’ presented by Leibniz in the eighteenth 
century. The further development of that concept, both in 1970s logic and philosophy 
and in contemporary literary theory, has also been examined. In both cases, although 
choosing to adopt the ‘worlds’ metaphor at the heart of all possible worlds theories, 
Werth finds the minimalistic nature of the worlds they examine an unsatisfactory basis 
on which to found his own approach. The cognitivist tradition in which Werth prefers to 
locate Text World Theory has been examined in detail throughout the latter sections of 
this chapter. In particular, the models of human knowledge structures proposed by 
schema theory and AI research, as well as the ‘mental models’ of cognitive psychology
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and the ‘ICMs’, ‘frames’ and ‘mental spaces’ of cognitive linguistics, have been put 
forward as central influences on Werth’s development of his own framework for a 
deeper understanding of human discourse processing. Both the main tenets and the 
possible shortcomings of each approach have been examined and discussed.
With the basic methodological foundations for the formulation of Text World Theory 
thus established, in Chapter Three of this thesis I now investigate how a range of 
components from each of the influential disciplines examined above manifest 
themselves in Text World Theory itself. Chapter Three therefore provides a detailed 
exposition of Werth’s own framework and explores the means by which Werth seeks to 
address those flaws so far identified in preceding cognitive and linguistic models. The 
basic mechanics of each of the three main levels of Text World Theory are examined 
and discussed alongside an exemplary application of the framework to a literary text.
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Chapter Three Text World Theory
3.0 Preview
This chapter provides a detailed exposition of the mechanics of Text World Theory, 
informed by the examination of Werth’s influences and contemporaries presented in 
Chapter Two. The chapter is initially divided into three main sections, corresponding 
with the three world-levels o f the theory: the discourse world, the text world, and the 
sub-world. Together, these sections offer an investigation into Werth’s unique 
adaptation of the ‘worlds’ metaphor as a means of explaining the conceptual space in 
which human beings process and understand discourse. With the theoretical foundations 
of Text World Theory thus established, section 3.4.0 goes on to explore Werth’s own 
typical use of the text worlds approach. A practical demonstration of the basic tenets of 
Text World Theory at work is provided in the preliminary text world analysis of an 
extract from Paul Auster’s (1992) novel The Music o f  Chance in section 3.4.1. Section
3.4.2 then explores Werth’s further adaptation of his framework to explain the 
phenomenon of extended literary metaphor. An extended analysis of The Music o f  
Chance as a whole is then presented in section 3.4.3, as a means of assessing the 
benefits and limits of this type of text world application. Throughout the chapter, key 
problematic areas of Werth’s approach are outlined in preparation for their further 
exploration in Chapter Four.
3.1.0 The Discourse World
Werth offers a provisional definition of the discourse world as the immediate situation 
surrounding at least one speaker or writer and one or more listeners or readers
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participating in the ‘joint venture’ (Werth 1995a: 51) of communication. To a certain 
extent, the discourse world can be seen to correspond with the notion of the ‘actual 
world’ in the moderate realist tradition of possible worlds semantics (discussed in 
section 2.1.0 above), insofar as it is the actualised state of affairs from which all other 
possibles derive. As we have already seen in section 2.1.1 above, however, Werth is not 
content to limit his understanding of states of affairs to the simplified definition of ‘an 
arrangement of objects, individuals or things having various properties and standing in 
various relations to one another’ (Bradley and Swartz 1979: 7). His central concern is 
not with the stipulation of minimalistic worlds for the purposes of logical analysis, but 
with the provision of a comprehensive model of human discourse production and 
reception. Chapter Two also demonstrated Werth’s belief that his commitment to this 
enterprise demands an account of states of affairs which bears the same complexity that 
speakers and hearers recognise in the real world.
To achieve this, Werth begins by distilling each state of affairs into smaller, constituent 
parts, or ‘situations’. Thus:
A situation is a particular kind o f  state o f  affairs, in which the time and place are held 
constant (or rather -  since time is continuously progressing -  are held in tandem). So a 
series o f  situations w ill make up a state o f  affairs.
(Werth 1999: 68)
Werth claims that this refinement enables him to overcome those problems of under- 
specificity encountered by possible worlds semantics and described in section 2.1.1 
above. It renders the world under scrutiny manageable and analysable without reducing 
its content. Imagine, for example, a state of affairs as analogous to a piece of video 
footage. The footage necessarily unfolds over a period of time, during which the 
relationships between the entities and objects portrayed is constantly shifting. To 
attempt to analyse the film as a whole would be impossible without at least some degree
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of reduction and generalisation. Approaching the subject matter scene by scene, or even 
frame by frame, however, enables a localised analysis which captures the complexity of 
the state o f affairs in its entirety.
Werth also stresses the importance o f the presence o f sentient beings in the discourse 
world, known as the participants at this level o f the theory. He argues that situations are 
not simply collections o f entities at a certain place and time, but rather are ‘states o f  
affairs conceived o f  by participants' (Werth 1999: 84, original emphasis retained). He 
adds:
Situations do not occur in a conceptual vacuum: they are given their situational status by an 
act o f  human will. We can conceive o f situations w ithout any humans in them -  but we 
cannot conceive o f  unconceived-of situations. The very notion o f  situation, then, is an 
experiential notion, and any kind o f theory o f situations other than an experientialist one 
must be incoherent.
(W erth 1999: 84)
Thus, an arrangement o f elements including inanimate objects but no human beings 
would not constitute a situation under W erth’s criteria. A real situation must contain at 
least one participant in order for the existence o f the other inanimate elements involved 
to be realised. Furthermore, Werth insists that the discourse world contains not only the 
participants and what they can perceive in their immediate surroundings, but also ‘what 
the participants can work out from their perceptions’ (Werth 1999: 83). He goes on:
In order to interpret and make sense o f that [sensory] input, we must be able to classify 
these ‘percepts’ (as psychologists call them). In order to do that, we m ust be able to call 
upon the knowledge we already have stored away from previous experience... This means 
we, the participants, have to be able to recognise qualities, both perceivable and non- 
perceivable, and infer relationships between things which we have previously been able to 
distinguish as entities (including also memories o f  approaching this type o f  object and 
seeing it from different viewpoints at different times).
(W erth 1999: 83)
These specifications highlight the inter-subjective (as opposed to objectivist) focus of 
Text World Theory and position it firmly within the cognitivist tradition described in 
Chapter Two. Indeed, Werth (1999: 50) offers ‘Cognitive Discourse Gram m ar’ as an 
alternative term for his approach.
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Werth is also keen to emphasise, however, that he views discourse as ‘the combination 
of a text and its relevant context’ (Werth 1999: 47), and he argues that the notion of 
context has yet to be systematically approached by any of the central proponents of 
cognitive linguistics. Werth points out:
Like democracy, discourse is universally assumed to be a Good Thing, but as also with 
democracy, very few are prepared to go out o f  their way to approach it. Indeed, even those 
who apply experientialist ideas most consistently tend to avoid direct confrontation with the 
horrors o f  context.
(Werth 1999: 46)
The considerable practical implications of Werth’s commitment to addressing this gap 
are evident in his illustration of the discourse world (1995a: 52), adapted and 
reproduced in Figure 3a below. Here, the situation surrounding the participants engaged 
in face-to-face communication is shown to include not only their immediate perceptions 
but also such abstract notions as beliefs, hopes, dreams, and so on. Werth admits that 
the discourse context initially appears to incorporate ‘no less than all the information 
available in principle to the human race’, and he concedes, ‘small wonder, then, that so 
many people have fought shy of attempting to deal with the notion in any systematic 
way’ (Werth 1999: 117).
BELIEFS MEMORIES
KNOWLEDGE
PERCEPTIONS
HOPES IMAGINATION
immediate situation
INTENTIONSDREAMS
Figure 3a. The Discourse World
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However, Werth maintains that Text World Theory provides the methodological means 
necessary to account not only for the structure of the text itself but for the context 
surrounding its production and interpretation as well. His framework, he claims, 
incorporates ‘current knowledge concerning the cognitive processes of information 
handling, storage and retrieval, the social principles of co-operation and purposefulness, 
and the pragmatic conditions of coherence and relevance’ (Werth 1999: 17). In the 
following sub-sections, I will deal with the latter of these areas first, with an 
examination of the negotiated nature of the discourse world in section 3.1.1. This is 
followed by a discussion of the role of human knowledge and experience in Werth’s 
model of discourse processing in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.
3.1.1 Negotiation
In explaining his position as a discourse linguist, as opposed to a text linguist, Werth 
places great emphasis on the precise differences between those terms, ‘text’ and 
‘discourse’. He states:
A text is to a sentence as a discourse is to an utterance. That is to say, a text, like a 
sentence, is somewhat o f  an abstraction which is made for the purposes o f  analysis. What it 
is abstracted from is its context... texts do tend to be written... although that is not the 
important thing about them. What is important is that they have been abstracted away from 
the real-life situation in which they occur, for one purpose or another.
(Werth 1999: 1, original emphasis retained)
As a discourse linguist, then, Werth believes he must necessarily account for the nature 
and structure of context as thoroughly and systematically as that o f the text to which it is 
inextricably linked. Indeed, Werth gives precedence to the ‘real-life situation’, using its 
pragmatic structure as a prototype for every level o f Text World Theory. More 
specifically, while Werth stresses that his Cognitive Discourse Grammar extends to all 
language situations, from telephone conversations to written communication of all 
types, the situation surrounding the participants in a face-to-face conversation, depicted
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in Figure 3a above, constitutes the basic language event upon which Werth’s framework
is based. He explains:
[conversation] represents our prototypical use o f  language: it is, in other words, the basic 
discourse-type -  socially, historically, statistically. This is particularly important for the 
concept o f  negotiation... The face-to-face, turn-taking, open-topic kind o f  activity we call 
conversation serves as the model for this process o f  negotiation, and may usefully be 
extended to non-prototypical language uses such as conversations-at-a-distance, monologue 
and written language.
(Werth 1999: 85, original emphasis retained)
Werth argues that all discourses are consciously and purposefully initiated, although he
does make exceptions for marginal cases such as automatic writing and talking in one’s
sleep (Werth 1999: 51). He points out that discourses are not simply a series of
randomly generated sentences but are ‘mutual attempts to negotiate a Common Ground’
(Werth 1999: 49). The exact nature of this Common Ground will be explored in section
3.1.3 below. It is Werth’s concept o f ‘mutual negotiation’ which concerns us for the
moment.
In keeping with his conversation prototype, Werth argues that the interaction between 
the participants involved in the discourse is governed by a set o f pragmatic meta­
principles, which he terms ‘the principles of discourse’ (Werth 1999: 49). These are as 
follows:
(i) Com m unicativeness (informativeness): discourses should normally be assumed to be 
purposive, and to be efficient in prosecuting their purposes, unless there is evidence to 
the contrary.
(ii) C oherence... except in pathological cases, entities, events and propositions are not 
introduced into the Common Ground superfluously...
(iii) C o-operativeness (responsibility, authoritativeness and reliability): the participants in 
a discourse tacitly agree to jointly negotiate a CG [Common Ground] as efficiently as 
is consistent with the other principles.
(Werth 1999: 49-50, original emphasis retained)
The similarities between this list and the following maxims from Grice (1975) initially 
appear striking:
QUANTITY... l.M ake your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes o f  the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required...
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QUALITY... 1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
RELATION... 1. Be relevant.
MANNER... 1. Avoid obscurity o f  expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.
(Grice 1975:45-46)
A more detailed analysis of Werth’s terminology, however, reveals some re-working of 
Grice’s model. Werth’s first principle, communicativeness, for example, can be seen to 
subsume Grice’s maxims of Quality and Quantity. Under the second principle, 
coherence, Werth explains that propositions can be considered coherent if  they ‘fit their 
context’ (Werth 1999: 51), a requisite suggestive of the maxims of both Relation and 
Manner. The discourse principle of coherence is obviously reminiscent of related 
‘relevance theory’, which is discussed in detail in section 3.1.3 below. However, 
Werth’s addition of a third, apparently all-encompassing principle, co-operativeness, 
appears to be an attempt to incorporate Grice’s super-maxim of the same name 
alongside his other principles. Indeed, Grice’s explanation of the necessity of the co­
operative principle bears a strong resemblance to Werth’s later re-working of the model:
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist o f  a succession o f  disconnected remarks, and 
would not be rational i f  they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, co­
operative efforts; and each participant recognises in them, to some extent, a common 
purpose or set o f  purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or set o f  
purposes might be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal o f  a question for 
discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so 
indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual 
conversation). But at each stage, SOME possible conversational moves would be excluded 
as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle which 
participants w ill be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction o f  the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
(Grice 1975: 45, original emphasis retained)
Despite a number of cosmetic alterations, then, for both Grice and Werth co-operation 
nevertheless forms the underlying, default principle for all communication, against 
which background any further conversational implicatures arise (see Eelen 2001 and 
Toolan 1996 for an opposing viewpoint).
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The ease with which Werth claims to be able to map the conversation prototype onto all 
other forms of language, however, raises a number of questions. Not least, Werth’s 
assumption that the relationship between the author of a written text and that text’s 
reader will be as necessarily co-operative as that between conversation participants 
would seem somewhat simplistic. This possibility is further demonstrated and explored 
in Chapter Four of this thesis. Furthermore, while Werth chooses the situation 
surrounding participants communicating face-to-face as his exemplary illustration (see 
Figure 3a), the discourse world involving the reader o f a novel in the year 2001 and its 
writer in 1901 would certainly be more difficult to reproduce. As Werth notes:
The discourse worlds o f  written texts are almost always split: since the writer and the 
readership occupy different spatio-temporal points, there w ill certainly be very little which 
is mutually perceivable. So even if  the writer is writing about his/her discourse world, this 
w on’t correspond to anything in the reader’s discourse world.
(Werth 1995a: 54-55)
So how significant can the immediate situation be during our processing of a novel 
which makes no reference to the chair in which we sit, or the dog at our feet, or to the 
situation surrounding the author at the time of writing? Werth himself admits:
There’s a parallel discrepancy here between the text-function for the writer and that for the 
reader: what is recapitulative for the writer may be informational for the reader, and so on. 
However, the immediate situations, respectively, o f  writing and reading are presumably less 
important in such cases than the shared baggage o f  cultural assumptions, general 
knowledge etc. -  collectively known as frame knowledge.
(Werth 1995a: 55)
The nature and importance of this frame knowledge is explored in the following section 
of this chapter. For the moment, however, following Werth’s admission of the limited 
relevance of the immediate situation in written communication, the question persists as 
to why he continues to place such importance on its pragmatic structure as a prototype 
for all other discourse processing. This question is all the more perplexing given the fact 
that Werth’s own use of Text World Theory is entirely limited to written texts and, 
despite considerable gesturing towards the adaptability of the framework as a tool for 
pragmatic analysis, Werth never attempts such an application himself.
70
3.1.2 Knowledge
With the pragmatic configuration of the discourse world defined, Werth goes on to 
examine the role of participant knowledge in the production and reception of discourse:
The inform ative m ode o f  language involves the transfer o f  propositions from exclusive 
speaker -  or hearer -  knowledge into shared knowledge. This means that communication 
consists o f  the transfer o f  knowledge ‘possessed’ by only one o f  the participants into their 
shared  knowledge area, i.e. into the knowledge o f  all the participants.
(Werth 1999: 95, original emphasis retained)
The separate domains of knowledge Werth is describing here are illustrated in Figure 3b 
below (adapted from Werth 1999: 94). The process by which knowledge is transferred 
from the speaker-only, or hearer-only, knowledge-base to the domain of mutual 
knowledge is known as incrementation and will be discussed further in section 3.1.3 
below. For the moment, however, let us focus on the precise nature of the knowledge 
being exchanged during the discourse process.
SHARED KNOWLEDGEI
MUTUAL
WHAT
HEARER
KNOWS
' WHAT 
SPEAKER 
KNOWS
(private)
KNOWLEDGE
(public)GENERAL
KNOWLEDGE
Figure 3b. Participant Knowledge
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Werth divides the knowledge-bases of both speaker and hearer into two initial 
categories; ‘general knowledge’ and ‘mutual knowledge’. He defines general 
knowledge, first o f all, as consisting of ‘all that information which is in principle 
available to individuals by virtue of their membership in various larger social 
groupings’ (Werth 1999: 96). This general knowledge is then separated into two further 
categories; ‘linguistic knowledge’ and ‘cultural knowledge’. Linguistic knowledge, 
Werth explains, is characteristically analytical. He takes issue with the generative 
linguistic view of language as an autonomous cognitive system by arguing that the links 
between cultural and linguistic knowledge ‘are multifarious and complex... all cognitive 
systems are interlinked, in that all may provide input for each other’ (Werth 1999: 98). 
Cultural knowledge is all o f the remaining non-linguistic information available, in 
principle, to members of a particular society, although not all members will have the 
same degree of access to it. It is characteristically open-ended, due to the fact that new
cultural information is constantly being generated and made available to participants,
/
and also contingent, in so far as it is not logically necessary and could have been 
otherwise.
Werth classifies mutual knowledge as all that information which is exchanged between 
participants during the discourse. He stresses that this type of knowledge is a result, 
rather than a part, o f the incrementation process. He explains:
Mutual knowledge consists, in principle, solely o f  knowledge shared by, and available to, 
the participants in the discourse under scrutiny. It may come from the discourse so far, or 
from previous discourses.
(Werth 1999: 98)
Werth refers to Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) notion of mutual manifestness as a 
sufficient explanation of the system by which participants are able to interpret each 
other’s allusions correctly during the discourse process. This is to say that participants
72
make interpretative decisions based on assumptions about one another’s cognitive 
environments, or the set of facts potentially available to each person’s awareness. 
Sperber and Wilson give the following example:
Suppose Peter and Mary are looking at a landscape where she has noticed a distant church.
She says to him:
(49) I’ve been inside that church.
She does not stop to ask herself whether he has noticed the building, and whether he 
assumes she has noticed, and assumes she has noticed he has noticed, and so on, or whether 
he has assumed it is a church, and assumes she assumes it is, and so on. All she needs is 
reasonable confidence that he w ill be able to identify the building as a church when 
required to: in other words, that a certain assumption w ill be manifest in his cognitive 
environment at the right time.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 43-44) 
Within his own framework, Werth terms that part of mutual knowledge derived from
the elements immediately manifest to the participants as ‘perceptual knowledge’. He
differentiates between this and ‘experiential knowledge’. He argues that the latter
consists of those situations in the memories of the participants in which they both know
they have directly participated or with which they have some other indirect connection.
Werth also distinguishes between the modes through which the various types of 
knowledge described above are expressed and, again, proposes two main categories: the 
‘propositional mode’ and the ‘functional mode’. He claims that each of his four 
categories of knowledge -  linguistic, cultural, perceptual and experiential -  can be 
propositional in nature, and that knowledge in this mode tends to be consciously 
acquired and retrieved. Werth (1999: 101-102) gives numerous examples o f the sorts of 
‘facts’ propositional knowledge may express, including:
•  Belgium is a kingdom -  cultural
•  A bachelor is an unmarried male adult human -  linguistic
•  There is an echo in this building -  perceptual
• Speaker went to hearer’s wedding -  experiential
All four types o f knowledge can also be functional in nature. In essence, this mode 
consists of a set of acts, either directed towards a particular goal or undirected, and
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either physical or conceptual in nature. Werth (1999: 102) gives several examples of 
each, in which conceptual activities are marked C and physical activities are marked 
with P. These include:
Cultural C Diagnosing an illness.
P Tying a shoelace.
Linguistic C/P Formulating a report.
P Articulating an utterance.
Perceptual c Listening out for the postman.
C/P Checking the quality o f  a wine.
Experiential c Recognising faces.
C/P Learning to drive.
We should notice that several examples involve aspects o f both conceptual and physical 
activity. Werth also points out that functional knowledge can often be ‘turned into’ 
knowledge in the propositional mode, the teaching of any skill being a prime example 
of this transition.
Following Fillmore (1982, 1985), whose work has already been discussed in section
2.2.4 above, Werth claims that the composite structure of knowledge is essentially 
frame-based. However, as we have also already seen in section 2.2.4, he remains 
dissatisfied with Fillmore’s explanation of what exactly constitutes a frame. Werth 
argues that one can come to an intuitive understanding of frames based on the numerous 
lexical examples Fillmore offers, but that these examples can at best provide only a 
fuzzy-edged idea of what a frame actually is. He also takes issue with Lakoff s (1982: 
48) characterisation o f frames as both generalised and experiential, arguing that human 
beings do not experience generalisations but rather that ‘generalisations are the result of 
abstract cognitive processes applied to material gained from experience’ (Werth 1999: 
110). Werth proposes that this material is made up of repeated encounters with real-life 
situations. He explains:
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The single experiences which make up the set from which the frame is distilled are 
situations which... represent actual phenomena. These situations will not be identical to 
each other; but they must be sufficiently similar to count as recurrences o f  something 
previously experienced. At a certain point (perhaps after as few as two such experiences), 
they fuse into a situation-type. It is to the situation-type that the frame is related -  indeed 
perhaps situation-types are rudimentary frames.
(Werth 1999: 111, original emphasis retained)
Werth emphasises, however, that frames are not created simply from repeated situation- 
types. The semantic and pragmatic complex which the situation-type becomes as it 
gathers more and more variation must also gain influence from the participant’s cultural 
knowledge-base. As Werth argues:
When a situation is expressed in propositions, each one is also accompanied by relevant 
information from the participant’s knowledge store. We can therefore see that when this 
happens often enough to set up a pattern, we get a frame.
(Werth 1999: 112)
Frames, then, represent complexes of situation-types and background knowledge. How 
this knowledge is divided up and deployed during the processing of discourse is 
explored in the following section of this chapter.
3.1.3 Common Ground
We have already seen that Werth views all communication as a mutual attempt to 
negotiate what he calls a Common Ground (CG), for which Werth offers the following 
provisional definition:
Com m on Ground:
the totality o f  information which the speaker(s) and hearer(s) have agreed to accept as 
relevant fo r  their discourse
(Werth 1999: 119)
The act of negotiating this information takes place within the discourse world, the 
pragmatic configuration of which has been set out in section 3.1.1 above. We have also 
seen that the discourse world contains not only the participants and their immediate 
surroundings, but also the personal and cultural background knowledge they bring with 
them to the language event. Werth points out, however, that not all o f the knowledge 
potentially available to participants will be needed during the discourse. Only selected
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information will be added to the CG by a continuous updating process, known as 
‘incrementation’.
Werth offers the following explanation of incrementation and how it works:
In text-processing, each Current Proposition (CP) is linguistically interpreted, the final 
stage o f  which is the coherence mechanism which relates the ‘raw proposition’ to the 
inferencing mechanism and the knowledge-base, and specifically, knowledge o f  the 
accumulated CG. Increm entation then adds the current CP to the current CG, together 
with the additional ‘annotation’ o f  evoked knowledge.
(Werth 1999: 131, original emphasis retained)
The grounds upon which the CP is selected (or not) for incrementation are based, to 
some extent, on the truth or falsity of that proposition. We have already seen some of 
the difficulties involved in traditional logical approaches to truth identified and 
discussed in section 2.1.0 and 2.1.1 above. Werth (1999: 131) gives the following 
further examples of propositions for which the assessment of truth is problematic:
•  My wife is the most beautiful woman in the world.
•  George is a genius.
•  God is Love.
Werth argues that possible worlds semantics offers some solution and can easily 
account for the truth-value of imaginary or abstract sentences, and indeed for each of 
the examples above, with reference to the particular world defined by the discourse. 
However, Werth also points out that the problem of indeterminacy still exists even 
within a multiple-world model of truth. He gives the example of a world containing 
proposition (1), in which it is possible to determine that further propositions (2) and (3) 
are true and (4) is false. The truth-values of (5) and (6), however, are not easy to 
ascertain with the same degree of certainty.
1. Hobbits are round and fat, and live in holes in the ground.
2. Hobbits exist in this possible world.
3. Hobbits are living creatures.
4. Hobbits are thin.
5. Hobbits are stocky.
6. Hobbits are jolly  and like to tell jokes.
(adapted from Werth 1999: 132-133)
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Although the last two propositions seem reasonable, it is not possible to say whether 
they are definitely true or false. Werth, then, prefers to approach truth assessment from 
a different perspective, that of probability.
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Figure 3c. Scale o f  Probability
Figure 3c above (adapted from Werth 1999: 133) illustrates the scale upon which a 
proposition’s probable truth can be assessed, ranging from 100% probable, or certain, at 
one end to 0% probable, or impossible, at the other. Werth (1999: 134) explains the 
reasons for his departure from traditional notions of truth and falsity as being based on 
the context-sensitivity of truth. He cites numerous examples from such disciplines as 
medicine, mathematics and physics, where analytical truths often turn out to be not 
quite as concrete as they first appeared and are frequently superseded by new 
discoveries and developments. He argues:
‘Analytically True’ often means ‘true at this moment, or in the present state o f  our 
knowledge, or for present purposes’, which is significantly different from the rigorous 
objectivist picture o f  analytic truth as an immutable property o f  certain propositions, 
irrespective o f  physical circumstance or human interaction.
Contingent truths, on the other hand, are susceptible to circumstances. Thus, the inclusion 
o f  contingent truths into logic opens up logic to the inclusion o f  context. Contingent truths 
are cognitively respectable, since they are subject to human experience and intervention.
This means that the seditious definition o f  ‘Analytically True’ given above as ‘true at this 
moment, or in the present state o f  our knowledge, or for present purposes’ is (part of) the 
normal definition o f ‘Contingently True’.
(Werth 1999: 134-135, original emphasis retained)
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By this reasoning, Werth argues that many so-called analytical truths are actually 
contingent. He also points out a further practical problem regarding truth assessment, 
specifically the need to take into account the reliability o f the author or speaker of the 
proposition under scrutiny. He argues:
... in practical terms, it seems not to be sentences, or even propositions, that have truth- 
values or probabilities, but utterances, i.e. propositions in contexts o f  situation... [this 
means] that the truth or probability which we loosely attribute to a proposition has actually 
to be assessed relative to certain properties o f  the context it is in.
(Werth 1999: 135, original emphasis retained)
Perhaps the most important factor in this context-sensitive assessment is the perceived 
authority the speaker has on his or her chosen subject. Parallel to the scale of probability 
in Figure 3c above, Werth (1999: 135) proposes a second scale by which such a 
judgement is made, reproduced in Figure 3d below.
lUU/o V / O
Highly Fairly Middling Low No
authoritative authoritative authoritative authority authority
Figure 3d. Scale o f  Authority
Werth suggests a number of means by which hearers may conclude where on the scale 
of authority a particular speaker belongs. As well as the function they have within the 
discourse, speakers will also hold various social roles and individual properties, many of 
which will be part of the mutual knowledge of the discourse participants and may thus 
affect how their authority is perceived. Werth further suggests an amalgamation of the 
notion of power presented in social psychology (e.g. Brown and Gilman 1968, 
Fairclough 1989) and Milroy’s (1987) theory of Social Networks. Thus, any connection 
within a network will also hold a certain power relationship, resulting in three possible
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types of connection: unequal power (-» or <-); equal power with respect to a mutual 
connection (e.g. power over a third person) (<-»); or equal power with respect to each
other (e.g. equal lack of power) (— ). Werth gives the following example:
... as an amateur gardener o f  somewhat patchy accomplishment, I might exercise authority 
on the subject o f  gardening in my role relationship with Joe Bloggs, a lifelong inhabitant o f  
a high rise in Hackney, whereas in my role relationship with, say, the Head Horticulturist at 
Kew Gardens, my gardening authority is zero.
(Werth 1999: 137)
Under Werth’s approach, authority is not an inborn property of a particular individual, 
who either has it or has not. Rather, authority is a function of whatever role relationship 
is in place between participants during a particular discourse.
A further possible explanation of the incrementation process is that offered by relevance 
theory, the main proponents of which are Sperber and Wilson (1986) (see also 
Blakemore 1987, 1992). Originally derived from Grice’s (1975) maxim of Relation (see 
section 3.1.1 above), relevance theory takes the following principle as the basis for its 
all-encompassing model of human cognition:
Principle o f  relevance
Every act o f  ostensive communication communicates the presumption o f  its own optimal 
relevance.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 158) 
According to Sperber and Wilson, when speakers produce an ostensive stimulus -  a
stimulus that is intended to be perceived as relevant (e.g. an act o f speech, or a physical
gesture) -  hearers automatically presume it to be so. A kind of cognitive trade-off then
ensues, during which the effort needed to process the communication is weighed up
against its cognitive effects. As a result, the hearer will only commit that amount of
cognitive effort needed in order to process the information to a level of optimal
relevance. Werth (1999: 138) gives the following literary example for his analysis of
relevance theory at work:
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MEG: Was it dark?
PETEY: No, it was light.
(Pinter 1960: 10)
Here, Petey’s answer ‘no’ is highly relevant, since it provides all of the information 
demanded by the question and requires little cognitive effort to process. His further 
expansion ‘it was light’, however, according to relevance theory, is of very low, if not 
zero, relevance. Yet Werth notes that Sperber and Wilson at no point make clear how 
one is supposed to assess such degrees of relevance in the first place, and further raises 
the question of the lack of attention paid to the meaning of such utterances under the 
relevance theory approach. He argues that while the expansion ‘it was light’ may be 
deemed of little relevance, it is still more relevant than if Petey had given an answer 
with no semantic connection to the question, such as ‘it was pink lace’ or ‘it was 
amazing’ (Werth 1999: 139).
Werth claims that the notion of context ‘receives surprisingly cavalier treatment in the 
Sperber and Wilson approach’ (Werth 1999: 139) and objects to their definition:
The assumptions left over in the memory o f  the deductive device from the immediately 
preceding deductive process then constitute an immediately given context in which the next 
new item o f  information may be deductively processed.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 139)
He (1999: 139) argues that while Sperber and Wilson claim to be arguing against
uniquely determined context, they are in fact arguing against context being
predetermined, and he further objects to the fact that their argument is based on the
demonstration that a single conversational opening may be followed by any number of
possible outcomes. He states:
Obviously, such an approach, while it may help to elucidate various possibilities o f  
whatever is under scrutiny, has no more than a very limited value as an instrument o f  
discourse analysis or discourse explanation -  since no single coherent discourse is being 
examined. But since they have chosen to vary their examples in this way, they cannot claim  
to have said anything about the context being uniquely determined. They have shown that it 
is not predetermined, i.e. that it may vary as the discourse proceeds.
(Werth 1999: 139)
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Werth argues that, while a definition of context as the set of assumptions the
participants have in mind during the processing of discourse may be adequate in those
cases where one utterance follows on from another, it cannot explain the processing of
the changes o f subject and new topics which arise during the course of perfectly
relevant conversation. Furthermore, he points out that Sperber and Wilson also
frequently confuse the concept of relevant information with news, using the following
example to illustrate his point:
... if  Mary knows that Peter buys every book by Iris Murdoch, and she sees the latest one 
being put on display in the local bookshop, it would be reasonable for her to say to Peter,
(63) Iris Murdoch’s new book is in the bookshops.
It may turn out that Peter already has this information, in which case utterance (63) will in 
fact be irrelevant to him.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 159-160)
Werth argues that, while Peter may already have the information Mary offers him, he
would probably still consider it relevant in the circumstances described. Other critiques
of relevance theory include Green (1997), on problems with the application of relevance
theory to literary texts; Harvey’s (1988) anthropological critique of the cultural-
specificity of relevance theory; and Toolan’s (1996) integrationalist evaluation of the
narrowness of relevance theory’s notion of context.
Werth, then, opts for a different approach to context, his basic argument being that the 
incrementation of a current proposition into the Common Ground is a ‘text-driven’ 
process. In order to explain this concept more clearly, it is useful to review our 
understanding of the configuration of the discourse world at this stage, illustrated in 
Figure 3e below. (This diagram originally appeared in the manuscript for Werth (1999), 
but was one o f many illustrations removed prior to publication due to financial 
restrictions.) Each participant brings a certain amount o f knowledge to the discourse 
event. The set of propositions which constitute this knowledge are represented in Figure
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3e by the notation {K}. As we have already seen, not all of the participants’ knowledge 
will be relevant for the processing of the current discourse. Werth explains that the text- 
driven nature of human cognition means that those which are relevant will be defined by 
the text itself and the propositions contained within it {P}. He states:
these propositions have many notional links with other propositions which are unexpressed, 
but nevertheless present. Some o f  them {PE} are more or less directly connected with the 
expressed propositions as entailments. Others {Pk}, probably the majority, are 
pragmatically connected in that they relate the propositions actually expressed {P} to 
speaker and hearer knowledge, {Ks} and {KH}.
(Werth 1999: 47)
Each of these links constitute areas of potential relevance, some of which will be 
activated as the text proceeds and some of which will not.
{K}
{Pe} {Pk}
CG
Figure 3e. Knowledge in the Discourse World
Werth (1999: 46) points out that the content of {P} is extremely limited at the start o f the 
discourse, as is the content of { P e }• {P k } ,  however, is very large, since it represents the 
intersection of {K} with only one proposition. As the discourse proceeds, then, new 
propositions are introduced and {P} grows in direct proportion. {P e } grows too, though 
not always in direct proportion as some entailments of early propositions may be 
blocked by later ones. { P k } ,  meanwhile, becomes more and more restricted, a process
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illustrated in Figure 3f below, adapted from Werth (1999: 146). As the text defines 
which parts o f the participants’ knowledge are needed to process the discourse, it 
creates what Werth (1999: 146) terms a ‘homing-in’ effect, as the relevant area of the 
knowledge-base becomes more and more specified. My application of Text World 
Theory to The Music o f  Chance in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 below provides a practical 
demonstration of the principle of text-drivenness at work. The following section of this 
chapter, however, now moves on to examine the precise structure of the mental 
representations which result from the participants’ co-operative and text-driven 
negotiation of a Common Ground at the discourse world level.
After one proposition After two propositions After three propositions
Figure 3 f  Text-Drivenness
3.2.0 The Text World
We have seen in section 3.1.0 above that Werth considers all acts of communication to 
be deliberate attempts to negotiate a Common Ground. The pragmatic rules which 
govern this negotiation have been demonstrated in section 3.1.1, with the rules which 
govern the incrementation of knowledge and information into the Common Ground 
described in section 3.1.2. However, the means by which the participants make sense of 
those propositions advanced during the discourse remains as yet undefined. In order to 
explain this area of the cognition process, Werth introduces the ‘text world’ metaphor,
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from which his approach as a whole takes its name. The text world is a conceptual space 
which, as already mentioned in section 2.2.2, bears a strong resemblance to Johnson- 
Laird’s (1983, 1988) notion of a mental model. Werth states explicitly:
I will assum e... that text worlds are in fact mental models constructed in the course o f  
processing a given discourse.
(Werth 1999: 74)
Indeed, Werth’s entire framework can be seen to be based on Johnson-Laird’s basic 
premise that ‘human beings understand the world by constructing working models o f it 
in their heads’ (Johnson-Laird 1983: 10). Thus, according to Werth, the participants at 
the discourse world level make sense of the discourse itself by constructing a mental 
representation of it -  a text world -  in which the language at hand can be conceptualised 
and understood. Where Johnson-Laird limits his analysis tp single propositions, 
however, Werth claims that his own primary application of the notion of conceptual 
space is to the processing of entire texts. The validity of this claim is explored further in 
section 3.4.0.
As already mentioned in section 2.2.4, further similarities.can also be identified between 
the structure and genesis of text worlds and those of Fauconnier’s (1994, 1996, 1997) 
mental spaces. As also already mentioned in 2.2.4, according to Mental Space Theory, a 
projected mental space (M) can be constructed from within the participants’ reality 
space (R) following a variety of different space-builders, such as
prepositional phrases (in L en ’s picture, in Joh n ’s mind, in 1929, at the factory, from  her 
poin t o f  view), adverbs (really, probably, possibly, theoretically), connectives ( if  A then..., 
either... or...), underlying subject-verb combinations (Max believes..., M ary hopes..., 
Gertrude claim s...).
(Fauconnier 1994: 17)
Fauconnier’s reality space can be seen to correspond with Werth’s notion o f a discourse 
world; the projected mental space with his text world; and space-builders with what
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Werth terms world-building elements, which are discussed in detail in section 3.2.1 
below. However, Werth notes:
Fauconnier does not restrict [the reality space] to the immediately perceivable environment.
In his system, it appears to include all speaker knowledge, which makes it something o f  a • 
blunt instrument, undefined, unrestricted, and unrelated specifically to M. Speaker reality is 
nothing more nor less than the undefined notion o f  reality that has bedevilled philosophy 
for centuries, and has made Possible World theory, Situation Semantics and much o f  formal 
semantics at the end o f  the twentieth century unworkable.
(Werth 1999: 181)
The undefined nature of Fauconnier’s speaker reality space is particularly significant to 
Werth since, in his own approach, he is keen to emphasise that the text world is 
constitutionally equivalent to the discourse world from which it springs. Such a claim 
demands a rigorous definition of that world in order for any clear understanding of 
subsequent worlds to be achieved. Werth’s attempts to provide such a definition have 
already been accounted for in sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 above. The means by which 
an equivalent richness of detail is created in the text world are the focus of this section 
of the chapter.
The pragmatic constraints at work within the discourse world, identified in section 
3.1.1, ensure that the contents of the text world are always negotiated. This means that, 
while varying personal experience will affect the precise detail of each individual 
participant’s text world to some extent, their basic structure will remain broadly within 
the same parameters. Werth divides that structure into two main components, 
corresponding with what he views as the two central functions of language, which he 
terms the ‘informational function’ and the ‘modality function’. The informational 
function, Werth argues, consists of propositional meaning or, more crudely, what the 
text is ‘about’. It is made up of what Werth terms ‘function-advancing propositions’, 
which will be discussed in section 3.2.2 below. The modality function of language, on 
the other hand, is concerned with ‘the situating of information with respect to the
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current context’ (Werth 1999: 157), and constitutes the background against which 
propositional meaning is expressed. The world-building elements which make up this 
background are discussed in the following section.
3.2.1 How to Build (and Maintain) a World
Werth offers the following further division of the modality function of language, briefly 
defined above:
You can situate information in terms o f  (i) interaction, or social relationships; in terms o f  
(ii) location, physical or abstract (which is then perspectivised for one participant, giving 
viewpoint); or in terms o f  (iii) probability (including reliability).
(Werth 1999: 183, original emphasis retained)
Werth (1999: 183) calls these the ‘three levels of modality’ and argues that world- 
building elements can be any of the three, depending on the type of world concerned. 
He proposes a world-building principle:
W orld-building principle
The world-building elements used are in every case appropriate to the level o f  modality 
currently in force.
(Werth 1999: 185, original emphasis retained)
For the moment, we are only concerned with the first two levels of modality, interaction
and location, since the probability level will be dealt with in detail in section 3.3.2
below. The discourse world, then, operates at the ‘interaction’ level, its parameters
being defined according to the principle of mutual manifestness (Sperber and Wilson
1986; see also section 3.1.3 above). This is to say that the elements that make up the
discourse world will tend to be implicit, particularly in a prototypical discourse situation
such as face-to-face conversation, since they are mutually manifest to both participants.
Werth (1999: 187) points out, however, that as discourse worlds get less and less
prototypical these elements may need to be explicitly expressed. A mobile-phone user’s
provision o f the basic deictic information ‘I ’m on a train’ for the benefit o f his or her
co-participant is a useful example of this progression. Furthermore, Werth notes:
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A written discourse w ill often go to considerable pains to make this kind o f  information 
available (consider all those novels which begin: ‘As I  write these pages, fifty  years have 
passed  since the tumultuous events I  shall shortly describe. Sitting here in my comfortable 
apartment, it is hard to believe th a t...’).
(Werth 1999: 187)
Thus, the discourse worlds of written texts constitute the extreme end of the scale, in 
which cases it is extremely rare for the writer and reader to occupy the same physical 
space.
More often than not, the language produced, even within a prototypical discourse world, 
will concern a situation which is remote in either time or space (or both) from the 
mutually manifest surroundings of the participants. The boundaries of the text world 
will therefore need to be established overtly, usually with one participant describing the 
text world for the benefit of the other. The text world thus operates at the modality level 
of ‘location’ and is further defined by Werth (1999: 80) as ‘a deictic space, defined 
initially by the discourse itself, and specifically by the deictic and referential elements in 
it’. He goes on to explain:
Assuming that we are at the beginning o f  our prototypical discourse, we need to be able to 
retrieve, at least in a general way, the time, place, entities and relevant relationships 
between them.
(Werth 1999: 187, original emphasis retained) 
Werth provides a list o f examples of deictic world-builders which may be used to
establish the boundaries of a text world:
Tim e (t): time-zone o f  verbs; adverbs o f  time; temporal adverbial clauses, e.g. it was a dark  
and storm y night, in 1979, at two minutes past midnight on A pril 7th, 10'9 seconds after the 
Big Bang, as soon as John realised.
Place (/): locative adverbs; NPs with locative meaning, locative adverbial clauses, e.g. on 
the table, at Lewes in the county o f  Sussex, there was an o ld  barn..., where the sea meets 
the sky.
Entities (c and o): noun phrases, concrete or abstract, o f  all structures and in any position, 
e.g. my frien d  Susan, these are the voyages o f  the starship Enterprise, a policem an who had  
lost his way, the square root o f  -1, your attitude to market forces.
(Werth 1999: 187, original emphasis retained)
87
Werth notes that time and place tend to be explicitly mentioned only at the beginning of 
a discourse and, since they are not usually a central focus of the discourse as a whole, 
only time will continue to be marked linguistically by means of the tense used.
Werth follows Reichenbach’s (1947) tense system, regarding verbal time expressions as 
consisting of a Speech Time (ST) component, a Reference Time (RT) component, and 
an Event Time (ET) component. Additionally, he argues that this system is most 
productive if the separate components are viewed as being layered (see Homstein 1977, 
Rohrer 1985, and Adelaar and Lo Cascio 1985, for alternative analyses of time 
expressions). Taking ST as the start point of the discourse, RT as the principal time 
period of the situation concerned, and ET as the time of the actual event described, 
Werth offers the following examples of these concepts:
(a) Pete had finished by 4 o ’clock:
ST (now) is preceded by RT (4 o ’clock), and both are preceded by 
ET (Pete finishes) or alternatively: (ST -  RT) -  ET
(b) Pete w ill have finished by 4 o ’clock:
ST (now) is followed by RT (4 o ’clock) and both are preceded by 
ET (Pete finishes)', otherwise: (ST + RT) -  ET.
(Werth 1999: 169)
The important fact about these examples, Werth argues, is that the ET/RT relationship 
remains the same, while the position of ST in relation to RT shifts. He advocates a 
double relationship:
... the first is RT/ST, with RT capable o f  being Before (-) , Simultaneous with (=) or After 
(+) ST. This provides the basic three-way semantic time (or time-zone) distinction. The 
second relationship is RT/ET; again, there is a choice between Before, Simultaneous with 
or After, but now it is ET which lays this on to RT, fine-tuning the basic threeway 
distinction into nine temporally related values.
(Werth 1999: 169-171)
Thus, the ST/RT relationship defines the background time-zone of the text world, while 
the RT/ET relationship defines the foregrounded time. The nine temporal values, and 
their related English tenses, are shown in Figure 3g below (adapted from Werth 1999: 
171).
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ST/RT
RT/ET
precedes
S T -R T
same as 
ST = RT
follows 
ST + RT
precedes
R T -E T
Past Perfect Present Perfect Future Perfect
same as 
RT = ET
Past Simple 
Past Continuous
Present Continuous ‘True Future’
follows 
RT + ET
‘ Future-in-the-Past’ Intentional Future (Future + adverb)
Figure 3g. Temporal Values and English Tenses
When ST = RT, the text world time-zone is the Present; the foregrounded situations 
relate to the present situation surrounding the participants and the discourse itself is 
therefore likely to be about some aspect of the discourse world. Werth also includes a 
Present time-zone tense in his system which he calls the ‘Intentional Future’ and which 
relates to the projection of the subject’s current state of mind. This is separate from the 
‘True Future’, which Werth claims ‘represents a prediction, speculation, etc., based in 
the Future time zone’ (1999: 171). When ST -  RT, the text world is in the Past time- 
zone, and when ST + RT, the text world is in the Future. In either case, the discourse 
will refer ‘into’ some text world context. Werth explains:
... the ST/RT relationship gives the general time zone (and in the text this might be 
expressed by adverbs or by the preceding sentences), while the RT/ET relationship fine- 
tunes the more precise time o f  the situation within that time zone. To represent this 
layering, I bracket the notation as follows:
(ST -  RT) -  ET
Thus RT is established by the more deeply embedded (bracketed) part o f  the expression, 
while ET is determined in relation to this.
(Werth 1999: 172)
The following examples of Werth’s system are adapted from Werth (1999: 172):
1. (ST = RT) = ET (Present Simple, Present Continuous)
I’m bleeding.
2. (ST = RT) -  ET (Present Perfect)
I’ve finished.
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3. (ST = RT) + ET (Intentional Future)
I’m going to finish soon.
4. (ST -  RT) =  ET (Past Simple, Past Continuous)
John left at 4 o ’clock.
5. (ST + RT) = ET (True Future)
Tomorrow will be foggy.
6. (ST -  RT) -  ET (Past Perfect)
John had left earlier.
7. (ST -  RT) + ET (Future-in-the-Past)
John would die later that evening.
8. (ST + RT) -  ET (Future Perfect, ‘Past-in-the-Future’)
John w ill have left by next Tuesday.
Here examples (1) to (3) all refer ‘into’ the discourse world, while (4) to (8) refer ‘into’ 
a text world context.
With the temporal boundaries of the text world set, and its spatial location established 
by means of locative adverbs, noun phrases and adverbial clauses, entities and objects 
may also be nominated as present in the conceptual space. At the text world level, any 
sentient beings are known as ‘characters’ and, since the text world is constitutionally 
equivalent to the discourse world, Werth emphasises that these characters should be 
assumed to ‘have the same kind of rational attributes as participants’ (Werth 1999: 189). 
This is a far cry from the manipulation of minimalistic symbols in possible worlds 
semantics and means that characters not only lead independent conceptual lives, but that 
the same logical and pragmatic principles apply to them as apply to the human beings in 
the discourse world.
Werth points out that once entities and objects have been established in the text world, 
the participants need to be able to keep track of how long they remain in the text world 
and where they are situated in relation to others as the discourse progresses. This is 
achieved by means of ‘reference-chaining’: the process of keeping entities in the active
register of the discourse by chaining each reference to a single entity in order to
preserve continuity. The choice of anaphor used to form this chain may depend on a 
number of factors, as Werth explains:
•  If the entity is present in the immediate physical situation, the next link in the chain is 
likely to be a demonstrative o f  some kind; otherwise a personal pronoun accompanied 
either by a gesture or by contrastive stress. (For example: That man [speaker points] 
shouted at me; S h e ’s pretty, isn ’t she?)
•  If the referent is firs t mentioned in the text (e.g. with a noun phrase), the next link in the 
chain is likely to be a personal pronoun (without gesture or stress), provided that the 
distance between the first mention and the next link is not too great... (For example: A 
car sw ept by. It looked like a Maserati. Cf.: John squinted down the road. Yes, it 
definitely looked like a M aserati.)
•  If  the distance between the textual reference and the next link is too great (roughly, if  at 
least a single sentence intervenes), then the link will probably be a definite NP -  either a 
definite form o f  the referent itself, or a virtual synonym, or an ‘epithet noun’ (i.e. a 
hyponym or a metonym).
(Werth 1999: 158-159, original emphasis retained) 
Werth goes on to point out that, if the material which interrupts a textual reference and
the next link contains a reference to another entity with the same pronoun profile, the
use of a definite noun phrase is essential to avoid ‘reference decay’. Werth (1999: 159)
makes particular reference to Cathy Emmott’s (1994, 1995, 1997) work on tracking and
maintaining character constructs in fictional worlds, which is discussed in detail in
Chapter Four. However, Emmott’s model o f narrative comprehension is of such
influence on Werth’s understanding of reference chaining that at least a brief
introduction to the framework is warranted at this point.
Emmott’s approach to linguistic study in general can be seen to be in harmony with 
Werth’s. Her account of narrative comprehension is not only grounded in the same 
cognitive principles as Text World Theory, drawing on many of the same sources and 
influences, but also places similar emphasis on the importance of a discourse approach 
to human language-processing, using full, real texts (see Green 2000 for an opposing 
view). Emmott explains:
91
•  Real text often has a hierarchical structure. A reader needs to be able to recognise this 
structure in order to be able to ‘orientate’ him/herself, but also to be able to interpret 
certain items at sentence level, such as pronouns.
•  In real text, the meaning o f  an individual sentence is derived partly from the 
surrounding sentences, the textual context.
•  Real text requires the reader to be able to draw on stored information from the 
preceding text (and general knowledge).
•  Stored information from the preceding text may also be used to assist interpretation by 
narrowing down the possibilities, such as when a reference item could in theory denote 
several referents.
•  Real text has ‘connectivity’. Sentences are organized so that they flow  on from each 
other and this connection is often signalled linguistically.
(Emmott 1997: 75)
Emmott proposes that readers construct mental representations of the fictional context. 
These, she argues, must contain information about the physical environment and details 
of the spatio-temporal location o f the events being described. Emmott terms these 
mental representations ‘contextual frames’ (Emmott 1997: 104), which can be seen to 
be similar, if  not identical, to Werth’s text worlds. Emmott explains:
I use the term ‘contextual fram e’ (or ‘fram e’) to describe a mental store o f  information
about the current context, built up from the text itself and from inferences made from the
text.
(Emmott 1997: 121, original emphasis retained)
A character becomes ‘bound’ into a contextual frame as soon as the text mentions their 
presence and they may be assumed to remain bound in that frame until the text gives 
any indication otherwise. Although a reader may hold information about more than one 
context at a time, Emmott argues that his or her attention will usually be directed to one 
in particular. She terms this process ‘priming’. Thus, the contextual frame currently 
being processed, and therefore focussed upon, by the reader is the primed context, and 
any characters within that context are both bound and primed. Emmott notes that even if 
a particular sentence does not mention a character by name, common noun, or pronoun, 
readers remain aware of their presence in the primed contextual frame from the moment 
they are bound into it. She uses the terms ‘textually-overt’ and ‘textually-covert’ to 
specify whether or not a character is currently being referred to by the text. The 
complete set of characters mentioned during the course of the text forms what Emmott
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terms the ‘central directory’. This contains knowledge about both primed and bound 
characters and bound and unprimed characters. A further set o f characters, those which 
are unbound and unprimed, may also be included in the directory. The reader will know 
that these beings exist in the fictional world but the contextual frame to which they are 
bound may be unclear at that particular point.
In his own Text World Theory framework, Werth introduces a ‘reference-crossing rule’
(see Werth 1999: 166), which sets out the reasoning process by which readers may
avoid losing track of characters’ movements and attributes. He identifies both zero
reference (0 ) and pronouns as instances where it may be easy to confuse referents,
giving the following example of ambiguity:
He sat on his stool and 0  watched her as she busied herself 0  clearing away the dishes and 
0  didn’t say anything.
(Werth 1999: 166)
The final zero is ambiguous between he and she and Werth offers the following rule as a 
recovery procedure:
R eference-crossing rule
(a) When a reference chain crosses another or decays:
(i) use an anaphor which is at least high enough on the information hierarchy to 
restore the reference, or
(ii) re-order the clauses to avoid the crossing or reduce the decay
(b) Information hierarchy:
Definite NP > Pronoun > (Gender > Number) > Zero
(Werth 1999: 166, original emphasis retained)
Thus, our initial example can be solved in one of two ways:
Repair Strategy 1
He sat on his stool and 0  watched her as she busied herself 0  clearing away the dishes and 
he didn’t say anything.
Repair Strategy 2
He sat on his stool and 0  didn 7 say anything and 0  watched her as she busied herself 0  
clearing away the dishes.
Further discussion of Emmott’s explanation of reference repair strategies in narrative is 
presented in Chapter Four of this thesis. Section 3.3.2 below now goes on to look at the
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structure o f that part of the text world which makes up Werth’s category of the 
‘informational function’ of language, mentioned in section 3.2.0 above.
3.2.2 Function-Advancing Propositions
We have seen that the deictic and referential expressions, or world-building elements, 
contained within a text establish the spatial and temporal boundaries of the text world 
and any entities or objects which may be present. These details can be seen to form a 
kind of static background against which the events of the narrative are played out. 
Throughout the introductory half of his final monograph, Werth (1999) describes the 
elements which make up the foregrounded ‘story’ of the text as ‘plot-advancing’, a term 
borrowed from Martin Joos (1964):
A ‘plot-advancing proposition’ is a non-deictic expression which functions, for the most 
part, as part o f  the motivation for setting up a text world in the first place: it tells the story, 
it prosecutes the argument -  in short, it helps to satisfy the speech act upon which the 
discourse at that point is founded.
(Werth 1999: 190)
However, Werth identifies a number of shortcomings with using Joos’ ‘plot-advancing’ 
terminology for the more advanced chapters of Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual 
Space in Discourse. He explains:
... as a technical term, it sends out too restricted a signal: it is fine for narrative texts, but 
for descriptive, discursive, instructive, etc., texts, it is too limited. I therefore propose to 
substitute for it the broader term ‘function-advancing’.
(Werth 1999: 190, original emphasis retained)
Within the category of function-advancing elements Werth then specifies a number of 
sub-categories relating to individual text types, a selection of which are set out in Figure 
3h below, adapted from Werth (1999: 191). He argues that all of these sub-categories 
will be manifested propositionally within the text. This claim raises the question of the 
precise nature of Werth’s understanding of what actually constitutes a proposition in the 
first place. He offers the definition of a proposition as a ‘unit o f  meaning’ (Werth 1999: 
194), and explains:
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... unlike a sem antic predicate, such as <Human>, which by itself makes no predication 
(in traditional terms, ‘does not make complete sense’), a proposition is independent, in the 
sense that it is a stand-alone semantic unit. This means that a semantic predicate by itself 
does not say anything about its text world, no more than does the word human by itself. To 
say something about its text world, a semantic predicate must be incorporated into a 
proposition, just as a word must be part o f a sentence, even if  only a sentence implied by 
the context.
(Werth 1999: 194-195, original emphasis retained) 
Werth argues that, by themselves, predicates like <cat> or <table> not only have no
connection to any text world entity and, therefore, do not refer, but also do not function.
In order to function, a semantic predicate must ‘team up’ with other semantic predicates
and logical functions.
Text Type Predicate Type Function Speech Act
Narrative action, event plot-advancing report, recount
Descriptive: scene state scene-advancing describe scene
Descriptive: person state, property person-advancing describe character
Descriptive: routine habitual routine-advancing describe routine
Discursive relational argument-advancing postulate, conclude...
Instructive imperative goal-advancing request, command...
Figure 3h. Sub-Categories o f  Function-Advancers
Furthermore, Werth proposes that his definition of a situation, ‘in which some 
nominated entities (protagonists and objects) were in some state or relationship at a 
certain time, in a certain place’ (Werth 1999: 195), not only holds as the configuration 
of discourse worlds and text worlds but o f propositions as well. Following case theory 
grammarians such as Fillmore (1968) and Langendoen (1969), Werth regards
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propositions as akin to a kind of ‘scenario’ containing an arrangement o f objects, or an
‘event’ involving some kind of action or change of state. In traditional accounts,
however, Werth notes that
The meaning o f  any proposition is considered to be the conditions which give its truth- 
value, and every proposition must possess a truth-value in order to be a proposition.
(Werth 1999: 196)
As we have already seen in section 3.1.3 above, there are numerous problems involved 
with any objectivist attempt to establish the truth-value of a proposition, some of which 
are emphasised by Werth a second time:
. .. predicate calculus has no machinery for taking context into account, so extensions o f  
constants have to be known by virtue o f  the proposition alone -  they have, in other words, 
to be ‘just known’. It is assumed, therefore, that reference is a straightforward matter o f  
being able to designate the extension o f  a constant ‘in the world’. But this assumes that 
constants have an extension in the world, i.e. that they are objectively definable, and the 
definition holds for that proposition whatever the circumstances o f  use.
(Werth 1999: 196)
Under the Text World Theory approach, however, propositions are regarded as 
representations of simple situations and, as Werth points out, ‘the domain of these 
situations is always a world, defined by the discourse itse lf (Werth 1999: 196). This 
means that reference is always resolved at a local, context-sensitive level, within the 
text world.
To return to Figure 3h above, Werth considers function-advancing propositions to be of 
two main types. The first of these, to which Werth applies the broad term 
‘modifications’, relates chiefly to those propositions which advance the descriptive and 
discursive functions shown in the diagram. Werth is keen to distinguish between basic 
world-building and more complex description, as he explains that
the distinction between world-building and description-advancing is sometimes difficult to 
draw. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish descriptive elements which belong to the 
world-building phase from those which advance the descriptive function. The former 
consist o f  elements which establish the presence in the text world o f  certain entities, 
including any descriptive material necessary to identify them (such as restrictive relatives); 
the latter provide further modification on elements already nominated as present in the text 
world.
(Werth 1999: 198)
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Werth also identifies three further categories of description; ‘identifying’, 
‘individuating’ and ‘framing’. The first of these, identifying, is part of the world- 
building process, through which an entity is nominated as part of the text world. 
Individuation advances the description function by providing further detail about that 
entity’s nature and attributes. Finally, framing is the process by which our knowledge of 
an entity is broadened yet further by the addition o f information from memory.
Werth’s second classification of function-advancers, ‘path-expressions’, may denote * 
either a steady state, as in the case of circumstances, states and metonymies, or a change 
of state, either real or abstract, as in the case of actions and processes. Werth’s choice of 
terminology is not accidental and his notion of a ‘path’ is drawn directly from 
Langacker’s (1987, 1990, 1991) usage as part of his ‘Cognitive Grammar’ (see also 
Talmy 1978 and 1988). Briefly, Langacker’s approach can be seen to follow on from 
Gestalt psychologists’ observations on perceptual prominence in human responses to 
visual stimuli (see Dember and Warm 1979, Haber and Hershenson 1980). According to 
their hypotheses, perception is separated into ‘figure’, or that aspect of the visual 
stimulus which is most outstanding, and ‘ground’, which forms the less prominent 
background. In Langacker’s model of the image-schematic structure o f human 
cognition, he proposes that image-schemas consist of a ‘trajector’, the most prominent 
element in the configuration, travelling along a particular ‘path’, in relation to a 
‘landmark’, which can be seen as a direct development of the notion of ground.
Langacker’s formula is equally applicable to both abstract and concrete motion and is 
adopted by Werth, who makes explicit that he ‘will assume that all action and process
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predications, whether concrete or abstract, are path statements, i.e. mappings from a 
source situation to a goal situation’ (Werth 1999: 198). He goes on to explain:
Paths may cover various kinds o f  source-goal relationships, from simple intransitivity  
{John is snoring =  ‘The entity John maps onto a situation by way o f  a snoring function’) to 
more complex functions {John claimed that dogs d id n ’t like him =  ‘The entity John maps 
on (by a claiming function) to the situation in which no member o f  the set o f  dogs maps on 
to John (by a liking function)’.
(Werth 1999: 198, original emphasis retained)
Once again, the particular significance of these specifications is discussed in further
detail during my application of Text World Theory to The Music o f  Chance in section
3.4.1 below. For the moment, however, this chapter now moves on to examine the third
and final layer of Werth’s text world framework.
3.3.0 The Sub-World
So far we have seen that the participants in the discourse world are responsible for the 
creation of a text world in which propositions are advanced and make complete sense. 
The structure and contents of this world are decided by means of negotiation. Section
3.1.3 explained the deductive processes by which the participants assess one another’s 
reliability and the truth value of the propositions being expressed, and by which certain 
propositions are incremented into the Common Ground. Once the text world is 
established and progressing, as set out in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 above, departures from 
its basic world-building parameters may occur. In these instances, further worlds are 
generated. They constitute the third and final layer of Text World Theory and are 
known a s ‘sub-worlds’.
In a similar manner to text worlds, sub-worlds may be created by the participants. In 
such cases its creators are free, particularly in face-to-face communication, to question 
one another’s statements and to clarify any aspect o f the discourse they do not
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understand. When characters communicate within the text world, however, the 
reliability of the worlds that they create cannot be assessed according to the same 
criteria as those produced at the discourse world level. As Werth points out:
... as we shift our focus o f  attention to the text world level, it is the text world, rather than 
the discourse world which provides our conceptual backcloth, and truth, probability, 
reliability and relevance are calculated no longer with respect to the participants, but 
instead with respect to the characters. *
(Werth 1999:210-211)
To explain his reasoning further, Werth gives the following example of a witness in a 
court case, explaining that
the witness is allowed to say that he or she has seen and spoken to a certain person, but all 
references to anything reported by that person have to be discounted as hearsay. Why does 
the law make that distinction? Because, in a court case, the witness, the judge, the 
prosecution and defence, and the jury are all co-present: they are all participants. Witnesses 
are, therefore, open to questioning about what they say -  indeed this is the function o f  the 
procedure. Furthermore, they are under oath: this corresponds to a formalisation o f  the tacit 
principle o f  co-operativeness.
(Werth 1999:214)
What a witness has seen, then, is acceptable evidence, since he or she can be 
interrogated about it, but what a witness may have heard through report is inadmissible, 
since the court cannot directly question the person responsible for saying it. Werth goes 
on:
In terms o f  the court discourse world, the absent informant is not a participant but a 
character. Unlike a witness, a character cannot be questioned and is bound by no oath to 
comply with the principles o f  discourse.
(Werth 1999: 214)
This distinction is essentially founded on those notions of ‘accessibility’, originating in 
possible worlds semantics and described in section 2.1.1 above. A world created by the 
participants may also be ‘accessed’ by them, since they have sufficient information to 
assess it for truth and to follow any inferences and reference chains contained within it. 
The participants, however, are unable to access those worlds created by characters, 
since they exist at a level removed from the immediate situation. The information 
contained within a character world, Werth (1999: 213) argues, can only be stored for 
possible future processing.
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In accordance with this reasoning Werth makes an important distinction between 
‘participant-accessible’ sub-worlds and ‘character-accessible sub-worlds’:
A participant-accessible sub-world is one in which the basic text-world parameters remain 
set as they are, but the participants temporarily depart from them. Since, in the world 
referred to by the text, the participants are responsible for this departure, the details remain 
bound by the principles o f  discourse, and normal discourse processes (reference chaining, 
inference drawing) continue to go through. A character-accessible sub-world is one in 
which the text-world parameters are departed from under the responsibility o f  a character, 
and hence in a way which is unpredictable and irrecoverable from the point o f  view  o f  a 
participant (the reader, say).
(Werth 1999:214-215)
Figure 3i below, adapted from Werth (1999: 215), schematises accessibility between 
worlds. The solid arrows in the left-hand diagram mean ‘has access’ and the dashed 
arrows in the right-hand diagram mean ‘does not have access’. The left-hand diagram 
shows that participants (marked P) have access to other participants, to characters 
(marked C) in a text world that they have created and to sub-characters (marked (C)) in 
a participant-accessible sub-world. The right-hand diagram shows that participants do 
not have access to sub-characters in character-accessible sub-worlds or to any entity 
more than two levels removed from the immediate situation. Characters, on the other 
hand, have access to other characters and to sub-characters in either participant- 
accessible or character-accessible sub-worlds. We should also note that no entity has 
any upward access.
ACCESSIBILITY NON-ACCESSIBILITY
((C))
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Figure 3i. Accessibility
According to Werth, both participant-accessible and character-accessible sub-worlds 
can be of three types: ‘attitudinal’, ‘epistemic’ or ‘deictic’. The following sub-sections 
examine each of these conceptual structures in turn.
3.3.1 Attitude
Werth divides his attitudinal sub-worlds into three central areas of conceptual activity: 
‘desire’ (or ‘want-worlds’), ‘belief (or ‘believe-worlds’) and ‘purpose’ (or ‘intend- 
worlds’). The sub-worlds related to the first of these, desire, have as their world- 
building elements such predicates as wish, want, hope and dream. In order to explain 
why separate conceptual spaces are needed to process these predicates, Werth examines 
the following examples:
(a) Clive wants to marry a millionairess.
(b) Jill has been trying to catch a pike.
(Werth 1999: 227, original emphasis retained)
Here, two senses of the ambiguous NPs in both (a) and (b) are possible, so that either of 
the following interpretations of each may apply:
(a) Sense 1 -  Specific
There exists a certain millionairess who Clive wants to marry.
Sense 2 -  Non-specific
Clive wants to marry any millionairess (who’ll have him).
(b) Sense 1 -  Specific
There’s a certain pike which Jill has been trying to catch (for ages).
Sense 2 -  Non-specific
Jill wants to catch a specimen o f  that particular breed -  any individual pike w ill do.
Werth, however, casts doubt on the traditional distinction between specific and non­
specific determiners exemplified above. He argues that such examples of the 
phenomenon are usually constructed using NPs which may conventionally be easily 
individuated, such as marriage partners and fish. Werth then provides the following 
alternative cases for consideration, which contain less easily individuated NPs:
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(a) My son wants to buy a packet o f cornflakes.
(b) Bill is looking for an aspirin.
(Werth 1999: 228, original emphasis retained)
A simple change of NP, Werth argues, results in the virtual disappearance of the
specific sense. Furthermore, he once again takes issue with the sentence-isolate
viewpoint from which the specific/non-specific determiner differentiation is usually
espoused. Werth argues that, in the majority of want-class predicate cases, alleged
specific-non-specific ambiguity will not be present under a context-sensitive approach.
He explains:
Thus in the normal case, the usual example o f  the specific/non-specific distinction:
9. John wants to catch a fish
will be interpreted non-specifically, since it is part o f  our frame knowledge that fish(es) are 
not usually individuated (angler’s tales and Jaws excepted, o f  course).
(Werth 1999: 229)
The numerous possibilities for interpretation are limited not only by the contextual 
information immediately surrounding the ambiguous phrase but also by the interpreter’s 
wider frame knowledge, which we have seen schematised in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 
above.
According to Werth, then, the specific/non-specific distinction is actually one between 
existential and stipulative contexts. Existential contexts are those which conform to the 
parameters of a single text world, with any entities nominated in the world-building 
process being deemed to exist in that world. Individuated concepts can be seen to fit 
into this category since they constitute a set of properties predicated of an entity present 
in the current text world. Stipulative contexts, on the other hand, require a separate 
conceptual space, a sub-world, to be established, since they describe a set o f conditions 
not fulfilled in the current text world. Thus, the desire predicates wish, want, hope and 
dream are stipulative world-builders, as Werth explains:
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... they build a more or less remote sub-world whose function it is to state what it would 
take to satisfy the desire. At its simplest, this stipulation might be that such and such an 
entity should exist. More complex desire worlds may contain further conditions on the 
properties to be possessed by the entity in question.
(Werth 1999: 230)
Advertisements for job vacancies provide a useful example of the sorts o f fulfilment 
conditions one might expect to find set out in the more complex want-worlds that Werth 
describes above.
Werth’s second category of attitudinal sub-world, believe-worlds, are constructed 
according to similar principles to those which inform Werth’s radical understanding of 
the process of truth assessment, outlined in section 3.1.3 above. The following example 
of a belief-context sentence is offered in Werth (1999) in order to explain his approach: 
John believes that a P ear  is better than a Banana.
(Werth 1999: 233)
The apparent obscurity of this context can be explained by the fact that this is not the 
original example used by Werth in his manuscript for Text Worlds: Representing 
Conceptual Space in Discourse. The names of two leading multinational computer 
manufacturers were replaced with ‘Pear’ and ‘Banana’ in the final version of the text, 
for obvious legal reasons. The general sense of the belief-context is not changed, 
however. Werth’s argument still follows that if the proposition syntactically below the 
belief predicate, i.e. a Pear is better than a Banana, has already been incremented into 
the Common Ground, then the belief-predicate itself will be new information. This 
would mean that not only have the discourse participants accepted the proposition, but 
that the subject, John, also believes it to be true. The following further context is then 
presented in Werth (1999), again with some minor editorial changes having been made:
John has used a Banana compatible all his adult life. The term customer loyalty could have 
been invented for him. He has always hotly defended his computer, particularly against 
what he calls ‘the Californian beach bums’ machine’ the Pear. Recently, though, several 
prestigious professional magazines have put both machines through rigorous testing, for 
hardware, software and user-friendliness. They concluded that a P ear  was better than a 
Banana on all counts. Several o f  John’s colleagues, including some o f  whose opinions he
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respects highly, have switched to a P ear , and finally, reluctantly, he was persuaded to put 
one through its paces. Now  John too believes that a Pear  is better than a Banana.
(Werth 1999: 233-234, original emphasis retained)
Since the ‘prestigious magazines’ have already concluded that a Pear is better than a 
Banana, and that information has already been incremented into the Common Ground, 
the validity of the proposition a Pear is better than a Banana is not at issue here, rather 
it is John’s attitude to the proposition. Werth explains:
. .. within the text world o f  [the above context], the current proposition functions to relate a 
prior proposition to a new fact about John. This is not an opacity-inducing context, since it 
does not concern the truth o f  the embedded proposition E, but the truth o f  the attitude A in 
the matrix proposition.
(Werth 1999: 234)
In ‘world’ terms, where E is already incremented into the Common Ground, the 
proposition John believes that E  can be regarded as function-advancing, since it simply 
reports a ‘public’ element of the text world. However, a second possible context for the 
sentence John believes a Pear is better than a Banana is offered as follows:
‘I’m really in a fix. I’ve got to buy the best computer available for my money, and I can’t 
seem to get any sensible advice. I know there’s a Pear and a Banana, but that’s about all I 
know.’
‘Well, it’s a pretty personal decision, but John believes that a Pear is better than a Banana.
H e’s worked with both.’
(Werth 1999: 234)
In this case, the embedded proposition is new information and the credibility of John’s 
beliefs will depend on who John is, whether a computer salesman or a technophobic 
computer-illiterate. The truth value of the embedded proposition E will thus be 
relativised to its context. This places E in a character-accessible sub-world, where E is 
true. This sub-world is a separate conceptual space from the main text world to which 
the proposition is relativised.
Werth’s final category of attitudinal sub-world, intend-worlds, relate to those speech- 
acts or propositional attitudes clustered around the concept of ‘intending future action’. 
Werth includes promises, offers, commands and requests as intend-world builders. He
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also acknowledges that there is some degree of overlap between intend-worlds and
want-worlds. While the fulfilment of want-worlds may involve some form of future
action, however, Werth argues that, in their case, there is no intention to carry that
action out. He goes on to explain:
Desire worlds [i.e. want worlds], as we have seen, are stipulative (when character- 
accessible), that is, they operate in terms o f  conditions for existence, and this can just as 
easily be existence o f  states or entities as o f  actions. Purpose worlds, though, are not 
conditional, but to a lesser degree intentional. Purposes themselves are intentions, while 
promises, commands, requests and offers involve some mixture o f  the speaker’s intention 
and the hearer’s acceptance.
(Werth 1999: 238, original emphasis retained)
The accessibility of want-worlds is connected to Werth’s earlier tense definitions,
explained in section 3.2.1 and Figure 3g above. There, a distinction was made between
the ‘intentional future’, based in the present time-zone and relating to any projection of
the subject’s current state of mind, and the ‘true future’, based in a future time-zone and
relating to predictions and speculations. In a present time-zone text world, then, an
intentional future would create a participant-accessible purpose sub-world. Werth
(1999: 238) gives the ‘Aims of this book’ sections which open many academic
monographs as an example of such a participant world. A true future construction in a
present time-zone text world, on the other hand, would create a character-accessible
sub-world. Werth explains that
the system as briefly set out here is as seen from the point o f  view o f  us, the participants, in 
our discourse world, in which the notion o f  intention is thought o f  in terms o f  speaker- 
intention. This is the normal assumption when working with tense, aspect and modality in 
the verb phrase, as with any deictic system. Speaker-intention is, then, quite normally 
located within the current text world. But character-intention (that is, third-person 
intention) is not a participant property, but is reported by the participants.
(Werth 1999: 238, original emphasis retained)
Since the participants have no means of vouching for the sincerity of a character’s 
intentions, the content of a character want-world is necessarily only character- 
accessible.
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Werth (1999: 227) acknowledges that there are many other propositional attitudes not 
included in the sub-world system laid out above. However, this brief note is as far as he 
goes in attempting to account for them. Even more peculiar is the lack of reference to 
modality anywhere in Werth’s explanation of attitudinal expressions. Following Coates 
(1983), Palmer (1986), Perkins (1983) and Simpson (1993), the attitudinal features of 
language can be divided into three main categories of modality: ‘deontic’, ‘boulomaic’, 
‘epistemic’, each reflecting a different speaker-attitude to a particular proposition. 
Deontic modality, first of all, is the modal-system concerning the speaker’s attitude to 
the degree of obligation attached to the performance of a particular action. This category 
includes such modal auxiliaries as may, should and must, forming a continuum of 
commitment from permission through to requirement. Adjectival and participial 
constructions such as it is necessary that, you are obliged to and you are forbidden to 
are also possible. Many of Werth’s purpose-worlds, and those relating to commands in 
particular, would appear to fit quite comfortably into the deontic category of modality. 
Consider the following examples:
You should go  straight to the police.
It is necessary that we take a blood sample.
I must take this suit to the cleaner’s.
You are forbidden to stay out after eleven o ’clock.
You may have another biscuit.
In each of these cases, the action being modalised can be seen to set up an unfulfilled, 
future situation in much the same way as Werth describes in his explanation of the 
formation of intending-future-action sub-worlds, summarised above.
Boulomaic modality broadly concerns any linguistic expression of desire. This category 
includes such modal lexical verbs as hope, wish and want, making it practically 
identical to Werth’s category of want-worlds. Again, adjectival and participial
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constructions are also possible, including hopefully, it is hoped that, and it is good that. 
Here are some examples:
I hope that you will be happy.
He wants a new car.
I wish y o u ’d  get lost.
It’s good thatyow ’re pregnant.
Once again, the italicised contexts stipulate the conditions by which a particular desire 
can be fulfilled, in exact accordance with Werth’s own explanation of want-world 
building expressions. Werth’s remaining type of attitudinal sub-world, believe-worlds, 
can be seen to correspond with the final category of epistemic modality. This modal- 
system will be discussed below, as part of the explanation o f Werth’s approach to 
epistemology.
3.3.2 Epistemology
According to Werth, epistemic sub-worlds correspond to situations which are in some 
way remote from either the participants, in the case of participant-accessible epistemic 
worlds, or the characters, in the case of character-accessible epistemic worlds. The 
everyday notion of remoteness, of course, refers to physical distance. Not only is it 
possible for us to talk about certain situations as being more or less removed from our 
immediate circumstances, in such terms as ‘unfamiliar’, ‘inaccessible’ and even 
‘unreal’, but we can also identify instances where a speaker may wish to remain 
psychologically detached, most frequently for reasons of social politeness. Werth 
(1997a, 1999) argues, however, that our understanding of these kinds o f distance, which 
have long been a central concern for logicians, are still based on our notions of physical 
space. Figure 3j below, adapted from Werth (1997a: 249), shows how the conception o f 
time in language mimics that of space.
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Figure 3j. Space, Time and Epistemic Distance
The zero-point, or ‘ego’ (which Werth can be seen to have developed directly from 
Biihler’s (1934) notion of the ‘origo’), is the ‘now’ of the speaker, the Reference time in 
the Reichenbachian terms described in section 3.2.1 above. Past and future time-zones 
are metaphorically deployed in terms of direction from that point. Similarly, our
epistemic system has as its zero-point the ‘actual’, or our sense of what is contingently 
true. As Werth explains:
Branching o ff  from the zero-point into the unexperienced resolution o f  the present situation 
are an infinite number o f  possible futures. These correspond to possible outcomes o f  the 
present conjuncture o f  events, which are in principle equal in likelihood. However, frame 
knowledge, inferencing and common ground knowledge usually also help to set 
probabilities for different outcomes.
(Werth 1997a: 250)
These possible outcomes are not limited to the decision-point of the actual moment, but 
occur at all decision-points, past, present and future. For those in the past, we already 
know how the situation turned out, but, as we have already seen in the discussion of 
possible worlds semantics in sections 2.1.0 and 2.1.1 above, we are still able to 
speculate how events may have differed had an alternative decision been made.
Remoteness can be expressed semantically in a number of different ways. The epistemic 
modal system, which Werth does not refer to, reflects the speaker’s confidence, or lack 
of confidence, in the truth of a particular proposition. Varying degrees of epistemic 
distance may be expressed through epistemic modal auxiliaries such as must, could and 
might, as well as certain modal lexical verbs, such as think, suppose and believe. It is 
also possible to express epistemic distance through adjectival constructions, such as it is 
certain that, it is sure that and it is doubtful that, as well as through the use of a number 
of epistemic modal adverbs, including maybe, perhaps, possibly, certainly, definitely 
and arguably. The epistemic modal system also includes a sub-system of ‘perception’ 
modality. This conveys the degree of commitment to the truth o f a proposition by 
reference to some form of human perception, usually visual. Examples o f perception 
modality include such adjectival constructions as it is clear that, it is apparent that and 
it is obvious that, as well as the use of related modal adverbs such as clearly, apparently 
and obviously. It should already be evident that this account of the epistemic modal
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system conflicts greatly with Werth’s own approach to the same subject. Although the 
remote worlds constructed by the belief-contexts outlined in section 3.3.1 above appear 
to belong to the traditional system of epistemic modality outlined above, Werth includes 
them as part of his category of attitudinal sub-worlds instead. He makes no mention of 
belief-contexts in his discussion of epistemic distance and the remote worlds it creates.
Werth focuses his attention on other semantic expressions of remoteness, noting, for 
example, that indirect speech can be considered to be more remote than direct speech. 
(Werth chooses to refer to ‘direct’ and ‘reported’ speech, following Banfleld (1982), but 
I will use the more familiar terminology, following Leech and Short (1981), of ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect’). While an instance of direct speech will set up a sub-world, having 
different deictic co-ordinates from the text world in which it occurs (see section 3.3.3 
below), indirect speech is a means of further shifting the relationship between those two 
worlds. Consider the following examples:
Direct: ‘I like playing go lf on Saturdays’, said Jack.
Indirect: Jack said he liked playing go lf on Saturdays.
Werth (1999: 241) notes that where direct speech contains the original words spoken, 
the narrativised account of the indirect version moves one tense backwards, suggesting 
a shift in epistemic distance rather than temporal setting.
Werth also argues that instances of politeness, including tentativeness and certain kinds 
of conditionality, create epistemic sub-worlds as part of the face-preserving strategy (cf. 
Brown and Levinson 1987). In cases such as these, speakers can be seen to attempt to 
distance themselves psychologically from their utterances. The following are typical 
examples:
(i) I ’d  like a biscuit (rather than I  want a biscuit)
(ii) Would you  be free  next Friday?  (rather than Are you  fre e  next Friday?)
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(iii) We could go to a show  (rather than We ’11 go to a show!)
Each of these can be seen to contain a conditional structure responsible for setting up a 
hypothetical sub-world, as follows:
(i) I f  you  were to offer me a biscuit, I  would like one
(ii) I f  I  were to ask you out, would you be free  next Friday?
(iii) I f  you  'd like to, we could go to a show
Werth (1999: 241) also points out that, even though such implicit conditionals cannot be 
applied to certain past tense structures, e.g. Did you want to speak to someone? or I  was 
hoping to fin d  some work here, an implied face-preserving condition can still be 
identified within them, as follows:
I wouldn’t want to presume, but it does seem to me that X  (where X is face-threatening); so 
assuming X, then it might be the case that Y.
(Werth 1999:241)
Thus, X might be This is the sort o f  place that takes casual labour and Y might be Ifin d  
some work here. Under this analysis, X is revealed as world-defining and can be seen to 
set up a remote hypothetical sub-world.
The sub-world building role of the conditionals implicit within the above examples 
receives particular attention in Werth (1997a) (see also Werth 1997b). Werth examines 
the classical division of conditional structures into the ‘protasis’ and the ‘apodosis’. The 
function of the protasis is to set up a theoretical situation and to mark it as remote from 
actuality. It therefore contains two components: a proposition defining the remote 
situation plus its remoteness marker. This marker may either be in the form of an if- 
clause or, alternatively, an inverted modal or auxiliary (see Fillmore, Kay and O ’Connor 
1988 and Kay and Fillmore 1999 for a detailed examination of these structures). 
Consider the following examples of the inverted forms:
a. Yes-no question: D id you  ph one your mother?
b. W h-question: Who did  you  phone?
c. Exclam ation: D id  I  enjoy that party!
d. C onditional I: Should you  see Ben tell him...
e. C onditional II: H ad I  known, I  would certainly have...
I l l
f. Tags: I  w asn ’t drunk, was I?
g. N egative items: Seldom had I  seen such a beautiful view.
(Werth 19997a: 251, original emphasis retained)
Werth argues that all of the above share a common property, namely that, rather than 
simply depicting a situation, they all ‘take some situation and hold it up for inspection’ 
(Werth 1997a: 251). Thus, (a) does not assert the situation you phoned your mother but 
rather suggests it to the hearer for either confirmation or disagreement. Similarly, (b) 
presents the incomplete situation You phoned X  for completion, (c) considers I  enjoyed 
the party and confirms it emphatically, and (d) and (e) stipulate a non-actual situation. 
The statement I  was drunk made in (f) is retracted and offered to the listener for 
confirmation, and the proposition I  see a beautiful view in (g) is considered and then 
relativised in terms of frequency.
The apodosis, on the other hand, defines a situation which is consequent on the protasis. 
As Werth points out:
... the apodosis can never simply denote an actual or current situation; it can never be 
anything more than a probability o f  some degree -  or, in other words, an epistemic 
expression.
(Werth 1997a: 252)
Furthermore, Werth argues that it is the epistemic nature of the apodosis which governs 
its grammatical structure. He explains that
the apparent simple future (or some other form which can also denote futurity) is in fact a 
high-force epistemic (a strong prediction), while both the so-called “conditional simple” 
and the “conditional perfect” are actually low-force epistemics (in the lower range o f  the 
possibility scale).
(Werth 1997a: 252)
In Text World Theory terms, then, the protasis sets up an epistemic sub-world more or 
less remote from the actual text world and the apodosis is the event, state or process 
which takes that initial situation on to a further point or conclusion. As such, the 
apodosis can be seen as the function-advancing element of the conditional epistemic 
sub-world.
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While existing accounts of modality do not specifically deal with the logical notions of 
hypotheticality and conditionality that concern Werth here, it nevertheless appears odd 
that he should separate the sub-worlds created by such expressions from those related to 
speakers’ desires and intentions. I would argue that both the want- and intend-worlds 
included in Werth’s attitudinal category, along with believe-worlds and any other 
conceptual structure relating to epistemic distance, actually belong under a broad 
umbrella of what could be termed modal sub-worlds. These mental representations, of 
varying degrees of remoteness from the speaker’s zero point, all convey a particular 
attitude to the proposition being expressed and, as such, should be more usefully 
grouped together within the Text World Theory framework. The viability of this 
suggestion is explored in detail throughout Chapter Four of this thesis, through the 
practical application of Text World Theory to Absurd prose fiction.
3.3.3 Deictic Alternation
This final category of sub-world relates to departures from the deictic signature of the 
text world. Werth claims that variations of any of the world-building elements of time, 
place and entity will set up deictic sub-worlds independent of the main text world. 
These variations may be initiated by either the participants, choosing to focus on a 
different time, location or set of entities, or by characters, who may also create deictic 
departures in their narration of memories. Such character flashbacks may have as their 
world-building elements predicates like remember and recall, and are the most common 
form of temporal alternation. They work by taking the narrated action out o f the existing 
temporal parameters of the text world and into a previous time frame. They are also 
only character-accessible, since they present episodes from within characters’ minds 
and do not carry the same reliability as a narration vouched for directly by the author.
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Participant-accessible temporal alternations, on the other hand, remain part of the 
existing text world, even though they may present events preceding the main plot- 
advancing elements. Werth includes any shift in tense in the main text world, as well as 
instances of direct speech, as typical examples of participant-accessible temporal sub­
world builders. He explains:
[Direct speech] is not normally thought o f  as a temporal variation at all, but its main effect 
is to change the basic time-signature o f  the text world, for example by injecting some 
Present Tense utterances into a Past Tense narrative. This takes us, as it were, directly into 
the character’s discourse world: the tenses used are then regrouped around the ST o f  this 
discourse world, rather than that o f  the participants.
(Werth 1999: 221)
We have already seen, in section 3.3.2 above, that indirect speech forms an epistemic 
rather than deictic sub-world, which can be either participant- or character-accessible. 
However, it is important to note that Werth appears unsure over this distinction. He 
claims in the first instance that ‘[indirect] speech... is not sub-world forming at all’ 
(1999: 221), an assertion repeated in Werth (ms: 10), only to contradict himself later in 
an extended discussion of the epistemic sub-worlds created by such speech 
constructions (1999: 240-241). I would agree with the later of these conflicting 
positions, which holds that the tense shift in indirect speech signifies a greater degree of 
epistemic distance than that of direct speech.
Werth argues that both direct and indirect thought, as well as le style indirect libre, 
provide an insight into characters’ mental processes and therefore create sub-worlds 
which are only character-accessible. This claim raises a question, acknowledged by 
Werth (1999: 221), namely that since the reader is being given privileged access to a 
character’s thoughts, surely these cases are participant-accessible? Werth explains, 
however:
... although these techniques make public what is usually private, they also offer only the 
limited viewpoint o f  the single individual. Although this viewpoint is being presented to the 
reader with crystal clarity, the thinker, as a non-participant, is allowed to entertain any
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bizarre kind o f  proposition without having to subject it to the normal safeguards o f  
discourse.
(Werth 1999: 221)
However privileged the insight, then, there can be no guarantee o f the truth or viability 
of its contents. Werth offers the example of the thought-processes of a schizophrenic as 
a possible example of the sort of suspect material to which a reader may be gaining 
access. Although Werth includes his discussion of direct and indirect thought in the 
deictic sub-world section of Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse 
(1999), it is not clear whether he is claiming that this is the type of world such 
constructions create. Consider the following examples of direct and indirect thought 
representation:
Direct: ‘I love Sundays’, thought Jack.
Indirect: Jack thought he loved Sundays.
It appears that the direct form fits comfortably into the deictic alternation category, 
showing the same injection of present tense utterances into past tense narration as direct 
speech, thus changing the time signature of the text world. Indirect thought, however, 
does not follow the same pattern. Rather, the tense shift in the narrativised indirect 
version suggests the same epistemic distance as that created by indirect speech. This 
would seem to suggest that direct thought representation creates a character-accessible 
deictic sub-world, while indirect thought creates a character-accessible epistemic sub­
world.
Variations in the temporal co-ordinates of the text world frequently also cause a 
subsequent variation in its spatial parameters as well. This is particularly common with 
flashbacks, which often project the reader into a sub-world which depicts both a 
different time and a different place. However, spatial deictic sub-worlds can also occur 
without a change in time-signature. Werth describes these as the “ ‘Meanwhile, back at
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the ranch” variety’ (Werth 1999: 224) which act as windows onto other concurrent 
scenes. Occasionally, argues Werth, a spatial displacement may be of equal importance 
in a narrative as the main text world, in which case it would be best regarded not as sub­
world variation but as parallel text world. The reader is then able to ‘toggle’ between the 
split locations. Werth goes on:
This depends on how independent from each other the alternate locations are. In cases 
where the action simply ‘moves on’, it seems plausible that a whole new set o f  parameters 
should be defined, and hence a separate text world... In other cases, there will be parallel 
scenarios which both (all) relate to a single principal situation. In such cases, it will be 
preferable to think in terms o f  parallel sub-worlds within a single text world.
(Werth 1999: 225)
Precisely how long the action in a new location should ‘move on’ before it can be 
considered an autonomous situation is never made clear, however. Werth provides no 
further detail on how the differentiation between text world and extended deictic sub­
world might be made.
Indeed, Text World Theory is unique in its specification of deictic alternation as a 
world-forming element. Unlike epistemic and attitudinal worlds, which have obvious 
theoretical roots in logic and possible worlds semantics, deictic sub-worlds have no 
apparent precursor in any other ‘worlds’ framework. A possible reason for this is 
suggested by the numerous problems which arise from Werth’s inclusion of deictic 
shifts as separate worlds, many of which seem to be associated with his choice of 
terminology. According to the hierarchical structure of Text World Theory, swZ?-worlds 
can be seen as conceptual detours which have a sub-ordinate relationship to the central 
text world. However, even short stories may contain dozens of deictic displacements 
and novels may contain many hundreds. Under Werth’s approach, the opening scene of 
every narrative would have to be regarded as the main text world for that discourse. All 
subsequent deviations from the world-building parameters of that world are then sub­
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worlds of one sort or another. But is this how literary texts are really structured? Surely 
readers rarely encounter texts whose opening lines remain as some sort of central 
reference point through to the novel’s end. Werth’s vague acknowledgement that there 
may be numerous text worlds of equal status presented in the course o f a narrative falls 
considerably short of a satisfactory explanation of this common, if  not universal, 
discourse feature. Similarly questionable is Werth’s account of entity displacement as a 
further deictic sub-world building element:
Just as it is possible to set up alternative times and alternative places within a single text 
world, it is also possible to set up alternative (sets of) entities (characters or objects). As 
with split locations, the different sets o f  entities can be co-equal -  attention is equally 
divided between the various sets. Or we can have a main set and a subsidiary set.
(Werth 1999: 227)
The suggestion here that an entirely separate conceptual structure is needed in order for 
the reader to shift his or her focus from one set of textual entities to another seems 
somewhat extreme. Indeed, Emmott’s (1997) alternative choice o f terminology in her 
theory of narrative comprehension, already briefly mentioned in section 3.2.1 above, 
provides an interesting alternative explanation.
We have already seen how Emmott’s account of the processes of binding and priming 
allows for the fact that readers may hold information about more than one context at a 
time, yet have their attention directed to just one situation in particular. Instead of 
‘worlds’, Emmott discusses deictic structure in terms of ‘frames’ and at no point 
specifies that one particular type of frame should be considered as superordinate to any 
other. Thus, while instances of epistemic distancing or the expression of a particular 
attitudinal stance may cause obvious remote situations to be constructed in the minds of 
readers, they are nonetheless able to track the countless scene-changes and character 
movements enacted during the course of a narrative without having to refer to an 
overarching conceptual hierarchy. This is the process known in Emmott’s terms as
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‘frame-switching’, by which the reader simply ‘ceases to directly monitor one frame 
and starts monitoring another’ (Emmott 1997: 147). The viability of incorporating this 
area of Emmott’s framework into a modified version of Text World Theory is explored 
in section 4.3.0 of this thesis. With the basic methodological foundations of Werth’s 
own version of the text world model now established, however, section 3.4.0 now goes 
on to examine the typical practical use to which Werth put his framework during his 
lifetime.
3.4.0 Narratological Perspectives
Following the exposition of the central tenets of Text World Theory presented in the 
preceding sections, in the remainder of this chapter I provide a practical demonstration 
of Werth’s typical text world approach to discourse study. Both the preliminary and 
extended applications of Text World Theory to Paul Auster’s (1992) The Music o f  
Chance which follow not only offer an example of Werth’s model at work, but also 
begin the further evaluation, which forms the focus of the latter half of this thesis, of the 
advantages and limits of Werth’s approach. Section 3.4.1 provides an initial illustration 
of the three levels of Text World Theory detailed in this chapter so far, through the text 
world analysis of the opening paragraph of The Music o f  Chance. As already mentioned 
in section 1.1, Auster’s novel can be seen to be situated at the most realist extreme of 
the cline of Absurd novels examined during the course of this thesis. It relates the story 
of Nashe and Pozzi, two characters who form an unlikely alliance as gambling partners 
following a chance meeting by the side of a deserted road. Nashe gives Pozzi the 
financial backing necessary for him to take part in a high-stakes poker game with two 
eccentric millionaires, Flower and Stone. Pozzi loses the game and the pair find 
themselves heavily in debt to their challengers with no means o f repayment. Their only
118
escape from this predicament is to become employees of Flower and Stone and 
contracts of employment are swiftly drawn up. Nashe and Pozzi are set to work building 
a wall of ten thousand stones, two thousand feet long and twenty feet high, in the 
grounds of the millionaires’ mansion.
The absurd themes present in Auster’s work have received a considerable amount of 
literary critical attention (see, for example, Bernstein 1995, Bruckner 1995, Chenetier 
1995, Little 1997, Wesseling 1991). However, despite the obvious correlations between 
the absurdity of the plot of The Music o f  Chance and that of the Greek myth at the heart 
of Camus’ (1975) Le Mythe de Sisyphe, Auster retains a realist structure throughout this 
particular narrative, which also follows a chronological progression from start to finish. 
The Music o f  Chance thus fits comfortably into Weinberg’s (1970: 10) category of 
‘more realistic than stylized’ Absurdism. To return to Weinberg’s explanation of her 
terminology, already discussed in section 1.1, she states:
These novels are informed by a vision o f  absurdity and have at their centre a passive, 
rationalistic, or hopelessly ineffectual victim-hero, dominated by his situation rather than 
creating or acting to change it. They have a more or less realistic surface, with somewhat 
surrealistic elements. Realism o f  detail, rather, underscores the madness o f  the world, its 
grotesque comedy.
(Weinberg 1970: 11)
The thematic absurdity, yet relatively unchallenging structure, of Auster’s novel renders 
it a particularly useful text upon which to base the initial exemplary text world analyses 
below. As also already discussed in section 1.1, the novels examined in Chapter Four of 
this thesis are, by contrast, situated further along the cline o f literary experimentalism 
and provide the more challenging literary data necessary for the rigorous testing of the 
boundaries of Text World Theory which forms the focus of that section of the thesis.
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Following the illustrative application of Text World Theory to a short extract from The 
Music o f  Chance in section 3.4.1, section 3.4.2 then begins the verification of Werth’s 
claims to be fundamentally a discourse linguist, dealing not only with real, extended 
texts, but also with the context surrounding their production and interpretation. Werth’s 
criticisms of possible worlds semantics, cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics, 
previously set out in Chapter Two, can thus be re-assessed according to his own 
attempts to broaden Text World Theory beyond the analysis o f sentence-level 
phenomena. The only extended application to which Werth put his text world 
framework during his lifetime, namely the analysis o f extended metaphor in literary 
texts, is therefore outlined in section 3.4.2. Section 3.4.3 then goes on to provide a 
practical test of the benefits and boundaries of such an approach to discourse study in 
the examination of the metaphorical undercurrents running throughout the whole of The 
Music o f  Chance.
3.4.1 A Preliminary Text World Analysis
We have already seen, in section 3.1.1 above, that the discourse worlds of written 
communication are usually split, with the real author and real reader o f a text occupying 
separate spatio-temporal points. As such, neither participant has direct access to the 
immediate surroundings o f the other. In cases of written correspondence between people 
who are familiar with each other, the participants may make fairly accurate assumptions 
about the nature of the discourse world their co-participant inhabits. The less familiar 
the participants are, however, the less accurate these assumptions are likely to become. 
In the case of a novel like The Music o f  Chance, for example, the contents o f the 
author’s discourse world may only be guessed at by the majority of readers, taking clues 
either from the current text or from other biographical information available in their
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wider, cultural surroundings (see Booth 1961). Similarly, although Paul Auster may 
have had some idea, particularly about the readership he expected to receive the novel at 
the time of its first publication, this would most likely have been limited to a fairly 
vague hypothesis, again based on general information. Nevertheless, the preconceived 
ideas that the participants have about one another form a substantial part of the 
background knowledge that each of them brings to the discourse event (see Figure 3b 
above), having the potential to influence directly both the writing and the interpretation 
of the text. As Werth notes, ‘the immediate situations, respectively, of writing and 
reading are presumably less important in such cases than the shared baggage of cultural 
assumptions, general knowledge etc.’ (Werth 1995a: 55). We have already seen in 
section 3.1.3 how the principle of text-drivenness allows the reader to differentiate 
which parts of that general knowledge will be needed in order to process and understand 
the discourse at hand.
The logistics of analysing the discourse world surrounding the production and 
interpretation of a novel are further complicated by the necessary involvement (except 
where an author is extremely unpopular) of a multiple readership as one half of the 
discourse-participant relationship. Each of the resulting multiple reader-situations can 
be considered as an entirely separate language event with its own unique discourse 
world. Even on those rare occasions where several readers may be reading a text in the 
same place at the same time (in certain classroom situations, for instance), each reader 
will have a distinct conceptualisation of the immediate surroundings, based on their 
individual knowledge and experience. Opinions and expectations of the author, for 
example, may differ greatly from reader to reader, depending on the nature and 
frequency of previous encounters with their work. (The frame-based structure by which
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this experience is stored and then deployed during the discourse has already been 
discussed in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 above.)
Section 1.2 of this thesis outlined the practical and theoretical reasons why the analyses 
undertaken in the course of this thesis focus on only one out o f the multitude of possible 
readings of each text. However, it is also important to note that, as with the majority of 
novels, I did not read The Music o f  Chance in one sitting. As a result, the spatio- 
temporal signature of the discourse world I temporarily occupied with the implied 
author o f the text varied several times before the discourse was completed. Indeed, it 
could be argued that each change of my scenery constituted a new discourse world, due 
to the potential of my environment to affect my interpretation o f the text. The discourse 
world of any given author, too, will usually vary spatially and temporally in the same 
way, again with the same potential influence on the text being created. Even focusing 
attention on one particular reading of The Music o f  Chance, then, does not avoid the 
presence of not one but countless discourse worlds.
The complexities identified here raise the question, once again, about the validity of 
Werth’s use of face-to-face conversation as a template for the discourse worlds of all 
other communication types. Not only is there considerable discrepancy between the 
structure of a conversation world and that of the multiple participant-worlds involved in 
the production and reception of a novel, but the split nature of those worlds also renders 
any notions of a ‘joint venture’ (Werth 1995a: 51) of discourse unstable. In order to 
explore this possibility further, let us consider the opening paragraph of The Music o f  
Chance, reproduced below, and its associated discourse world:
For one whole year he did nothing but drive, traveling back and forth across America as he 
waited for the money to run out. He hadn’t expected it to go on that long, but one thing kept 
leading to another, and by the time Nashe understood what was happening to him, he was
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past the point o f  wanting it to end. Three days into the thirteenth month, he met up with the 
kid who called him self Jackpot. It was one o f  those random, accidental encounters that 
seem to materialise out o f  thin air -  a twig that breaks o ff  in the wind and suddenly lands at 
your feet. Had it occurred at any other moment, it is doubtful that Nashe would have 
opened his mouth. But because he had already given up, because he figured there was 
nothing to lose anymore, he saw the stranger as a reprieve, as a last chance to do something 
for him self before it was too late. And just like that, he went ahead and did it. Without the 
slightest tremor o f  fear, Nashe closed his eyes and jumped.
(Auster 1992: 1)
According to Werth’s framework, then, the separate events of Paul Auster’s creation 
and the reader’s reception of this text constitute a unified discourse. As I have already 
mentioned above, however, the majority o f readers will have no direct access to the 
immediate situation(s) surrounding Auster during his writing of the novel. Instead, they 
must rely on their immediate surroundings, including their background knowledge, 
upon which to base an understanding of the discourse. Although previous experiences 
of other Paul Auster texts, stored alongside other propositional and functional 
knowledge-frames, may affect the precise structure of the mental representation the 
reader constructs, the only real connection they have with Paul Auster is the text of The 
Music o f  Chance. They are not able, as in face-to-face conversation, to make inferences 
based on Auster’s body language and tone of voice, to ask questions or to clarify any 
misunderstandings. In this sense, the reader is unable to negotiate the Common Ground 
of the discourse with the text’s author in the same way as if the participants were 
communicating face-to face. Nevertheless, Werth argues that all readers will enter into 
written discourse with the same expectations of co-operation from their co-participant 
as those set out by Werth (1999:49-50) (see also section 3.1.1 above), at least insofar as 
they can expect to be able to construct a coherent text world in which the propositions 
advanced will make complete sense. (This concept is explored in more detail in Chapter 
Four of this thesis.)
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For the moment, however, let us return to the opening lines of The Music o f  Chance, 
which establish the initial deictic boundaries of the reader’s text world. The simple past 
construction, ‘he did nothing but drive’, in the first line of the passage signals that the 
text world has a past time-zone and, although no precise year is mentioned, my cultural 
knowledge enables me to infer that the story is set in the twentieth century or later from 
the reference to driving. Knowledge of the fact that Paul Auster is a contemporary 
writer will also further aid that deduction. The same reference, of course, also allows us 
to assume that there is a car present in the text world, as well as the other explicitly 
mentioned object, ‘money’. The first line of the narrative also narrows the possible 
geographical location of the text down to ‘America’, and nominates a male character, 
‘he’, as present. The first proper noun to occur in the text, ‘Nashe’, allows that initial 
third person pronoun to be chained to its single referent. The second character 
introduced into the narrative, ‘the kid who called himself Jackpot’, is then easily 
identifiable as a separate textual entity by the same reference-chaining process (see 
section 3.2.1 above). The fact that both of these characters are referred to in the third 
person also makes clear the presence of a separate narrator. However, no further details 
are offered about the identity or characteristics of this textual persona. In such cases, the 
reader might assume that the narratorial voice is a textual manifestation of the real 
author and may even use the information and opinions expressed in the text to enhance 
their mental picture of this inaccessible discourse world co-participant (for further 
discussion see Booth 1961 and Toolan 2001: 64-68).
The structure of the emerging text world of The Music o f  Chance can be translated into 
diagrammatic form. Figure 3k below shows each of the world-building elements 
identified so far -  time (t), location (1), characters (c), and objects (o) -  in the world-
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building section of the diagram, marked WB. The numerous function-advancing 
propositions also expressed in the text are represented in the function-advancing section 
of the diagram, marked FA. We should note that the diagram allows a useful distinction 
to be drawn between those function-advancers which are actions, events or processes, 
signified by vertical arrows, and those which are metonymies or predications made 
about the characters, signified by horizontal arrows. This particular schematisation can 
be seen to follow Halliday’s (1985) differentiation between material processes on the 
one hand and relational processes on the other. In terms o f Werth’s sub-categories of 
function-advancers, represented in Figure 3h above, those function-advancing elements 
relating actions and events (i.e. Nashe driving, Nashe meeting the kid, Nashe taking a 
chance) are all plot-advancers, while the further detail provided by the specific location 
and the kid’s name can be classed as scene-advancing and person-advancing, 
respectively.
TEXT WORLD
WB: t: Twentieth Century or later 
1: America 
c: Nashe, the kid 
o: money, car
FA: Nashe
4
drives —> across America
4
meets the kid —> named Jackpot
4
takes a chance
Figure 3k. The Initial Text World o f  The Music o f Chance
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The information carried by the main function-advancing propositions in the passage is 
incremented into the Common Ground of the discourse. The ease with which this 
happens will depend on the reader’s assessment o f each proposition’s individual truth 
value. As we have already seen in section 3.1.3 above, this is a context-sensitive 
discourse world process and its results will depend on the perceived reliability of the 
author of the text. However, as we have already seen, the reader has no direct access to 
their co-participant in this particular discourse situation. Other sources o f information 
must therefore be relied upon in order for the reliability of the text to be established. As 
I have already mentioned above, the narratorial voice (the implied author) is likely to 
form the reader’s main point of reference in the construction o f an opinion on (the real 
author) Paul Auster’s reliability. Furthermore, the high degree of authority attributed to 
authors in contemporary society in general is evident in the shared etymological roots 
of those very terms. This, coupled with the fact that The Music o f  Chance describes a 
fictional world, unfamiliar to the reader, means that the reliability of the reader’s co­
participant may be easily accepted and the function-advancing propositions identified 
above can be incremented into the Common Ground relatively effortlessly. There are, 
however, a number of other propositions contained in the opening paragraph of The 
Music o f  Chance whose truth values are less straightforwardly assessed, requiring a sub­
world to be constructed in the mind of the reader.
The first sub-world forming proposition occurs when the time signature of the text 
world changes from the simple past, initially constructed in the first sentence, ‘For one 
whole year he did nothing but drive’, to the past perfect, ‘He hadn’t expected it to go on 
that long’, in the second. In terms of the tense and aspect system described in section
3.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 3g above, the RT in the first instance is the same as the
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ET, whereas in the second instance the ET precedes the RT. This temporal alternation 
constitutes a basic flashback for which, as we have seen in section 3.3.3, Werth insists a 
deictic sub-world must be created. In this case, the flashback lasts only for the duration 
of a single sentence, as Nashe’s state of mind at a previous point in history is recalled. 
Although the exact date of the alternative time zone is not specified, we can assume 
from the preceding reference to ‘one whole year’ and the following reference to ‘three 
days into the thirteenth month’ that the state of affairs described in the sub-world is 
situated approximately one year before that of the main text world.
A second sub-world, this time epistemic in nature, occurs with the sentence, ‘Had it 
occurred at any other moment, it is doubtful that Nashe would have opened his mouth’. 
The protasis portion of this conditional construction (see section 3.3.2 above) describes 
a theoretical situation, remote from actuality, in which Nashe’s meeting with the kid 
happens at another moment. The apodosis portion of the conditional can then be seen to 
take the role of function-advancer in that remote world, as also discussed in section
3.3.2 above. In this case, it describes the unrealised event o f Nashe keeping his mouth 
shut. The epistemic distance of this function-advancer from the main text world is 
further exaggerated by the additional presence of an epistemic modal within the 
apodosis, in the form of an adjectival construction, ‘it is doubtful that’. Indeed, if we 
consider all instances of epistemic modality to be sub-world forming, as suggested in 
section 3.3.2 above, we can see that this particular conditional construction actually 
creates one epistemic sub-world embedded within another. Figure 31 below illustrates 
this complex conceptual structure and shows the increasing epistemic distance created 
between the main text world and each subsequent sub-world.
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M AIN
TEX T W ORLD
EPISTEM IC
SUB-W ORLD
REMOTE
PROTASIS
EM BEDDED
‘had it occurred...’ EPISTEM IC
SUB-W O RLD
MODALISED
APODOSIS
‘it is doubtful that...’
Figure 31. Embedded Epistemic Sub-World
Further examples of exaggerated epistemic distance can be found elsewhere in the 
opening paragraph of The Music o f  Chance, namely with the inclusion in the passage of 
what Uspensky (1973) and Fowler (1986) refer to as verba sentiendi, or words denoting 
thoughts, feelings and perceptions. In the extract under analysis, these words occur as 
Nashe’s state o f mind is revealed to the reader by means of the omniscient narrator:
He hadn’t expected  it to go on that long, but one thing kept leading to another, and by the 
time Nashe understood  what was happening to him, he was past the point o f  wanting  it to 
end... because he had already given up, because he f ig u red  there was nothing to lose 
anymore, he saw  the stranger as a reprieve, at last a chance to do something for him self 
before he was too late.
(Auster 1992: 1, my emphasis) 
Fowler (1986) differentiates between this type of internal narration and that which 
describes events external to any participating character’s consciousness. He further 
divides internal narration into Type A: a highly subjective mode of mainly first-person 
narration, characterised by extensive use of modality and verba sentiendi, and Type B: 
in which events are portrayed from the perspective of an omniscient narrator, also 
characterised by extensive use of verba sentiendi. The extract from The Music o f
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Chance above fits into the latter of these two categories and is, of course, an example of 
indirect thought representation. It has already been argued, in section 3.3.3 above, that 
indirect thought creates an epistemic sub-world which is only character-accessible, 
since the validity o f its contents are not verifiable by the reader. The extract from The 
Music o f  Chance appears to support this hypothesis and is all the more interesting for 
the fact that one o f the insights into Nashe’s inner thoughts is actually embedded within 
the deictic sub-world of the flashback identified earlier. This conceptual structure is 
illustrated in Figure 3m below, along with each of the other worlds identified so far.
Figure 3m adheres, for the most part, to Werth’s own notation (Werth 1999: xvi-xvii), 
with the main text world outlined in bold and the surrounding rounded frames depicting 
each of its related sub-worlds. The origins of those sub-worlds are contained within the 
function-advancing section of the main text world and are again represented as rounded 
frames. From this diagram, we can see clearly that the first description of Nashe’s 
thoughts presented in the extract (illustrated at the top of Figure 3m) is taking place 
within the past time-zone of the flashback. The origin of the flashback is shown in the 
main text world as an FBK frame and the origin of the indirect thought world is shown 
as an IT frame within the flashback. Since Werth does not acknowledge the epistemic 
sub-world forming properties of indirect thought, the IT notation is my own addition to 
the theory. The second instance of indirect thought in the passage is also represented, 
with its origins in the main text world clearly marked. The final sub-world, arising from 
the conditional construction ‘had it occurred at any other moment’, is shown at the 
bottom of Figure 3m. Its point of origin is marked in the main text world as an IF frame, 
following Werth’s own notation. Once again, the further epistemic sub-world embedded 
within it is clearly discernible in the diagram. In this case, the embedded world arises as
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DEICTIC SUB-W O RLD:
participant-accessible flashback
WB: t: twelve months 
earlier 
c: Nashe
FA:
IT
M AIN TEXT W ORLD
WB: t: Twentieth Century or later 
1: America 
c: Nashe, the kid 
o: money, car
FA: Nashe4
drives -»  across America4,
meets the kid -»  named Jackpot4,
takes a chance
FBK
IT
IF
EM BEDDED EPISTEM IC  
SUB-W ORLD:
character-accessible 
indirect thought
FA:
Nashe —» hadn’t expected... 
—> understood...
-»  past the point o f . ..
EPISTEM IC
SUB-W O RLD:
character-accessible 
indirect thought
FA:
Nashe —» given up... 
—» figured... 
—> saw ...
EPISTEM IC SUB-W O RLD
participant-accessible conditional
WB: had it occurred at any 
other m oment.. . _____
EPS
EM BEDDED EPISTEM IC  
SUB-W O RLD
participant-accessible modalised 
apodosis
W B: ‘it is doubtful that...’
FA: NasheI
keeps his mouth shut
Figure 3m. The Opening Paragraph o f  The Music of Chance
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a result o f the modalised form the apodosis portion of the conditional takes and is 
shown in the diagram as an epistemic modal frame (EPS). Once again, Werth’s failure 
to account for the sub-world forming properties of such modalised propositions, 
discussed in section 3.3.1 above, means that this notation is my own addition to Text 
World Theory. A final conceptual level, relating to the metaphorical constructions 
contained within the opening paragraph of The Music o f  Chance, is not represented in 
Figure 3m. This type of sub-world is discussed in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 below.
3.4.2 Extended Metaphor
So far, the discussion of Text World Theory has been limited to an explanation of the 
basic mechanics o f the framework, presented in the first half of this chapter and 
illustrated by the text world analysis of a short extract from The Music o f  Chance above. 
The aim of this section of the chapter is to explore the wider uses to which Werth put 
his text world framework during his lifetime. As already mentioned in section 3.4.0 
above, Werth claims to have devised a Cognitive Discourse Grammar capable of 
accounting not only for real, extended texts, but also for the context surrounding their 
production and interpretation. The most obvious attempt by Werth to achieve this aim 
can be identified in his analysis of extended metaphor in literary texts (see Werth 1994 
and 1999: 313-335).
Werth (1994: 79) points out that traditional linguistic and philological accounts of 
metaphor (e.g. Nowottny 1965, Reddy 1969, 1973 and Richards 1936) have essentially 
been concerned with the mechanisms of single metaphors, usually contained within one 
sentence. While he acknowledges the broader, cognitive focus developed in more recent 
work on conceptual metaphor (initiated by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and
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discussed in section 2.2.3 above), Werth also argues that Lakoff and his colleagues are 
nonetheless still limiting their analyses to sentence-level phenomena. He criticises 
Lakoff and Turner’s (1989) supposedly global analysis o f a William Carlos Williams 
poem as ‘rather atomistic’ (Werth 1994: 84) and, furthermore, he states:
I believe that there are real differences between literary and everyday metaphor (although I 
would agree that the basic machinery and constraints are the same). One o f  these 
differences is the occurrence o f  sustained metaphor through a single text... Another 
difference, I believe, stems from a difference in what impels the producer o f  a literary 
metaphor as opposed to the producer o f  ordinary metaphor.
(Werth 1994: 84, original emphasis retained)
While Werth agrees with Lakoff and Johnson’s explanation of the production of 
ordinary metaphor, where the speaker will employ language from familiar, often 
physical areas o f experience in order to express abstract concepts and ideas, he argues:
[Lakoff and Johnson’s account] fails to explain a great deal o f  poetic metaphor, unless one 
wishes to argue that poets’ thoughts are always so ineffable that they have to use the 
language o f  directly experienced phenomena to express otherwise inexpressible concepts.
This may be true in some, perhaps many, cases. However, there are also many cases where 
the metaphor is simply used to make the expression more striking (the ‘flowers o f  rhetoric’ 
approach), and many other cases where using a metaphor allows the topic to be viewed  
simultaneously from more than a single perspective.
(Werth 1994: 84)
Werth argues that, in the cases he describes above, metaphor is not so much forced on 
the producer because of the poverty of the language but is, rather, a question of poetic 
choice. He suggests that literary texts contain sustained metaphorical undercurrents 
which can extend throughout the discourse and which contribute to the reader’s 
understanding of the ‘gist’ of the text. These undercurrents, or ‘megametaphors’, 
manifest themselves as numerous and varied surface metaphors. In turn, Werth argues, 
these ‘micrometaphors’ accumulate to form an identifiable, overarching structure in the 
same way that function-advancing propositions can be seen to reveal indirectly the 
macrostructure of the text.
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Werth proposes a theory of literary metaphor to show the following:
(i) M etaphor is participant-accessible
(ii) The relationship between source and target domains
(iii) The ground o f  the relationship
(iv) Any megametaphors
(v) The ability to switch back and forth between source and target domains.
(Werth 1999: 324)
Characteristics (ii) to (v) here seem reasonable and fairly self-explanatory. Werth argues 
that any theory of literary metaphor should comprise sufficient notation to show the 
basic domains of the conceptual mapping process, point (ii), as well as the common 
properties which make them comparable, point (iii), and the basic human ability to 
switch between domains, point (v). His text world approach would also reveal the 
sustained metaphorical undercurrents contained within a text, point (iv). The first of 
Werth’s specifications, however, is considerably more problematic. Werth argues that 
all instances of metaphor in literature set up a conceptual space, separate from the main 
text world, which is necessarily participant-accessible. He explains:
In terms o f  the text-worlds approach, metaphor is essentially a participant-accessible 
phenomenon. What it does is to provide a sub-text which sheds light on the topic o f  the 
discourse, and the one who provides this sub-text is usually the author, and not a character.
O f course, it is possible to put metaphorical language into the mouth or thoughts o f  a 
character, but I can think o f  no coherent instance where we would need to postulate a 
metaphor which was opaque to its originating world, hence character-accessible.
(Werth 1999: 323)
Yet this rationalisation does not appear to fit with any of Werth’s previous explanations 
of the accessibility of character-initiated sub-worlds. Despite Werth’s insistence to the 
contrary, surely the same logical rules should apply to metaphor sub-worlds as apply to 
sub-worlds created as a result of other linguistic structures?
This contradiction appears to be a direct result o f the inconsistent explanation o f the 
sub-world forming properties of speech and thought constructions that Werth provides, 
already identified and discussed in section 3.3.3 above. In that section, I suggested that 
both direct and indirect speech form sub-worlds which are participant-accessible, the
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former being deictic and the latter epistemic, but that the sub-worlds created by direct 
and indirect thought, again deictic and epistemic respectively, are only accessible by the 
characters that create them. Any metaphorical language spoken by characters would 
thus set up an embedded sub-text freely accessible by the participants, but a metaphor 
which forms part o f a character’s thoughts would create a sub-text verifiable and 
accessible by that character alone. These problems, along with my suggested solution, 
are discussed further in the following section of this chapter, as part of the analysis of 
the metaphorical undercurrents present in The Music o f  Chance. The aim of section
3.4.3 is to provide an evaluative, as well as illustrative, extended Text World Theory 
analysis along the same lines as those undertaken by Werth (1994 and 1999). (As 
already noted in section 1.0, Werth’s own applications of Text World Theory are 
limited to the examination of short extracts of texts, similar to the exemplary analysis 
presented in section 3.4.2 above.) The further development of that initial investigation 
which follows is intended as a more rigorous test of Werth’s methodology, comprising 
an application of Werth’s framework for the analysis of extended metaphor to the entire 
novel of The Music o f  Chance, rather than to a few selected paragraphs.
3.4.3 The Music o f  Chance
The linguistic analysis of any lengthy text in its entirety presents obvious logistical 
problems regardless of the methodological framework being employed. In such an 
extended study, it seems reasonable to expect that, while one’s exploration of a text 
should be as thorough and exhaustive as possible, certain editorial choices will need to 
be made in the presentation of results and findings. These choices are most defensible 
when made according to the considered aims and objectives of the study at hand. Thus, 
Werth’s own text world analyses of short, written texts can be seen to be consistent with
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the introductory nature of the majority of his work, while my own further exploration of 
the respective usefulness and limits of Text World Theory demands more extensive 
analyses. The reported findings of those analyses, however, must remain accessible to 
the wider academic community and therefore be reasonably reader-friendly. The 
discussion of The Music o f  Chance which follows, then, is based on a detailed analysis 
of the metaphorical undercurrents present within that text, the results of which are only 
selectively presented. This selection is based on the hypothesis discussed above that 
individual metaphors accumulate to form a sustained sub-text to the main world- 
building and function-advancing components of the text world, informing the reader’s 
understanding of the ‘gist’ of the novel. Thus, the metaphors chosen for detailed 
examination below, from the multitude contained within the whole of The Music o f  
Chance, are those clustered around the central plot-advancing events, with the aim of 
discovering what, if any, additional meaning they bring to the text.
To begin our survey of the conceptual structure of The Music o f  Chance, let us return to 
the text’s opening paragraph, reproduced here for the reader’s convenience:
For one whole year he did nothing but drive, traveling back and forth across America as he 
waited for the money to run out. He hadn’t expected it to go on that long, but one thing kept 
leading to another, and by the time Nashe understood what was happening to him, he was 
past the point o f  wanting it to end. Three days into the thirteenth month, he met up with the 
kid who called him self Jackpot. It was one o f  those random, accidental encounters that 
seem to materialise out o f  thin air -  a twig that breaks o ff in the wind and suddenly lands at 
your feet. Had it occurred at any other moment, it is doubtful that Nashe would have 
opened his mouth. But because he had already given up, because he figured there was 
nothing to lose anymore, he saw the stranger as a reprieve, as a last chance to do something 
for him self before it was too late. And just like that, he went ahead and did it. Without the 
slightest tremor o f  fear, Nashe closed his eyes and jumped.
(Auster 1992: 1)
Alongside the main text world and sub-world structures identified and illustrated in 
section 3.4.1 above, this passage also contains a number of metaphorical constructions. 
The first and most prominent of these relates to Nashe’s chance meeting with the kid, 
which is compared to ‘a twig that breaks off in the wind and lands at your feet’. The
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metaphor which underlies this comparison, namely a c c i d e n t a l  e n c o u n t e r s  a r e  
t w i g s  IN t h e  w in d ,  follows a basic A IS B structure, albeit extended across two 
sentences. It also appears that the metaphor constitutes a further representation of 
Nashe’s inner thoughts, an interpretation which is supported by the predominantly 
Internal Type B narrative (see section 3.4.1) which surrounds it. Following this reading, 
the metaphor can be seen to be embedded within a character-accessible epistemic sub­
world created by indirect thought representation. This structure can be presented in 
diagrammatic form, as shown in Figure 3n below, which once again follows Werth’s 
(1999) notation. Here, the epistemic sub-world of Nashe’s thoughts can be seen to 
extend from the main text world, which is outlined in bold. The metaphorical content of 
that sub-world comprises a further conceptual layer, related to the sub-text the metaphor 
creates.
MAIN TEXT WORLD
FA:
EPISTEMIC
SUB-WORLD
character-accessible 
indirect thought
Nashe
meets the kid METAPHOR
FA: ACCIDENTAL
ENCOUNTERS
MET
TWIGS IN THE 
WIND
Figure 3n. Embedded Metaphor
The second obvious metaphoric sub-world in the extract is of similar structure to the 
first. Towards the end of the opening paragraph we are told, ‘he saw the stranger as a 
reprieve’, a metaphor which again allows us insight into Nashe’s conceptualisation of
his meeting with the kid. In this case, the sub-text t h e  k id  is  a  r e p r ie v e  is embedded 
into the indirect thought epistemic sub-world shown to the right of the main text world 
in Figure 3m above. What is more, the reader may infer from this particular metaphor 
that, if Nashe sees the kid as a reprieve, he must understand the rest of his existence to 
be some form of punishment.
An extended metaphor is also identifiable in the opening extract, evident in the common 
theme shared by numerous connected micrometaphors present. The final sentence of the 
passage tells us, ‘Without the slightest tremor of fear, Nashe closed his eyes and 
jumped’. This, o f course, is not a literal description but instead relates Nashe’s decision 
to pick the kid up as comparable to taking a blind leap. The RISK is A PHYSICAL l e a p  
sub-text, however, is only one amongst many surface manifestations of an extended 
‘chance’ metaphor:
Three days into the thirteenth month, he met up with the kid who called him self Jackpot. It 
was one o f  those random, accidental encounters that seem to materialise out o f  thin air -  a 
twig that breaks o ff in the wind and suddenly lands at your feet... he figured there was 
nothing to lose anymore, he saw the stranger as a reprieve, as a last chance to do 
something for him self before it was too late. And just like that, he went ahead and did it. 
Without the slightest tremor o f  fear, Nashe closed his eyes and jumped.
(Auster 1992: 1, my emphasis)
As the Internal Type B narrative reveals more and more about Nashe’s psyche, it 
becomes apparent that he conceptualises much of his life in terms of risks and gambles. 
The sustained metaphorical sub-text which underlies these mental mappings can be seen 
to develop throughout The Music o f  Chance into a LIFE IS A g a m e  o f  c h a n c e  
megametaphor, which will be discussed in greater detail later on in this section as 
further micro-occurrences are identified.
As the novel continues, the events which have led to Nashe’s current situation are 
explained. The world-building and plot-advancing elements of the text tell us that Nashe
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has a wife, who walked out on him following the death of his father. He also has a 
daughter, Juliette, whom he left living with his sister in Minnesota in order to begin 
travelling across America in a car bought with the inheritance money left to him by his 
father. The indirect thought representations which reveal the motivation behind Nashe’s 
actions in the first portion of the novel, as well as his thoughts and feelings about events 
happening around and because of him, contain a good deal of metaphorical language. 
Predictably, Nashe rationalises complex, abstract emotions by mapping familiar, 
physical sources onto them. We are told, for example, that on seeing his daughter, 
Nashe felt ‘the roof started to cave in on him’ (Auster 1992: 4), but that the new family 
Juliette was now a part of was ‘as solid as a rock’ (Auster 1992: 5).
Here, two related underlying metaphors can be identified, firstly, as e m o t io n a l  
TRAUMA IS A COLLAPSING STRUCTURE, compared with EMOTIONAL STABILITY IS A SOLID 
s t r u c t u r e  in the second instance. Further conceptualisation of emotional trauma 
through physical experience is apparent in the later description of Nashe’s response to a 
break-up with a girlfriend:
... he knew she was right, but that didn’t make it any easier to absorb the blow. After he 
left Berkeley, he was stunned  by the anger and bitterness that took hold o f  h im ... he did 
not recover so much as lose ground, lapsing into a second, more prolonged period o f  
suffering.
(Auster 1992: 18, my emphasis)
In this case, Nashe understands the pain of rejection and separation in terms of a
physical fight. While both of these examples extend over more than one sentence,
however, they do not qualify as megametaphors under Werth’s criteria. He argues that
megametaphors must comprise ‘over-arching cultural images’ (Werth 1994: 97). This
somewhat vague specification presumably means that a metaphorical undercurrent must
not only extend through an entire text but must also shed light on a theme of some wider
cultural significance in order to be eligible for Werth’s ‘mega’ prefix. We can only
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guess at the sorts of themes which might fall into this category, since Werth offers no 
further explanation. Indeed, it is perhaps noteworthy that Werth’s reworking of his 1994 
article on extended metaphor into chapter eleven of his 1999 monograph involves a 
removal of his comments on the necessary cultural significance of megametaphorical 
structures. For this reason, I will follow the later of Werth’s approaches throughout the 
rest of this thesis.
A more prevalent metaphor, one perhaps more worthy of megametaphor status, is 
revealed in the surface metaphors which cluster around Nashe’s conceptualisation of 
freedom in the first half of the novel. Alongside the plot-advancing event of him 
deserting his daughter and extended family, we are told that, once on the road, Nashe 
‘carried no burdens, was unencumbered by even the slightest particle of his former 
life’ (Auster 1992: 12, my emphasis). The r e s p o n s ib il it y  is  a  p h y s i c a l  b u r d e n  
metaphor expressed here might lead one to expect that Nashe’s new-found liberation 
would bring him greater satisfaction. However, the metaphors relating to Nashe’s 
freedom are, on the whole, extremely negative, as shown in the following extract:
After that second night, Nashe realised that he was no longer in control o f  him self, that he 
had fa llen  into the grip  o f  som e baffling, overpowering fo rce . He was like a crazed  
animal, careening blindly from  one nowhere to the next, but no m atter how  m any 
resolutions he m ade to stop, he could not bring h im self to do it. Every morning he would 
go to sleep telling him self that he had had enough, that there w ould be no m ore o f  it, and 
every afternoon he would wake with sam e desire, the sam e irresistible urge to craw l back  
into the car. He wanted that solitude again, that nightlong rush  through the emptiness, that 
rumbling o f  the road along his skin.
(Auster 1992: 6-7, my emphasis)
In this passage, freedom is described in terms of drug addiction, with Nashe as the
animal-like addict. The FREEDOM IS AN a d d ic t io n  sub-text extends beyond a single
cluster of surface metaphors, however, and becomes megametaphorical as it stretches
throughout the first half of the novel:
. .. he had fa llen  in love  with his new life o f  freedom and irresponsibility, and once that 
happened, there were no longer any reasons to stop.
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Speed was o f  the essence, the jo y  o f  sitting in the car and hurtling him self forward  
through space. That became a good beyond all others, a hunger to be fe d  at any price. 
Nothing around him lasted for more than a moment, and as one moment followed another, 
it was as though he alone continued to exist. He was a fixed  poin t in a whirl o f  changes, a 
body poised in utter stillness as the world rushed through him and disappeared... once he 
put his foot down on the gas and started driving, the music would carry him into a realm o f  
weightlessness.
(Auster 1992: 11-12, my emphasis) 
Although this description of Nashe’s addicted, semi-hallucinatory state might appear 
positive, this possible interpretation is negated by the resurfacing of the l if e  is  a  
p u n is h m e n t  metaphor, identified earlier in the text:
For the rest o f  July, he continued to wander, spending as much time in the car as ever 
before, on some days daring him self to push on past the point o f  exhaustion: going for 
sixteen or seventeen straight hours, acting as though he meant to punish him self into 
conquering new barriers o f  endurance.
(Auster 1992: 19, my emphasis)
The persistence of this particular metaphor seems to be connected to Nashe’s guilty
conscience, particularly since we are also told that Nashe is ‘ashamed of himself for
having enjoyed it so much’ (Auster 1992: 7) and feels ‘grubby and depressed’ (Auster
1992: 19) after one of his marathon driving sessions. These elements combine to suggest
that the addictive rush that freedom gives Nashe has a seedy, shameful side and is, on
the whole, a negative sensation.
The arrival of Pozzi (as we later learn the ‘kid’ is called) appears to reconnect Nashe 
with his previous role as a father and family man. The developing relationship between 
the two men forms another sustained metaphorical strain, as the following extracts 
show:
The shirt was so large on Pozzi that he almost drowned in it. The cloth dangled halfway 
down his legs, the short sleeves hung over his elbows, and for a moment or two it looked as 
i f  he had been turned into a scrawny twelve-year-old boy. For reasons that were not quite 
clear to him, Nashe fe lt moved by that.
(Auster 1992: 24-25, my emphasis)
Nashe noticed a shift in his feelings toward Pozzi. A certain softening set in ... for all his 
wariness, he sensed a new and growing impulse to watch out fo r  him , to take on the role 
o f  PozzVs guide and protector... Once a man begins to recognize him self in another, he 
can no longer look on that person as a stranger. Like it or not, a bond is fo rm ed ... there was 
little he could do to stop him self from feeling drawn to this lost and emaciated creature.
(Auster 1992: 49, my emphasis)
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Although the metaphor n a s h e  IS a  f a t h e r / p o z z i  IS h is  SON surfaces regularly
throughout The Music o f  Chance, however, it is questionable whether it could be
considered culturally significant or allegorical enough to qualify as a central
megametaphor of the text. The l if e  is  a  g a m e  o f  c h a n c e  metaphor, for example, is
both more frequent and more universal, raising its head once more as Nashe rationalises
his feelings towards Pozzi:
Pozzi was simply a m eans to an end, the hole in the wall that would get him from one side 
to the other. He was opportunity in the shape o f  a human being, a card-playing spectre 
whose one purpose in the world was to help Nashe win back h is freed o m ... The important 
thing was to remain calm, to rein in his excitem ent and convince P ozzi that he knew what 
he was do in g ... he instinctively felt that he had to keep the upper hand, to match the k id ’s 
bravura with a qu iet unflinching confidence o f  his ow n ... That was the surest way to 
control the situation: to keep the k id  o f f  balance, to create the illusion th at he was always 
one step ahead o f  him.
(Auster 1992: 36-38, my emphasis)
Once again, Nashe understands his position in his relationship with Pozzi through
gambling metaphors and, in the latter half of this extract, he plans to manage the
balance of power between them by using poker-game tactics of bluff and deceit.
Nashe finally decides to back Pozzi and the two of them go to Flower and Stone’s 
mansion to play poker. A variety of negative metaphors are used to describe Nashe’s 
initial impressions of his opponents and their surroundings. Following a tour of the 
mansion, which includes a visit to Flower’s hoard of historical ‘treasures’ and Stone’s 
scale model of a city (the ‘City of the World’, as he calls it), we are told that the two 
men are ‘no more than grown-up children, half-wit clowns who did not deserve to be 
taken seriously’ (Auster 1992: 87, my emphasis). It is interesting to note, however, that 
Flower and Stone’s wealth and their resulting freedom to pursue their individual 
eccentricities are entirely the result of a gamble, a win on the lottery.
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As Pozzi settles down to play cards with the millionaires, the game of poker becomes an 
actual, rather than metaphorical, event and, as such, is described through a new set of 
metaphors:
The three o f  them played cautiously, circling like boxers in the firs t rounds o f  a figh t, 
testing each other with jabs and head-feints, gradually settling into the fe e l o f  the ring...
He was hoping for an early blowout, a massacre, but in the first two hours Pozzi merely 
held his own, winning about a third o f  the pots and making little i f  any headway... any 
number o f  times he was forced  to fold after betting on the initial three or fours cards o f a 
hand, occasionally using his bad luck to bluff out a victory... Fortunately the bets were 
rather low in the beginning... and that helped keep the damage to a minimum... Nashe 
could see the other two begin to sag, as if  their wills were buckling, visibly giving way to 
the attack... one look at the table was enough to tell Nashe that everything had changed, 
that tremendous battles had been fought in his absence... they seemed to have him on the 
run, pushing hard to break his confidence, to crush him once and for a ll... he was 
turning into a corpse before Nashe’s eyes.
(Auster 1992: 93-99, my emphasis)
The POKER IS WAR metaphor is used extensively throughout the lengthy description of
the game which dominates the central section o f the novel. As defeat looms, this
narrative line is pursued to its logical, medical conclusion:
Pozzi had been given an emergency transfusion, but that did not mean he was going to 
live. He would pu ll through the present crisis, perhaps, but the long-term prospects were 
still cloudy, touch-and-go at best. Nashe had done everything he could, however, and that 
in itself was a consolation, even a point o f  pride. But he also knew that the blood bank was 
exhausted... Nashe assumed he was dead... the hand was alive and w ell... I f  Pozzi won, 
he would be o ff  and running again... Nashe could not help feeling a bit let down. Not so 
much for the king, perhaps, but for the absence o f another heart. Heart failure, he said to 
himself.
(Auster 1992: 100-102, my emphasis)
Pozzi blames his loss of nerve on the fact that Nashe leaves the room in the midst of
battle to wander around the mansion, where he takes a closer look at the ‘City of the
World’ shown to him briefly earlier in the day. It depicts, in painstaking detail, an entire
modem city, complete with shops, houses, model people and, most fascinating to
Nashe, a model prison:
Nashe found him self concentrating almost exclusively on the prison. In one comer o f  the 
exercise yard, the inmates were talking in small groups, playing basketball, reading books; 
but then, with a kind o f  horror, he saw a blindfolded prisoner standing against the wall just 
behind them, about to be executed by a firing squad. What did this mean? What crime had 
this man committed, and why was he being punished in this terrible way? For all the 
warmth and sentimentality depicted in the model, the overriding mood was one o f  terror, o f  
dark dreams sauntering down the avenues in broad daylight. A threat o f  punishment 
seemed to hang in the air -  as i f  the city were at war with itself, struggling to mend its 
ways before the prophets came to announce the arrival o f  a murderous, avenging God.
(Auster 1992: 96, my emphasis)
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It seems that Nashe’s first impressions of Flower and Stone have been misguided, as 
this description introduces a sinister note to the atmosphere in the mansion. The 
recurrence of the punishment theme suggests that Nashe conceptualises his own 
situation as comparable to that depicted in the model. He sees himself as the ‘City o f the 
World’, his guilty conscience surfacing once more, this time exaggerated to biblical 
proportions (emphasised in the extract). Nashe’s realisation serves to highlight further 
the literalisation of the l if e  is  a  g a m e  o f  c h a n c e  megametaphor that has occurred. 
Nashe’s persistent mapping of gambling and chance onto the events of his life has now 
developed to the point where his freedom actually depends on the results of a poker 
game.
Nashe’s darkest fears are confirmed when he and Pozzi are forced to pay heavily for 
their defeat, left with no choice but to sign contracts of employment with Flower and 
Stone in order to pay off the substantial cash sum borrowed from them to finance the 
final stages of the poker game. The adjusted balance of power is made clear in the 
following description of Flower’s demeanour:
Flower leaned back in his chair, puffed on his cigar for several minutes, and studied Nashe 
and Pozzi as though he were seeing them for the first time. His expression made Nashe 
think o f  a high school principal sitting in his office with a couple o f delinquent kids.
His face did not reflect anger so much as puzzlement, as i f  he had been presented with a 
philosophical problem that had no apparent answer. A punishm ent would have to be meted 
out, that was certain, but for the moment he seemed to have no idea what to suggest. He 
didn’t want to be harsh, but neither did he want to be too lenient. He needed  something to 
fit the crim e, a fair punishm ent that would have some educational value to it -  not 
punishment for its own sake, but something creative, something that would teach the 
culprits a lesson.
(Auster 1992: 105, my emphasis)
What is interesting about this passage is that it begins with an indirect representation of 
Nashe’s impressions o f Flower sitting in his chair and then slips in and out o f Flower’s 
own thoughts on the situation. The sections of the narrative which signal Nashe’s point 
of view are underlined in the extract above, whereas the verba sentiendi which mark the
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switch into Flower’s consciousness are shown in italics. The two separate epistemic 
sub-worlds which arise from this narrative structure each contain their own embedded 
metaphor layers, shown in bold in the passage. Particularly striking is the fact that the 
source/target structure of each character’s metaphorical mapping is identical (f l o w e r  IS 
A HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPAL/NASHE AND POZZI ARE DELINQUENTS). Indeed, it could be 
argued that this cross-consciousness correspondence adds an extra degree of credibility 
to the propositions expressed in Nashe’s inner thoughts. The reader may now be more 
willing to trust Nashe’s judgement, to increment his thoughts into the Common Ground 
of the discourse, having witnessed their correlation with an external source.
Nashe and Pozzi embark upon their mammoth wall-building task, guarded by the 
ominously-named Murks. The enforced nature of their incarceration is brought home to 
them by a late-night walk around the nine-foot high barbed wire fence that encircles the 
grounds, confirming that there is no escape from the mansion. The theme of freedom 
remains dominant throughout, as both Nashe and Pozzi struggle to come to terms with 
their predicament. As in the first half of the novel, Nashe’s thoughts seem to fluctuate 
between viewing freedom as a prize, something to be ‘won back’ (Auster 1992: 116), 
and struggling with his persistent guilt about his days on the road:
The days passed, and even though there was rarely a moment when they were not together, 
he continued to say nothing about what truly concerned him -  nothing about the struggle to 
pu t his life together again, nothing about how he saw the wall as a chance to redeem 
him self in his own eyes, nothing about how he welcomed the hardships o f  the meadow as 
a way to atone fo r  his recklessness and self-pity.
(Auster 1992: 127, my emphasis) 
Presiding God-like over Nashe’s salvation, of course, are Flower and Stone. Nashe’s
image of himself as a part of their ‘City of the World’ is also repeated:
Sooner or later, Nashe thought, there would be a new section to represent where he was 
now, a scale model o f  the wall and the meadow and the trailer, and once those things were 
finished, two tiny figures would be set down in the middle o f  the field: one for Pozzi and 
one for himself. The idea o f  such extravagant smallness began to exert an almost 
unbearable fascination over Nashe. Sometimes, powerless to stop himself, he even went so
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far as to imagine that he was already living inside the model. Flower and Stone would look 
down on him then and he would suddenly be able to see h im self through their eyes -  as 
though he were no larger than a thumb, a little gray mouse darting back and forth  in his 
cage.
(Auster 1992: 178, my emphasis)
This recurring metaphor emphasises not only Nashe’s helplessness but Flower and
Stone’s sinister power over both him and Pozzi. Any doubts over their dominance are
expelled when an attempted escape by Pozzi one night leads to his being dumped back
outside the caravan the following morning, beaten nearly to death. Murks takes Pozzi
away soon afterwards, he claims to a hospital, although Nashe does not see or hear of
Pozzi again. On the last night of Nashe’s term of imprisonment, the wall completed and
his debt paid in full, Murks takes him to a local bar to celebrate. They go in Nashe’s car,
which Flower and Stone gave to Murks immediately after the poker game, and on the
way back to the mansion Nashe asks if he may drive. Although ‘happier than he had
been in a long time’ (Auster 1992: 214), in a final act of rebellion against the controlling
force of Flower and Stone, Nashe drives the car at full speed into the path of an
oncoming truck.
3.5 Review
The initial sections of this chapter provided a detailed exposition of each of the layers of 
Werth’s Text World Theory. Firstly, those elements which play an essential role in the 
discourse world surrounding the participants in a language event were set out; from the 
co-operative principles which inform the pragmatic behaviour o f both speaker and 
listener (or writer and reader), to the deployment of knowledge and previous experience 
during the discourse process. A number of problematic areas of Werth’s model of the 
discourse world were also identified, including the complexities arising from the 
occurrence of split discourse worlds and the as yet unanswered questions surrounding 
Werth’s emphasis on the necessarily co-operative relationship between the participants
in all language situations. The text world constructed by the participants in order to 
process and understand the discourse at hand was then also examined in detail. This 
mental representation was shown to have a twofold structure, made up of world- 
building elements and function-advancing propositions.
With the basic parameters of the text world thus established, sections 3.3.0 to 3.3.3 
detailed the various types o f sub-world which may arise as a discourse progresses. 
Again, a number of problems with Werth’s typology of sub-worlds were identified. In 
particular, an unsatisfactory account of modality in Werth’s model was noted and an 
alternative grouping of his categories o f ‘attitudinal’ and ‘epistemic’ sub-worlds under a 
new, all-encompassing heading o f ‘modal sub-worlds’ was suggested. In section 3.3.3, a 
further inconsistency was detected in Werth’s use of the hierarchical term deictic sub- 
world as a means of describing a switch in the spatial or temporal focus o f the text 
world. It was argued that Werth’s notion of a main text world, established at the 
beginning of a discourse and then retained as a central reference point to which all 
subsequent worlds are subordinate, would seem inappropriate considering the multitude 
of temporal and spatial shifts enacted in most extended discourses. Possible solutions to 
this and all the other flaws identified during the course o f this chapter, are explored in 
detail in the text world analyses in Chapter Four.
As a precursor to those investigations, the preliminary analysis of the opening paragraph 
of The Music o f  Chance, presented in section 3.4.1 above, provided an introductory 
demonstration of each level of Text World Theory at work. The structure of the initial 
text world of The Music o f  Chance was discussed, with both the world-building and 
function-advancing elements identified and laid out in Figure 3k. A number of sub­
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worlds were also identified, arising from a flashback, a conditional construction and an 
instance of indirect thought. Both the flashback and the conditional had further 
conceptual layers embedded within them. The flashback was shown to comprise a 
representation of Nashe’s inner thoughts at an earlier point in history, creating a 
character-accessible, embedded sub-world at an increased epistemic distance from the 
main text world. It was also suggested that, since the apodosis portion of the conditional 
construction was modalised, it too created an embedded epistemic world. Both of these 
complex structures are shown in Figure 31.
The analysis of the rest of The Music o f  Chance in section 3.4.3 followed the same 
methodological lines as those extended analyses attempted by Werth (1994 and 1999). 
With a focus on sustained literary metaphor, the metaphorical constructions clustered 
around the central plot-advancing elements of the text were identified and discussed. 
The Internal Type B narrative ensured that the majority of the metaphor sub-worlds 
created were embedded into the sub-worlds of Nashe’s inner thoughts and were, as 
such, only character-accessible. However, the reader’s trust o f Nashe’s judgement, and 
of the truth of the propositions expressed in his thoughts, was reinforced by an incident 
in the middle of the novel where Nashe’s conceptualisation of events is shown to 
correspond with those of another character. The Music o f  Chance thus presents Nashe’s 
life through his own eyes. Through the use o f metaphorical language it portrays an 
emotionally damaged and troubled man, escaping his pain by driving aimlessly across 
America. Freedom is a major preoccupation for Nashe, who both enjoys the emotional 
and physical high it brings him and suffers from a relentless guilty conscience over the 
responsibility he has abandoned in favour of his life o f liberty. This information is
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revealed to the reader through the recurrence of a f r e e d o m  is  a n  a d d ic t i o n  metaphor 
throughout the first half of the novel.
Nashe also compares much of his life to gambling and taking risks, evident in the 
presence of a second megametaphor, l if e  is  a  g a m e  o f  c h a n c e . This attitude not only 
leads him to pick up a strange young man by the side of a road, but to entrust the last 
remnants of his inheritance to the kid’s card-playing ability and to risk everything on his 
winning a game of poker with Flower and Stone. The game itself can be seen as a 
literalisation o f the metaphor, as Nashe and his companion, Pozzi, lose their freedom as 
a result o f their defeat. Nashe’s thoughts on Flower and Stone vary throughout the 
second half of the novel, his initial impression of them as harmless eccentrics giving 
way to fear and resentment once the men become his captors. Nashe sees himself as a 
helpless, but guilty convict in their ‘City of the World’, paying his debt for his addicted 
past. However, The Music o f  Chance is not a moral tale. Instead of celebrating his final 
release, Nashe denies its significance, choosing to commit suicide rather than accept 
freedom as a gift from Flower and Stone.
The ‘gist’ of The Music o f  Chance, then, cannot be argued to be simply a sum of its 
constituent metaphorical parts. Rather, it is a necessary combination of text and sub­
text. The metaphors and megametaphors identified in section 3.4.3 give no real idea of 
what the novel is about unless considered together with the world-building and 
function-advancing components of the text. The f r e e d o m  is AN a d d i c t i o n  metaphor, 
for example, is meaningless without some idea of who thinks or speaks it, when, where 
and in what context. A valid criticism of Werth’s own work on extended metaphor 
could then be that he not only limits his analysis to short extracts from longer texts
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(which could later reveal further mutating, fluctuating or developing metaphors), but 
that he also shows little concern for the text-world mechanisms, detailed throughout the 
initial sections of this chapter, at work alongside the metaphorical constructions in the 
text.
Indeed, it could be further argued that Werth’s work on extended literary metaphor 
contains so little use of the main components of the text world framework as to raise the 
question of whether it can still be considered as an application of Text World Theory at 
all. Despite Werth’s criticisms of Lakoff and his colleagues (discussed in section 2.2.0 
above), the methodology he uses to analyse literary metaphor, the same methodology 
followed in section 3.4.3 above, differs almost imperceptibly from the original 
conceptual metaphor framework. Indeed, the only real variation, namely the application 
of the conceptual model to a complete discourse, is achieved by Werth to only a limited 
degree, hence the stated aim of the current chapter to provide a more extensive 
application. The analysis of further, and more experimental, literary texts in Chapter 
Four is based on a more text-world focussed approach which, while retaining a critical 
awareness of extended metaphorical sub-texts, will provide a more precise test of the 
main tenets of the Text World Theory framework. The aim of the chapter is to explore 
the contribution that a fully-integrated Text World Theory approach can make to our 
knowledge of both the poetics of the texts under analysis and the conceptual processes 
involved in our readings of them.
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Chapter Four Text Worlds o f the Absurd
4.0 Preview
The study of Paul Auster’s The Music o f  Chance in Chapter Three provided an example 
of the approach to literary analysis typically followed by Paul Werth. It was shown that 
while an emphasis on extended literary metaphor may reveal a number of interesting 
narratological undercurrents sustained throughout a text, such ventures make little use 
of the complex methodological structures devised by Werth in his Text World Theory 
framework. As such, they cannot be considered an adequate test of the model’s efficacy 
and, in section 3.5, I advocated a fully-integrated text world approach as a means 
towards that end. This chapter is intended as just such an analysis. As explained in 
Chapter One, four Absurd novels have been selected as Text World Theory case studies. 
The complex narratological structure of each novel provides a significant challenge to 
Werth’s framework, allowing a full exploration of the scope of Text World Theory to be 
undertaken in the course of the following analyses. A number of resulting modifications 
to Text World Theory are also suggested throughout the course o f this chapter.
4.1.0 The Third Policeman
To begin this chapter’s exploration of the text worlds of Absurd prose fiction, I will be 
examining Flann O ’Brien’s (1993) novel The Third Policeman, originally published in 
1967. (Parts of this analysis have previously appeared in Gavins 2000.) In keeping with 
the majority o f abundant critical opinion on the text (see, for example, Booker 1991, 
Doherty 1989, Kemnitz 1985 and Spencer 1995), Clissman (1975: 152) argues that
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O’Brien’s central concern in the novel is ‘reality viewed through the medium of 
scientific and philosophical concepts’. This perspective, she argues,
tends to lead to the world o f  the absurd... which [O’Brien] had created out o f  fragments o f  
philosophy, ideas o f  the Celtic otherworld and the topsy-turveydom o f  Sterne.
(Clissman 1975: 181)
The structure o f O ’Brien’s ‘world of the absurd’, however, is not explained beyond this 
brief list, since Clissman, once again in keeping with the majority of critics, limits her 
‘analysis’ of The Third Policeman to a heavily descriptive appraisal of the text from a 
purely literary critical standpoint. Simpson’s work (1997 and 2000) is a notable 
exception to this rule, employing a stylistic methodology to examine the discoursal 
incongruities contained in the text. Simpson’s findings are explored in detail later on in 
this section. Apart from his analyses, however, current understanding of the stylistic 
mechanisms at work within The Third Policeman remains relatively slight and its 
conceptual structure is as yet entirely uncharted.
Compared to the opening of The Music o f  Chance, that of The Third Policeman offers 
the reader little deictic detail with which to begin establishing the temporal and spatial 
boundaries of the text world:
Not everybody knows how I killed old Mathers, smashing his jaw  in with my spade; but 
first it is better to speak o f  my friendship with John Divney because it is he who first 
knocked old Mathers down by giving him a great blow in the neck with a special bicycle- 
pump which he manufactured himself out o f  a hollow iron bar. Divney was a strong civil 
man but he was lazy and idle-minded. He was personally responsible for the whole idea in 
the first place. It was he who told me to bring my spade. He was the one who gave me the 
orders on the occasion and also the explanations when they were called for.
(O ’Brien 1993: 7)
The novel is narrated in the first person, constituting an Internal Type A narrative in 
Fowler’s (1986) terms, which have already been discussed in some detail in section
3.4.1 above. The ‘I ’ of the extract quoted here, then, provides the main perspective 
through which both the world-building and function-advancing elements of the text 
world are focalised. This focaliser is also, by necessity, a character in the text world of
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The Third Policeman. In Text World Theory terms, of course, the thoughts and 
perceptions o f characters are not ‘accessible’ to the reader, who is unable to verify their 
contents for truth and reliability (see section 3.3.0). Indeed, this claim was supported by 
the analysis of The Music o f  Chance in section 3.4.3 above. That novel’s narration is 
different from that o f The Third Policeman, however, in that its omniscient narrator 
occasionally switches from the main focaliser Nashe’s point of view to those of other 
characters. O ’Brien’s text, on the other hand, remains focalised through a single 
perspective from start to finish, with no additional narratorial presence being made 
evident. This difference is one between what Genette (1980) terms ‘fixed’ and 
‘variable’ internal focalisation, a difference which Text World Theory seems unable to 
account for.
Werth (1999) pays only minimal attention to the issue of focalisation in fiction in 
general. Exploring the similarities between his text world approach and Bockting’s 
(1995) frame-based approach to characterisation in the novels of William Faulkner, he 
offers a brief analysis of the narrative voices contained within The Sound and the Fury:
... we can regard the character frames o f  Benjy, Quentin and Jason as both building up 
representations o f  their inner worlds, and also as providing vantage points from which 
commonly experienced events are view ed... Our privilege as readers is to be able to 
experience separate ‘realities’ vicariously. Within each text world, then, the details o f  
characterisation perform a world-building function, while the observation o f  events is 
function-advancing.
(Werth 1999: 333)
Werth also discusses Bockting’s distinction between ‘memories as words’ and 
‘memories as feelings’ contained within Faulkner’s character monologues. He explains:
The ‘memories as words’ part represents the character’s version o f  his own and other 
people’s actions, including their spoken activity; the ‘memories as feelings’ part represents 
the character’s own inner landscape. It seems reasonable, then, to think o f  the ‘memories as 
words’ events as representing more or less public situations in which the character was 
present, while the ‘memories as feelings’ represent the play o f  emotions in the character, 
and as such are essentially private. It therefore makes good sense to think o f  the latter as 
character-accessible sub-worlds, since their content and significance are inaccessible (in the 
sense discussed) to the participants.
(Werth 1999: 334)
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It is unclear from this discussion what logical status Werth considers ‘memories as 
words’ to have and whether a character’s representation of common events can be 
accessed and judged for accuracy by the participants. However, since The Third 
Policeman shares the same Internal Type A structure as Faulkner’s text, the monologic 
nature of which means that each of its separate narrative sections is also fixed with a 
single focaliser, it would seem reasonable to place the two novels in the same category. 
The readers of O’Brien’s text will also be unable to verify the truth status of the events 
described within it, rendering the narrative of The Third Policeman as a solely 
character-accessible sub-world under Werth’s framework. What type of sub-world is 
again unclear, although one might hazard a guess at focalised narration falling into the 
‘epistemic’ category, due to its close relationship with indirect thought representation 
(see section 3.3.2 above).
Yet is this a satisfactory conclusion to draw? It seems unlikely that with a fixed 
narration, where the only access route to the text world is through the perspective of a 
character, the reader might resist incrementing the contents of that focaliser’s mind into 
the Common Ground simply for lack of adequate evidence of its truth status (see Searle 
1975 for a related discussion). It would seem far more probable that typical reader 
behaviour, when faced with such a text, would be to build a text world based on the 
information presented by the main narrator, regardless o f whether that happens to be a 
participating character or not. In such a case, two previously separate levels of Text 
World Theory might be seen to conflate. The world created by the focalised narration, 
which can be identified as an epistemic modal sub-world under the modified Text 
World Theory framework suggested in section 3.3.2, would be taken by the reader as 
the main text world. In the opening paragraphs of The Third Policeman, then, the text
153
world layer of Werth’s framework remains redundant, as the reader builds a focalised 
world according to the details filtered through the main character’s perspective. Figure 
4a below illustrates this conceptual structure.
The redundant text world level is shown at the top of the diagram, with the fixed 
focalised narration (FOC) emerging from it. Since, as Bockting (1995) has shown, a 
focalised narration is made up of more than simply indirect thought representation, this 
notation is a necessary new addition to Werth’s framework. The initial focalised 
narrative world is only briefly established by the clause ‘Not everybody knows’, 
however, and, thus, has predictably limited world-builders. The passage is then 
complicated by the epistemic modal construction also contained within the opening 
clause. The modal lexical verb ‘know’ signifies that the function-advancing details of 
the murder which follow belong in an even more remote sub-world at a further 
epistemic distance from the world in which ‘not everybody’ exists. This world is shown 
to the immediate right of the focalised world as an epistemic modal world construction 
(EPS). Again, this notation is my addition to Text World Theory, made according to the 
modifications to the framework suggested in section 3.3.2 o f this thesis. The first clause 
of the opening passage also contains a change in tense, from the present continuous 
‘knows’ to the simple past ‘killed’. This is a deictic alternation, a flashback, which 
shifts the reader’s focus to a separate time-zone; the first time-zone being the narrator’s 
here and now and the second being a previous time when a murder took place. As 
indicated in the diagram, it is this embedded, modalised sub-world which forms the 
main world of the narrative.
154
TEXT WORLD
EPISTEM IC M O DAL  
SUB-W O RLD
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focalised narration
WB: t: unknown 
1: unknown
c: not everybody, narrator
FA: not everybody
knows
EPS EPISTEM IC
M ODAL
SUB-W ORLD
‘I k illed ...’
FBK
M AIN N A RRATIVE  
EM BEDDED DEICTIC  
SUB-W O RLD
character-accessible, modalised
FA:
narrator
killed Philip Mathers
John Divney friend, strong, 
civil, lazy, 
idle-minded, 
responsible 
for idea
gave the orders
knocked Mathers 
down
Figure 4a. The Opening Passage o f  The Third Policeman
Figure 4a also makes clear how each of the factors described above contributes to the 
construction of an introduction based on somewhat shaky conceptual foundations. This 
is a predominantly function-advancing passage, holding few clues to the spatio- 
temporal setting of the events described, presented at considerable epistemic distance by
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a narrator whose reliability is impossible to gauge. Such vague beginnings are not 
unusual in narrative fiction; the majority of novels give little away in their first few 
lines, drawing the reader in and often raising many more questions than they answer. 
What is unusual about The Third Policeman, however, is how little the novel’s clarity 
improves as the narration progresses.
The remainder of Chapter One continues chronologically, providing a detailed account 
o f the narrator’s personal history along the same heavily function-advancing lines as the 
novel’s opening paragraph. The narrator describes his early upbringing and schooling 
away from home, the death of his parents and the subsequent appointment, in his 
absence, of a man named John Divney as caretaker o f their pub. The narrator’s 
relationship with Divney on his return home from school develops from initial distrust, 
through extreme intimacy (as he takes to following and even sleeping with Divney, in 
order to keep an eye on his movements), to an eventual conspiracy. To rescue 
themselves from the financial ruin which looms as a result o f Divney’s mismanagement 
of the pub, the two men plan to rob and murder a local retired cattle-trader, Mathers. 
They wait for the old man at the side of a country road near his home, hit him over the 
head and steal his black money box.
As the narrator murders Mathers with a spade, however, Divney runs away with the 
black box, telling his co-conspirator that he has hidden it under the floorboards in 
Mathers’ own home. It is during the narrator’s later return to that scene, to recover his 
share of the newly-acquired fortune, that the conceptual structure of his narration 
undergoes a dramatic transformation:
Without stopping to light another match I thrust my hand bodily into the opening and just
when it should be closing about the box, something happened.
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I cannot hope to describe what it was but it had frightened me very much long before I 
had understood it even slightly. It was some change which came upon me or upon the 
room, indescribably subtle, yet momentous, ineffable. It was as i f  the daylight had changed 
with unnatural suddenness, as if  the temperature o f  the evening had altered greatly in an 
instant or as if  the air had become twice as rare or twice as dense as it had been in the 
twinkling o f  an eye; perhaps all o f  these and other things happened together for all my 
senses were bewildered all at once and could give me no explanation.
(O ’Brien 1993:24)
The declarative tone which has characterised the storytelling up to this point is suddenly 
replaced with one of confusion and uncertainty, articulated through an array of 
epistemic modality. With no clear idea of what has happened to him, the narrator relies 
on perceived changes in his physical environment to describe his bewildering 
predicament, expressed modally in such phrases as ‘as //"the daylight had changed’, ‘as 
i f  the temperature had altered’ and ‘as i f  the air had become twice as dense’. 
Furthermore, the narrator shows little trust in what his senses are telling him, adding 
‘perhaps all of these and other things happened’ and admitting ‘all my senses were 
bewildered all at once and could give me no explanation’.
This new narrative structure is comparable to that identified at work within Samuel 
Beckett’s Molloy (1950) by Simpson (1993: 51-53). In a development of both Fowler’s 
(1986) and Genette’s (1980) models of narrative viewpoint, Simpson divides all 
narrative fiction into two main categories. The first o f these, Category A, covers all 
those narratives narrated in the first person by a participating character. This category 
can be seen to correspond to Genette’s (1980) notion of ‘homodiegetic’ narration. 
Category B, on the other hand, covers third person narratives narrated by a non­
participating, disembodied narrator. This can be seen to correspond to Genette’s (1980) 
category of ‘heterodiegetic’ narration, although Simpson divides such texts into two 
further modes. The ‘reflector mode’ (Simpson 1993: 55) relates to those stories which 
are focalised; narrated from the internal perspective o f one of the characters. The 
‘narratorial mode’ (Simpson 1993: 55), on the other hand, relates to those stories told
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from a ‘floating’ viewpoint which remains external to the characters’ consciousnesses. 
Some narratives, of course, shift from narratorial to reflector mode and back again by 
the use of an omniscient narrator, who may enter and leave the minds of characters at 
any point during the course of the text. We have already seen above how some texts, 
like The Third Policeman, may remain with a single focaliser throughout, whereas 
some, like The Music o f  Chance, may alternate between the perspectives of a number of 
different textual entities.
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Narratorial mode
Category B 
(heterodiegetic)
Reflector mode
A positive  
‘co-operative’ first- 
person narrative; 
canonical example: Jane 
Eyre
A neutral
‘flat’ or unreflective first- 
person narration; 
characteristic o f  much o f  
‘hard-boiled’ detective 
fiction genre
B(N) positive  
disembodied narrator 
offering opinions and 
judgem ents (often ironic) 
on the story; mode used 
extensively by Fielding 
and Joyce ___________
A negative
less ‘co-operative’ first- 
person narrative through 
distancing effect o f  
negative shading; 
canonical example: 
M olloy
B(N) neutral 
external narrator refusing  
privileged access to 
thoughts and feelings o f  
characters; technique 
used extensively by 
Hem ingway ___________
B(R) p ositive  
action located within 
view ing position o f  
character, offering their 
opinions and judgements; 
canonical example: The 
A m bassadors
B(N) negative  
disembodied narrator 
trying to ‘make sen se’ o f  
characters and events; 
distancing and 
‘bewilderm ent’ common; 
canonical example: The 
Trial____________________
B(R) neutral
action situated in view ing  
position o f  passive  
character, though 
evaluative modalities still 
withheld; much used by  
Flaubert
B(R) negative  
‘estrangement’ situated in 
mind o f  character: hence 
‘double focalization’ in 
Kafka; often used to 
suggest spatial distance 
between view er and 
object
Figure 4b. Simpson ’s (1993) Modal Grammar o f  Narrative Fiction
Figure 4b above (reproduced from Simpson 1993: 75) illustrates Simpson’s categories, 
along with his final distinctions between the various possible modal ‘shadings’ of 
narrative fiction. As can be seen from the diagram, ‘positive’ modal shading is typified
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by the foregrounding of deontic and boulomaic modal systems and the presence of 
verba sentiendi (see section 3.4.1 above). Negatively-shaded narratives, on the other 
hand, foreground epistemic and perception modal systems and often contain a 
substantial amount of ‘words of estrangement’ (see Uspensky 1973 and Fowler 1986). 
This results in what Simpson (1993: 75) describes as a ‘less co-operative’ feel to the 
narration. Finally, ‘neutral’ narratives are made up solely of categorical assertions and 
are marked by the absence of narratorial evaluation in general.
These categories allow Simpson to categorise frequent shifts in the narrative of Molloy, 
between a subjective, first person, Internal Type A narration and a more externalised, 
Type D narration, in Fowler’s (1986) terms, more specifically as the result o f the text’s 
fluctuating modal structure. Under Simpson’s modal grammar of narrative fiction, 
Molloy typifies a negatively-shaded, category A structure. The narrative of The Third 
Policeman can be seen to be constructed along similar lines, expressing confusion and 
uncertainty through the foregrounded use of epistemic and perception modality. In Text 
World Theory terms, these modal structures add another conceptual layer to the text 
world structure shown in Figure 4a above. The narrator’s perceptions form a series of 
epistemic modal sub-worlds, embedded within the deictic sub-world of the main 
narrative and shown in Figure 4c below. The contents of the initial deictic world, of 
course, are already embedded and character-accessible. The new narrative layer, then, is 
not only positioned at an epistemic distance yet further from the reader’s here-and-now, 
but it also has its contents explicitly doubted by the narrator in the modalised world 
shown at the very bottom of Figure 4c.
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Figure 4c. Embedded Modal Worlds in The Third Policeman
The questionable reliability of the narrator’s perspective continues to be foregrounded 
as he becomes increasingly distressed by his confused state, upset not least by the 
sudden appearance of a mysterious figure:
In the darkest comer o f  the room near the window a man was sitting in a chair, eyeing me 
with a mild but unwavering interest. His hand crept out across the small table by his side to 
turn up very slowly an oil-lamp which was standing on it. The oil-lamp had a glass bowl 
with the wick dimly visible inside it, curling in convolutions like an intestine. There were 
tea things on the table. The old man was Mathers.
(O ’Brien 1993: 26)
160
The narrator is somewhat comforted, however, by the simultaneous appearance of a 
second odd presence, this time internal rather than external.
In my distress I thought to m yself that perhaps it was his twin brother but at once I heard 
someone say:
Scarcely. I f  you  look carefully at the left-hand side o f  his neck you will notice that there is 
sticking-plaster or a bandage there. His throat and chin are also bandaged.
(O ’Brien 1993: 26, original emphasis retained)
The narrator concludes that, since these words seem to come from deep inside him, they 
must be the voice of his soul. The modality of his description fluctuates once more:
Never before had I believed or suspected that I had a soul but just then I  knew  I had. I  knew  
also that my soul was my senior in years and was solely concerned for my own welfare. For 
convenience I called him Joe. I felt a little reassured to know  that I was not altogether 
alone. Joe was helping m e... /  decided in some crooked way that the best thing to do was to 
believe what my eyes were looking at rather than to place my trust in a memory. I  decided 
to show unconcern, to talk to the old man and to test his own reality by asking about the 
black box which was responsible, i f  anything could be, for each o f  us being the way we 
were. I  made up my mind to be bold because I  knew I was in great danger. I  knew  that I 
would go mad unless I got up from the floor and moved and talked and behaved in as 
ordinary a way as possible.
(O ’Brien 1993: 26-27, my emphasis)
As if to pre-empt any doubts about his dependability, the narrator expresses a renewed
decisiveness through his use of epistemic modality. All traces o f previous confusion are
removed. This self-confidence is not long-lived, however, once Mathers’ ghost enquires
about the narrator’s name:
I was surprised at this question. It had no bearing on my own conversation but I did not 
notice its irrelevance because I was shocked to realize that, simple as it was, I could not 
answer it. I  did not know  my name, did not remember who I was. I  was not certain where I 
had come from or what my business was in that room. I found I  was sure o f  nothing save 
my search for the black box. But I knew that the other man’s name was Mathers, and that 
he had been killed with a pump and spade. I had no name.
(O ’Brien 1993: 32, my emphasis)
Here, the modality of the narration shifts again, as the narrator reveals that, despite his 
earlier assertions of his trust in his own judgement, he lacks the basic knowledge of his 
own name. The ‘distancing effect’ (Simpson 1993: 75) o f this negatively-shaded 
structure undermines the reader’s faith in the narrator’s reliability once again.
Nevertheless, based on expectations of co-operation mapped directly from the discourse 
world level, the majority of readers will probably persevere with their efforts to
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construct a solid and coherent text world from the narrator’s erratic and untrustworthy 
commentary. They are encouraged along this path by the intermittent presence of 
footnotes running alongside the main narrative which, on first impressions, seem to add 
weight to the narrator’s authority. The footnotes all relate to the work of de Selby, an 
eccentric scientist and philosopher, in whom the narrator claims to have an intellectual 
interest. At one point during his conversation with the narrator, for example, Mathers’ 
ghost makes the bizarre suggestion that all human beings have a ‘colour’, which he 
claims is determined by the colour of the prevailing wind at the time of their birth. The 
ghost explains:
‘A record o f  this belief will be found in the literature o f  all ancient peoples.4 There are four 
winds and eight sub-winds, each with its own colour. The wind from the east is a deep 
purple, from the south a fine shining silver. The north wind is hard black and the west is 
amber. People in the old days had the power o f  perceiving these colours and could spend a 
day sitting quietly on a hillside watching the beauty o f  the winds, their fall and rise and 
changing hues, the magic o f  neighbouring winds when they are inter-weaved like ribbons at 
a wedding.’
(O ’Brien 1993: 34)
The numbered reference in this speech can be traced by the reader to the following 
narrator’s footnote:
4 It is not clear whether de Selby had heard o f  this but he suggests (Garcia , p. 12) that night, 
far from being caused by the commonly accepted theory o f  planetary movements, was due 
to accumulations o f  ‘black air’ produced by certain volcanic activities o f  which he does not 
treat in detail. See also p.79 and 945, Country Album. Le Fournier’s comment (in Homme 
ou Dieu) is interesting. ‘On se saura jamais jusqu’a quel point de Selby fut cause de la 
Grande Guerre, mais, sans aucun doute, ses theories excentriques -  specialement celle que 
nuit n ’est pas un phenomene de nature, mais dans 1’atmosphere d ’un etat malsain amene par 
un industrialisme cupide et sans pitie -  auraient l ’effet de produire un trouble profond dans 
les masses.’
(O ’Brien 1993: 33)
The format in which this information is presented is recognisable, from existing frame- 
knowledge of similar texts, as that of academic prose; a genre one might normally 
expect to convey reasonably reliable and authoritative information. Indeed, the narrator 
provides a neat summary of de Selby’s ideas, complete with additional quotes from a 
suitably obscure (and untranslated) French critic and full references to the work of both 
de Selby and his commentator. The ridiculous content of the footnote, however, is the
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reader’s first clue to the myth of authority being created through its form, a confidence 
trick which can be further exposed with the help of Figure 4d below.
M AIN NARRATIVE
embedded 
character-accessible 
deictic sub-world
IS
EPISTEM IC
SUB-W ORLD
embedded
character-accessible
de Selby’s ideas
DS
DEICTIC
SUB-W O RLD
embedded
character-accessible
Le Fournier’s 
commentary
Figure 4d. The Narrator’s Footnotes in The Third Policeman
The diagram shows how, once again, an embedded epistemic sub-world is formed, this 
time from the indirect speech contained in the narrator’s footnotes. Since the world of 
the main narrative is also embedded and, thus, already twice removed from the initial 
text world, the real epistemic value of the narrator’s footnotes can be seen to be 
negligible. At such a conceptual distance from the reader’s reality, the reliability and 
truth of its contents are utterly inaccessible and unverifiable. Furthermore, the narrator’s 
quotes from Le Fournier are, like all direct speech, also sub-world forming and, thus, 
yet more remote from the reader’s reality.
The narrator eventually leaves Mathers’ house and ghost, and sets out on a quest to 
retrieve the black box. His first stop is a police barracks where Mathers has told him he 
will find a group of police officers -  Sergeant Pluck, Sergeant MacCruiskeen and a 
third, more elusive policeman, Sergeant Fox -  all of whom are blessed with the gift o f
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‘wind-watching’. The narrator reasons that anyone with such knowledge and talent will 
have no problem in telling him where his money box is hidden. On his arrival at the 
barracks, however, he is greeted by a peculiar sight:
As I approached, the house seem ed  to change its appearance. At first, it did nothing to 
reconcile itself with the shape o f  an ordinary house but it became uncertain in outline like a 
thing glimpsed under ruffled water. Then it became clear again and I saw  that it began to 
have some back to it, some small space for rooms behind the frontage. I gathered this from 
the fact that I seem ed to see  the front and back o f  the ‘building’ simultaneously from my 
position approaching what should have been the side. As there was no side that I could see  I 
thought the house must be triangular with its apex pointing towards me but when I was only 
fifteen yards away I saw  a small window apparently  facing me and I knew from that that 
there m ust be some side to it.
(O ’Brien 1993: 55, my emphasis)
Once again, the abundant perception modality sub-worlds created in this passage
(shown in emboldened italics above) suggest a deep-seated uncertainty which belies the
positive epistemic modal worlds also present (shown underlined in bold above).
Nevertheless, the narrator courageously enters the barracks and is greeted by a large, 
red-faced man, Sergeant Pluck, who asks, ‘Is it about a bicycle?’ This enquiry is 
unlikely to be out of place in the reader’s frame-knowledge of the police and their likely 
responsibilities and interests. As such, it presents little challenge on first impressions. 
However, though the narrator immediately answers ‘no’, the conversation continues as 
follows:
‘Are you sure?’ he asked.
‘Certain.’
‘Not about a motor-cycle?’
‘N o .’
‘One with overhead valves and a dynamo for a light?’
‘N o .’
‘In that circumstantial eventuality there can be no question o f  a motor-bicycle’...
‘Tell m e,’ he continued, ‘would it be true that you are an itinerant dentist and that you came 
on a tricycle?’
‘It would not,’ I replied.
‘On a patent tandem?’
‘N o .’
‘Dentists are an unpredictable coterie o f  people,’ he said, ‘Do you tell me it was a 
velocipede or a penny-farthing?’
‘I do not,’ I said evenly.
(O ’Brien 1993: 57-58)
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As remarkable as the Sergeant’s bizarre pursuit o f the conversation beyond his co­
participant’s first negative response is the narrator’s complicity in this highly 
infelicitous exchange. At no point does he signal any desire to bring the interaction with 
the Sergeant to a close, protesting no further against its pointlessness than his minimal 
negative turns.
The structure of the passage is one repeated on a number o f occasions throughout the 
course of the novel. One of these, also an exchange between the narrator and Sergeant 
Pluck, is analysed in detail in Simpson (1997):
He was frowning so heavily with wrinkles which were so deep that the blood was driven 
from his face leaving it black and forbidding.
Then he spoke.
‘Are you completely doubtless that you are nameless?’ he asked.
‘Positively certain.’
‘Would it be Mick Barry?’
‘N o .’
‘Charlemagne O ’K eeffe?’
‘N o .’
‘Sir Justin Spens?’
‘Not that.’
‘Kimberley?’
‘N o .’
‘Bernard Fann?’
‘N o .’
‘Joseph Poe or Nolan?’
‘N o .’
‘One o f  the Garvins or the Moynihans?’
‘Not them.’
(O ’Brien 1993: 104)
The Sergeant continues his search through a further sixteen names before concluding 
the narrator’s failure to match any of his suggestions to be ‘a nice pancake’ (O’Brien 
1993: 105). Simpson (1997: 75) notes that the Sergeant uses a total o f twenty-one 
elicitations, all o f which produce the same response from the narrator. He also points 
out that there is one stage in the transaction where the elicitation-reply structure is 
broken:
‘That is an amazing piece o f  denial and denunciation,’ he said.
He passed the red cloth over his face again to reduce the moisture.
‘An astonishing parade o f  nullity,’ he added.
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‘My name is not Jenkins either,’ I vouchsafed.
(O ’Brien 1993: 104)
As Simpson observes, the Sergeant appears to be slowing down here, possibly even 
ending the search:
Yet the protagonist initiates a new exchange him self with the remark ‘My name isn’t 
Jenkins either.’ This, in fact, functions to re-trigger the name-search and the Sergeant 
begins the next exchange with renewed vigour. The protagonist seems just as committed to 
the search as his interlocutor, as he is the one who provides the discoursal signal for the 
verbal torture to recommence.
(Simpson 1997: 76)
The narrator, then, is not only complicit in but actively encouraging of the 
infelicitousness of this particular transaction. In Text World Theory terms, the 
Sergeant’s pursuit o f the topic beyond his co-participant’s first negative response in 
both of the examples quoted above violates all of our frame-based expectations of how 
such an encounter should proceed. The narrator’s behaviour then compounds the 
damage and adds to the now mounting evidence of his possible psychosis.
Once again, however, the focalised nature of the narration means that the reader has no 
choice but to continue in his or her attempt to construct a solid and coherent text world 
based on the information presented through the protagonist’s perspective. This 
enterprise is aided in the latter sections of the novel by an increase in the world-building 
detail offered by the text. The Sergeant and narrator leave the police barracks and set off 
on a trek ‘going where we are going’, as the Sergeant puts it, and in a direction that is in 
‘the right direction to a place that is next door to it’ (O’Brien 1993: 80):
It was a queer country we were in. There was a number o f  blue mountains around us at 
what you might call a respectful distance with a glint o f  white water coming down the 
shoulders o f  one or two o f  them and they kept hemming us in and meddling with our 
minds. Half-way to these mountains the view got clearer and was full o f  humps and 
hollows and long parks o f  fine bogland with civil people here and there in the middle o f  it 
working with long instruments, you could hear their voices calling across the wind and the 
crack o f  the dull carts on the roadways. White buildings could be seen in several places and 
cows shambling lazily from here to there in search o f  pasture.
(O’Brien 1993: 80)
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Although the characters’ purpose may be unclear, this passage is perhaps one of the 
most heavily descriptive in the entire novel, providing enough deictic and referential 
information for the reader to build a richly detailed mental representation of their 
surroundings. The geographical details of the characters’ immediate situation are 
particularly clearly established, with not only ‘a number of blue mountains’ nominated 
as present in the text world but also additional details such as ‘a glint o f white water 
coming down the shoulders’, ‘humps and hollows and long parks of fine bogland’, as 
well as a number of ‘white buildings’ and ‘roadways’. Several animals and people are 
also referred to and a number of reference chains (see section 3.2.1) are formed between 
the nominated entities and the various predications made about them (the pronominal 
link between ‘the civil people’ and ‘their voices’, for example).
Readerly patience is also encouraged by the recurrent pre-empting of any doubts in the 
protagonist’s reliability as a focaliser by the narrator himself. At one point during their 
travels, for example, Sergeant Pluck relates the following story:
‘Michael Gilhaney’, said the Sergeant, ‘is nearly sixty years o f  age by plain computation 
and if  he is itself, he has spent no less than thirty-five years riding his bicycle over the 
rocky roadsteads and up and down the hills and into the deep ditches when the road goes 
astray in the strain o f  the winter. He is always going to a particular destination or other on 
his bicycle at every hour o f  the day or coming back from there at every other hour. If  it 
wasn’t that his bicycle was stolen every Monday he would be sure to be more than half-way 
now.’
‘Half-way to where?’
‘Half-way to being a bicycle h im self, said the Sergeant.
(O’Brien 1993: 86)
The Sergeant goes on to explain that the process of transformation from human to 
bicycle results from a gradual ‘interchange of atoms’, similar to that which takes place 
when a bar of iron is struck by a hammer or other blunt instrument. He goes on:
‘The gross and net result is that people who spend most o f  their natural lives riding iron 
bicycles over the rocky roadsteads o f  the parish get their personalities mixed up with the 
personalities o f  their b icycles... you would be surprised at the number o f  people in these 
parts who nearly are half people and half bicycles.’
(O’Brien 1993: 88)
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The narrator responds to this bizarre logic as follows:
I knew  the Sergeant was talking the truth and if  it was a question o f  taking my choice, it 
was possible that I would have to forego the reality o f  all the simple things my eyes were 
looking at.
(O ’Brien 1993: 89, my emphasis)
The affirmative epistemic modality with which the narrator here admits his acceptance
of the Sergeant’s reasoning over what his own perceptions are telling him is, I would
argue, somewhat disconcerting for the reader. However, his acknowledgement of the
dubious foundations of the Sergeant’s reckoning is enough to reassure the reader,
temporarily at least, o f the narrator’s own good sense and sanity.
Indeed, sufficient appeasement of the reader by such means can be seen to be the key to 
the success of the final twist in the tale of The Third Policeman. The narrator’s quest 
eventually brings him full circle, back to the scene of Mathers’ murder and inside the 
walls of the old man’s house. There, he meets a gruesome and mysterious figure:
The great fat body in the uniform did not remind me o f  anybody that I knew but the fa ce  at 
the top o f  it belonged to old Mathers. It was not as I had recalled seeing it last whether in 
my sleep or otherwise, deathly and unchanging; it was now red and gross as i f  gallons o f  
hot thick blood had been pumped into it. The cheeks were bulging out like two ruddy 
globes marked here and there with straggles o f  purple discolouration. The eyes had been 
charged with unnatural life and glistened like beads in the lamplight.
(O ’Brien 1993: 189, original emphasis retained)
Although the creature also speaks with the voice of Mathers, he introduces himself as 
Sergeant Fox, the elusive third policeman. The following exchange takes place between 
the two men:
‘I thought you were dead! ’...
‘That is a nice thing to say,’ he said, ‘but it is no matter because I thought the same thing 
about yourself. I do not understand your unexpected corporality after the morning on the 
scaffold.’
‘I escaped,’ I stammered.
He gave me long searching glances.
‘Are you sure?’ he asked.
Was I sure? Suddenly I felt horribly ill as if  the spinning o f  the world in the firmament 
had come against my stomach for the first time, turning it all to bitter curd.
(O ’Brien 1993: 189)
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Should the reader’s mental representation, painstakingly constructed over the course of 
the novel, manage to withstand the strain of this extraordinary encounter, the narrator’s 
next visit, back to the pub and to Divney himself, ensures the collapse of even the most 
concrete conceptual foundations.
The narrator returns home to find Divney and a woman named Pegeen Meers, who 
Divney had once talked of marrying, together in the kitchen with a small boy he has 
never seen before. Pegeen is pregnant and also appears to have aged considerably since 
the narrator last saw her. Divney too appears to have aged and ‘had grown enormously 
fat and his brown hair was gone, leaving him quite bald’ (O’Brien 1993: 201). Although 
Pegeen and the boy seem to not even notice his entrance, Divney’s reaction to the 
narrator is extreme:
He turned lazily towards the open door, half-rose and gave a scream which pierced me and 
pierced the house and careered up to reverberate appallingly in the vault o f  the heavens. His 
eyes were transfixed and motionless as they stared at me, his loose face shrunk and seemed 
to crumble to a limp pallid rag o f  flesh. His jaws clicked a few times like a machine and 
then he fell forward on his face with another horrible shriek which subsided to heartrending 
m oans... He sobbed convulsively where he lay and began to cry and mutter things 
disjointedly like a man raving at the door o f  death. It was about me. He told me to keep 
away. He said I was not there. He said I was dead. He said that what he had put under the 
boards in the big house was not the black box but a mine, a bomb. It had gone up when I 
touched it. He had watched the bursting to bits o f  it from where I had left him. I was dead.
He screamed to me to keep away. I was dead for sixteen years.
(O ’Brien 1993:203)
The narrator, then, has been dead since Chapter Two of the novel. More specifically, he 
has been dead since ‘something happened’ as he reached for Mathers’ money box under 
the floorboards on page 24. The cognitive effect of this revelation lacks a descriptive 
term under the Text World Theory model. However, an approximate explanation of how 
a reader might deal with the challenge of a disintegrating text world such as this can be 
found within Emmott’s (1997) framework for narrative comprehension.
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Some of the similarities between Emmott’s model and Text World Theory have already
abeen outlined in section 3.2.1 and section 3.3.3 above. It was explained there that 
Emmott’s term for a reader’s mental representation of a fictional discourse, a 
‘contextual frame’, can be considered as equivalent to Werth’s notion of a text world. 
Characters may be ‘bound in’ or ‘bound out’ of the contextual frame as they enter and 
leave. Such occurrences result in what Emmott (1997: 142) terms ‘frame modification’, 
where the participant set of the frame alters yet our monitoring assumptions about other 
characters remain the same. Emmott also specifies a further type of frame change: a 
‘frame switch’, where the reader ceases to monitor one contextual frame and begins 
monitoring another. The frame to which the reader’s focus switches may either be a 
completely new frame or, in the case of a ‘frame recall’, may simply involve a return to 
a previously constructed context. In either case, this type of change can be seen to be 
roughly equivalent to Werth’s notion of deictic sub-worlds, involving an alternation of 
time or place. This correlation is discussed in more detail in section 4.3.0 below.
Emmott notes that the success of each of the frame changes described so far depends on 
the reader responding to textual signals in the correct manner:
... it is possible that readers may occasionally ‘m iscue’ on these signals and fail to change 
context. This may be due to inattentive reading but on occasions it might be because the 
signals to change context are not clear or because there are conflicting signals.
(Emmott 1997: 160)
In such instances, Emmott argues, readers are forced to repair their mental 
representation of the discourse, replacing the erroneous contextual frame with the 
correct one. Although Emmott’s terminology is restricted to frame change failures 
alone, the notion of frame repair in general seems to provide a useful means of 
discussing the cognitive effect of The Third Policeman. Where the majority o f 
Emmott’s examples involve fairly minimal deictic or referential miscues, O ’Brien
170
employs what Michel Charolles (1983, 1989) has termed a ‘garden-path’ narrative 
strategy as the central structure of his novel. The reader does not simply lose track of 
the movements of a particular character or miss a textual signal to change frames, but is 
deliberately misled into constructing a complex and highly detailed mental 
representation of the text based on false information. The revelation that the narrator has 
been dead throughout the course of the last one hundred and fifty pages forces a major 
re-evaluation, not only of the current contextual frame, but of one’s understanding of 
the entire novel. I would suggest that the reader must carry out considerable world 
repair if anything is to be salvaged from the wreckage of the text world o f The Third 
Policeman at all. With our suspicions of narratorial unreliability confirmed, the quest 
for the black box can be re-interpreted as one man’s ghostly journey through an absurd 
and hellish landscape; a journey which seems destined to last far beyond its sixteen 
years as the narrator, joined by the recently deceased Divney, finally returns to the 
police barracks and to the familiar greeting of Sergeant Pluck -  ‘Is it about a bicycle?’
4.1.1 Analysis Review
From the outset, the narrative o f The Third Policeman offers little in the way of 
comprehension aids to its struggling reader. Indeed, the process of attempting to resolve 
the novel’s incomprehensibility may be part of many readers’ enjoyment of the text. 
The slight world-building information with which the story opens has been shown to 
increase only marginally throughout the course of the rest of the novel, with a far 
heavier emphasis being placed on the function-advancing events that propel the story 
forwards. These details are presented through a fixed focaliser, who takes the shape of a 
participating character, narrating in the first person. Under Werth’s framework, the 
worlds created from this perspective would be classified as epistemic sub-worlds which
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are only character-accessible, since the reader has no means of verifying their contents 
for truth and reliability. I have shown, however, that the absence of any additional 
omniscient narratorial presence in The Third Policeman results in the text world layer of 
Werth’s framework being rendered redundant, as the sub-world of the focalised 
narrative remains dominant throughout the text. I therefore raised a question over 
whether the logical categorisation of the narrative as only ‘character-accessible’ under 
Werth’s approach is an adequate account of the only available source of information 
upon which the reader must build their mental representation of the discourse. A further 
question also arises, once again, over Werth’s choice of terminology. Should the 
focalised world upon which the entire narrative is based still be referred to as a sub­
world., since it represents the inner workings of a character’s mind, or does this 
hierarchical term once again present a misleading picture o f the real structure of the 
narrative? These questions will be addressed in further detail over the course of the 
following sections of this chapter.
The reader’s acceptance of the focaliser’s perspective as the main text world for The 
Third Policeman is by no means straightforward, however, since his reliability is 
continually undermined throughout the course o f the novel. The narrator has been 
shown to participate in, and even actively encourage, highly infelicitous discourse and 
explicitly questions the reliability of his own perceptions on a number of occasions. 
Furthermore, the modality of his narration has been identified as fitting into the 
negatively-shaded mode of Simpson’s (1993) category A narratives. The epistemic and 
perception modality typically abundant in these forms express confusion and 
uncertainty and make it difficult for the reader to form a consistent mental picture of the 
narrator’s point of view. Although external confirmation of the ideas of the narrator of
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The Third Policeman is offered in the form of academic notes on the work of the 
philosopher De Selby, the text world analysis presented above has exposed the true 
epistemic value of these footnotes to be negligible. Figure 4d above illustrates the 
exaggerated distance from the reader’s here and now at which the narrator’s notes are 
actually situated.
I have suggested, however, that the exclusive reader/focaliser relationship encourages 
the reader’s attempts to construct a coherent text world from the information presented. 
Indeed, The Third Policeman can be seen to rely heavily on this bond, since the novel’s 
final twist would be impossible without it. The delayed announcement of the narrator’s 
demise confirms our suspicions about the unreliability of his focalisation and threatens 
the stability o f the mental representation constructed up to this point. I used Emmott’s 
(1997) framework for narrative comprehension to suggest that the reader is then forced 
to repair the world of The Third Policeman, re-interpreting it as a darkly humorous 
ghost story in order to preserve the precarious structure of its text world. The following 
section of this chapter continues the exploration of the ideas and questions raised above, 
paying further attention to the implications that focalised narrations hold for Werth’s 
approach to discourse study and his notions of hierarchical world-structure in particular.
4.2.0 The Mustache
In this section of the chapter, I will be examining the conceptual structure of Lanie 
Goodman’s American-English translation of the novel La Moustache by Emmanuel 
Carrere (1998). It is important to clarify from the outset, however, that the conclusions I 
draw as a result o f my study are not in any way intended as an account o f the conceptual 
structures contained within the original French version of the text. The analysis which
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follows is not concerned with issues of literary translation, but with the text worlds of 
Goodman’s edition, The Mustache [sic], alone. To date, no major critical work on either 
version of the story has been published, although reviewers of The Mustache have 
described the novel variously as ‘excruciating... [a novel which] sets forth the casual 
swiftness with which one’s tenuous grip on reality can be lost forever’ (Hawthorne 
1997) and ‘an allegory of the larger brutality which confronts our time: the narcissism 
which fails to flower into a new wholeness’ (Couteau 1988).
Like both Auster’s The Music o f  Chance and O ’Brien’s The Third Policeman, the 
narrative structure of The Mustache progresses chronologically and appears, at least 
from its opening paragraphs, to be building its main text world along realist lines:
“What would you say if  I shaved o ff my mustache?” Agnes, who was on the living room 
couch, flipping through a magazine, laughed and replied, “That might be a good idea.”
He smiled. Small islands o f  shaving cream sprinkled with little black hairs were floating 
on the water’s surface in the bathtub, where he had been lingering. His beard was heavy 
and grew back quickly, which meant he had to shave twice a day if  he didn’t want to have a 
five o ’clock shadow. In the evening this unpleasant chore became a moment for relaxation, 
he’d be careful to use the shower to run the bathwater, so the steam wouldn’t cloud the 
mirrors surrounding the tub. H e’d prepare a drink, kept within arm’s reach, then lavishly 
spread the shaving cream on his chin, going back and forth with the razor, making sure not 
to come too close to his mustache, which he would later trim with a scissors [sic].
(Carrere 1998: 149-150)
The description of this fairly unremarkable domestic scene provides the reader with 
substantial world-building information. Once again, although the exact time of the story 
is unspecified, we may assume, according to Ryan’s (1991) principle of minimal 
departure, that the events portrayed are unfolding against a contemporary background. 
Indeed, the opening paragraph quoted above presents little challenge to this supposition, 
with none of its composite objects (a couch, a magazine, a bathtub and so on) or its 
characters (an unnamed male character and a female, Agnes) appearing out of place in 
our knowledge frames of everyday contemporary domestic existence.
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The construction of a coherent text world based on these deictic and referential 
foundations is complicated only by the occurrence of a handful of sub-worlds in the 
passage. The first of these springs, in fact, from the very first line of the novel, which 
happens to contain two connected instances of direct speech. As already discussed in 
section 3.3.3, this initial exchange between the two characters can be seen to inject 
some present tense discourse into the past tense narrative, a temporal shift which forms 
an associated deictic sub-world. Further deictic alternations also arise later on, as the 
male character’s daily shaving rituals are described. Once again, a temporal shift occurs 
as we are told, ‘Upon waking, before his shower, he quickly performed this task in front 
of the mirror, as a series of mechanical gestures, without ceremony’. This description 
and that o f evening shaving which follows it both depict worlds that are temporally 
separated from the main text world. These worlds are also habitual in nature, 
representing a series of events that have happened on a daily basis up until the present 
point. Insight into how the main character views these activities is provided by the 
access granted to his inner thoughts and motivations:
For better or for worse, this evening rite had an important place in his daily equilibrium, 
like the one and only cigarette he allowed him self after lunch, ever since he’d stopped 
smoking. Since the end o f  his adolescence, the calm pleasure  that he drew from this ritual 
hadn’t changed; his work schedule had even accentuated it, and when Agnes affectionately 
made fun o f  the sacred aspect o f  his shaving sessions, he answered only that they were, in 
fact, his form o f  Zen exercise. It was the only time he had left for meditation, self- 
knowledge, and the spiritual world, given his trivial but consuming activities as a young, 
urban professional.
(Carrere 1998: 150, my emphasis)
Here, the italicised micrometaphors can be seen to combine to produce an extended 
s h a v i n g  IS ZEN EXERCISE metaphor running throughout the passage. The daily act of 
shaving emerges as one of central importance in the protagonist’s life, as the ritualistic 
nature o f this simple task is emphasised through repeated reference to its calming, 
meditative qualities. The same Zen metaphor could even be argued to be evident in the 
opening description of ‘small islands of shaving cream’ floating on the surface of the
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protagonist’s bath water. Foregrounded as the only metaphorical description in the 
entire paragraph, the comparison of the spots of foam to ‘islands’ echoes the theme of 
peaceful isolation.
Such information contributes to the increasingly detailed portrait o f the main male 
character which is beginning to emerge. In Simpson’s (1993) terms, discussed in section
4.1.0 above and set out in Figure 4b, The Mustache constitutes a Category B narrative in 
the ‘reflector’ mode, since it is written in the third person, with the unnamed male 
character providing the fixed perspective through which both the world-building and 
function-advancing elements of the text world are focalised. Once again, in Text World 
Theory terms, the worlds created from this perspective are only character-accessible, as 
the reader is unable to verify their contents for truth and reliability. Once again, 
however, the fixed nature of the narration means that the point of view of the reflector 
of the fiction forms the reader’s only access route to the world-building and function- 
advancing elements of the discourse. Just as in The Third Policeman, two levels o f Text 
World Theory can be seen to conflate as an epistemic modal sub-world forms the main 
world of the narrative, leaving the text world layer of the framework essentially 
redundant.
I suggested in section 4.1.1 above that the dominant nature of many focalised worlds 
might lead us to question the viability of Werth’s classification of these conceptual 
structures as swZ?-worlds. This terminology would seem to suggest that, in the case of 
The Mustache, for example, despite the fact that the narrative remains focalised through 
a single point of view for the duration o f the entire novel, the worlds that are 
constructed according to that point of view are still in some way subordinate to the now
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redundant text world. With evidence to the contrary now found in both The Third 
Policeman and The Mustache, the sub- prefix will now be dropped from all references 
to modal worlds for the remainder o f this thesis. Thus, two modifications to Text World 
Theory which I have suggested in the course of this study can now be fully integrated, 
both with each other and with the thesis as a whole. The first, put forward in section 
3.3.2, brings together all instances of epistemic, boulomaic and deontic modality, along 
with conditional constructions, hypotheticals, indirect thought representation and 
focalised narration (previously separated into the categories of ‘attitudinal’ and 
‘epistemic’ sub-worlds under Werth’s approach) under the all-encompassing term of 
‘modal sub-worlds’. The second modification, suggested here, drops the sub- prefix 
from that classification in recognition of the possibility that any one of the types of 
modal world listed may constitute a substantial part of a particular text, rendering 
Werth’s original terminology entirely inappropriate.
To return to the opening paragraphs of The Mustache, then, the deictic alternations 
identified above can be seen to be embedded into an existing focalised modal world. 
This world initially presents the reader with few surprises, progressing coherently and 
cooperatively and allowing easy construction and development. Agnes’ subsequent 
departure to buy groceries, however, advances the novel’s plot to a new level, though 
this shift is by no means immediately apparent in the unremarkable nature of her 
actions. With his wife gone, the protagonist ponders their recent conversation and the 
possibility of surprising her on her return:
... what if, when she came back upstairs, he surprised her by actually shaving o ff  his 
mustache? She’d declared five minutes ago that it might be a good idea. But she couldn’t 
have taken his question seriously, not anymore than usual. She liked him with a mustache, 
and besides, so did he, although after all this time he was no longer accustomed to a clean­
shaven face; there was really no way o f  knowing. In any event, i f  they didn’t like his new  
look, he could always let his mustache grow back. It would take ten to fifteen days, and at 
least he would have had the experience o f  seeing him self differently.
(Carrere 1998: 151-152)
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TEXT WORLD
(REDUNDANT)
FOC
M AIN N A RRATIVE  
EPISTEM IC M O DAL  
SUB-W O RLD
character-accessible 
fixed focalised narration
FA:
EM BEDDED EPISTEM IC M O DAL  
SUB-W O RLD
character-accessible hypothetical
WB: what if, when 
she came 
upstairs, he 
surprised her...
EM BEDDED  
EPISTEM IC M O DAL  
SUB-W O RLD
character-accessible
conditional
WB: if  they didn’t 
like...
FBK
EPS
BOUL
IF
EM BEDDED  
DEONTIC M O DAL  
SUB-W ORLD
modalised apodosis
WB: he could 
always...
"e m b e d d e d  d e i c t i c \
SUB-W O RLD
character-accessible 
flashback
WB: five minutes ago
FA: Agnes
declared...
EM BEDDED  
EPISTEM IC M O DAL  
SUB-W O RLD
character-accessible 
modalised proposition
W B: she couldn’t 
have...
EM BEDD ED  
BO ULO M AIC M O DAL  
SUB-W O RLD
character-accessible 
modalised proposition
W B: she liked... 
so did he
Figure 4e. Embedded Worlds in The Mustache
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Figure 4e above shows the complex conceptual structure which develops around this 
passage. The epistemic modal world which makes up the main body of the narrative is 
shown emerging from the redundant text world layer as a focalised world, marked FOC 
in the diagram. A second epistemic world, a hypothetical situation, is then embedded 
within the FOC world, as the protagonist considers what might happen if  he were to 
shave off his moustache to surprise his wife. The origins of this world are marked in 
Figure 4e as HYP. The character’s thoughts then flash back to Agnes’ comments some 
minutes ago that shaving might be a good idea, creating another embedded world, 
shown in the diagram as an FBK frame. The next sentence then contains some strong 
epistemic modality, as the protagonist decides that Agnes ‘couldn't have taken his 
question seriously’, producing an embedded epistemic modal world, marked EPS. 
Further modality, this time boulomaic, is also evident in the sentence which follows, as 
we are told of both Agnes’ and the protagonist’s fondness of his moustache. This is 
shown in the diagram as a BOUL frame, which is another new addition to Text World 
Theory notation I have developed. Finally, the conditional construction ‘if  they didn’t 
like his new look, he could always let his mustache grow back’, creates an epistemic 
modal sub-world, shown as an IF world embedded in the central hypothetical frame. As 
with many conditionals, the apodosis portion of the construction is modalised, signified 
in this case by the deontic modal auxiliary ‘could’. This sets up a further embedded sub­
world, marked in Figure 4e, under my modified Text World Theory notation, as a DEO 
world within its containing IF frame.
At the end of this prolonged contemplation, the protagonist finally shaves off his 
moustache; another apparently unremarkable act, the eventual repercussions of which 
are only darkly hinted at as he awaits his wife’s return ‘with the distressing feeling that
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he was in a dentist’s waiting room’ (Carrere 1998: 155). His unease increases when 
Agnes’ reaction to his new appearance fails to fit in with any of the hypothetical 
situations he has imagined while soaking in the bath. She simply unpacks her shopping, 
turns off the stereo and the two of them leave for dinner at some friends’ house, without 
her even mentioning the change. As the couple arrive at Serge and Veronique’s 
building, an extended episode of free indirect thought allows the reader an additional 
insight into the protagonist’s increasingly irritated and confused state of mind:
Why was she pretending not to have noticed anything? Was it so she could retaliate with 
her own surprise to the one he’d arranged for her? But that was precisely what was so 
strange: she hadn’t seemed surprised at all, not even for a second to regain her composure 
and put on a straight face... O f course, one could claim that he’d warned her, she’d even 
said laughingly that it would be a good idea. But that had obviously been in jest, a false 
answer to what was still, to his way o f  thinking, a false question. It was impossible to 
imagine that she’d taken him seriously, that she’d gone to do her errands and said to 
herself, H e’s in the middle o f  shaving o ff his mustache. When I see him, I’ll have to 
pretend as i f  it were nothing. On the other hand, her sangfroid was even less believable if  
she’d been expecting it. In any case, he decided, hats o ff  to her. N ice job.
(Carrere 1998: 158-159)
Once again, a series of worlds are embedded within one another as the character 
struggles to understand his wife’s behaviour. Hypothetical worlds, for example, are 
created by the character’s wondering, ‘Was it so she could retaliate’, as well as by his 
admission that, ‘one could claim that he’d warned her’. A number o f modalised worlds 
also occur, created, for example, by the epistemic modality in the assertion that an 
earlier comment by his wife ‘had obviously been in je s t... ’.
A series of further remote worlds are then posited:
Serge and Veronique were going to laugh, first at his new look, then at the practical joke 
Agnes had played on him, they’d laugh at his nervous irritation, which he planned to 
acknowledge, sparing no details, making him self look as if  he were in a fog, and 
ridiculously grouchy, playing tit for tat.
U nless...unless his opponent, who never ran out o f  ideas, was one step ahead o f  him and 
intended to let Serge and Veronique in on it... He imagined her in the middle o f  coaching 
Serge and Veronique at that moment, Veronique chortling with laughter, on the verge o f  
hysteria from trying to act natural.
(Carrere 1998: 159-160)
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The first o f these possible worlds is a hypothetical future situation (beginning ‘Serge 
and Veronique were going to laugh’) with different spatial and temporal parameters 
from those of its originating world. It is also considerably more detailed in its 
construction than those which formed the protagonist’s initial reaction to his wife’s 
unexpected conduct. The same can be said for the further deictic alternation which 
follows it, embedded in the hypothetical construction ‘Unless... unless his opponent, 
who never ran out of ideas, was one step ahead of him’. As the protagonist goes on to 
imagine his wife coaching Serge and Veronique in their apartment, the reader’s focus is 
allowed to relocate temporarily to a separate, but concurrent scene, with the time- 
signature of the spatial shift matching that of the world from which it has sprung (see 
section 3.3.3 above).
In the end, Serge and Veronique’s behaviour during dinner seems to support the latter of 
the two hypotheticals contained within the extract above, as they too fail to mention any 
change in their friend’s appearance. Their conduct triggers a shift in the modality of the 
focalised narration:
Serge and Veronique were in rare form. No supporting glances, no ostentatious display o f  
discretion, they looked him straight in the eye, just as usual... During dinner the four o f  
them talked about skiing, work, mutual friends, new films, so naturally that the joke began 
to lose its novelty, like those near-perfect pastiches that look so like the original that they 
generate more respect than gaiety. The game was played so well that the pleasure he’d 
anticipated was spoiled... Despite the implicit tension that this impeccably crafted joke 
produced as the evening wore on, he felt sad, like a child who, during a family dinner held 
in honor o f  his prize for outstanding achievement, wants the conversation to center only on 
this, and suffers because the adults don’t constantly refer back to it but speak o f  other 
things.
(Carrere 1998: 161)
The abundant hypothetical wonderings of the previous passages are gone and the 
protagonist’s opinions are presented in an epistemically non-modal form (‘Serge and 
Veronique were in rare form’, ‘The game was played’, and so on). His conclusions are 
obviously drawn -  this is a joke, a game. Also, once again, the thoughts and feelings of
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the focaliser form a sub-text to the main narrative, as we are told that the joke is ‘like 
those near-perfect pastiches’, losing its appeal and making him feel ‘like a child’.
As the evening draws to a close and, despite his frequent provocations, the protagonist 
realises that ‘there would be no denouement, that the gag had stopped right there’ 
(Carrere 1998: 163), his earlier irritation and confusion returns. During the car journey 
home, he finally confronts his wife:
She should understand that it didn’t amuse him anymore, that he wanted to discuss it 
calmly. He forced him self to continue in the tone o f  an adult trying to reason with a 
stubborn little girl, and declared emphatically, “The best jokes are the shortest ones.”
“What joke?”
“Stop it.” He cut her o ff  with a brusqueness that he instantly regretted. He began again, 
more gently, “That’s enough.”
“What’s wrong?”
“Please stop, I’m asking you to stop it.”
He was no longer smiling, and neither was she.
(Carrere 1998: 165)
The argument quickly escalates as Agnes refuses to admit that she has been playing a 
joke on her husband. It is during this extended fight that the significance of the fixed 
nature of the narration becomes most apparent. Because the reader’s entire experience 
of the narrative o f The Mustache so far has been filtered through the perspective of the 
main male character, contrary to Werth’s claims, the reader is encouraged to accept the 
information he presents as fact and construct their mental representation of the story 
accordingly. Thus, during the following exchange, the reader’s empathy is firmly 
directed towards its focaliser as their only point of access to that world:
He grabbed her by the shoulders, overcome by trembling and by the contraction o f  her 
muscles. Her bangs hid her eyes; he pushed them aside, exposing her forehead, took her 
face into his hands, ready to do anything to stop the pain. She stammered, “What’s this 
story about a mustache?”
“Agnes,” he murmured, “Agnes, I shaved it off. It’s not important, it’ll grow back. Look 
at me, Agnes. What’s going on?”
He repeated every word gently, almost crooning as he caressed her, but she moved away 
again, with the same wide-eyed stare as she had had in the car; it was the same thing all 
over again.
“You know very well that you never had a mustache. Stop it, please.” She was screaming. 
“Please. It’s ridiculous, please, you’re scaring me, stop it. Why are you doing this?” Her 
voice trailed o ff  in a whisper.
(Carrere 1998: 170)
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The reader sees Agnes’ distress entirely from her husband’s point of view, since no 
representation of her inner thoughts is offered. Agnes’ mind remains closed off and the 
focalisation remains securely fixed with the main male character. The omniscient 
narrator can also be seen to be complicit in the creation of this effect, since it provides 
no external evaluation of the protagonist’s representation of events, as would be seen in 
a narrative in the narratorial mode, in Simpson’s (1993) terms (see Figure 4b above).
It could be argued that the discrepancy between how Agnes seems to see the text world 
and how her husband has presented it to the reader is significant enough to act at least as 
a reminder to the reader of the essentially character-accessible status o f the narration so 
far. At one point Agnes even telephones Serge and Veronique to verify her case. 
However, though her obstinacy may begin to raise questions about the protagonist’s 
reliability in the mind of the reader, the fact remains that he must be trusted as sole 
focaliser if a text world for this story is to be built and maintained. Furthermore, the 
continuing, complicit silence of the omniscient narrator adds to the reader’s confidence, 
since one might reasonably expect some sort of warning if the perspective of the main 
character was at fault in any way. Such trust is bolstered yet further by the production of 
the protagonist’s own ‘evidence’ to support his claims. He hunts out some photographs 
of his and Agnes’ last holiday in Java, in which he describes himself as appearing 
‘dressed in a batik shirt, his hair stuck to his forehead with sweat, smiling and 
mustached’ (Carrere 1998: 174). Agnes simply hands the photos back to him, asking 
him, ‘What do you want to prove?’ (Carrere 1998: 174). Once again, the reader is 
encouraged to ignore the obvious ambiguity o f this response by the protagonist’s own 
acceptance of it as confirmation of his own perspective.
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The empathetic connection between the protagonist and the reader continues to be 
strengthened by the provision of numerous extended metaphors through which the 
character conceptualises his increasingly disturbing situation:
He had made the firs t move, surrendered completely... He who yields  first is the smartest, 
he repeated to him self... he slipped into bed, took her into his arms, both relieved that she’d 
surrendered and worried about his modest victory... What could he say to her? To stop this 
farce and go back to a crossfire o f  misunderstandings?... This time, once again, she was 
one step ahead, securing her advantage by making a reasonable offer that put him on the 
defensive... he’d be admitting defeat... H e’d have to refuse this ordeal, abandon this 
fruitless terrain, and move on to another where he would have the advantage, a possibility 
o f  control... Might as well surrender, wait for it to pass.
(Carrere 1998: 165-174, my emphasis)
Abundant evidence of a developing a r g u m e n t  is  w a r  megametaphor runs throughout 
the description of the focaliser’s lengthy fight with his wife. Indeed, this sustained 
undercurrent continues well into the next morning, when he wakes to find Agnes gone 
for the day and attempts to rationalise the events of the previous evening:
Why in the world did she have to invent such ridiculous excuses? Such tactics bewildered 
people, and what’s more, she’d boast about them after the fact, telling everyone she could.
But if  one o f  the victims reminded her o f  these confessions, she’d answer yes, she did it 
often, but not this tim e... They thought they were lending themselves to a game among 
themselves, one o f  those private jokes that they were accustomed to playing, and not the 
first serious skirmish in a kind o f  conjugal guerrilla warfare.
(Carrere 1998: 178: 181, my emphasis)
Still smarting from the night before, the protagonist not only compares the argument 
with his wife to a war but also firmly positions Agnes as the aggressor in that battle and 
himself as the victim. Again, the exclusive reader-focaliser relationship encourages 
sympathy with this point of view.
The protagonist remains confident in his perspective for most of that morning. The 
access granted to his inner thoughts reveals his conviction that Agnes has organised a 
conspiracy against him, a cruel practical joke in keeping with her mischievous 
personality. The protagonist’s only uncertainty is his wife’s motives for playing such a 
trick, but the modality of the majority of this section of the narrative remains 
categorical:
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He stepped out o f  the tub, shook him self off, and decided to forget the whole incident. He 
promised him self that he wouldn ’t reproach her, even i f  there was cause to do so. No, 
there wouldn’t be any cause. The case was closed. They wouldn’t speak o f  it again.
(Carrere 1998: 182, my emphasis)
Once again, the protagonist’s decisiveness is expressed through epistemically non- 
modal constructions. On his arrival at work, however, a note of anxiety begins to re­
surface. None of his work colleagues mention the change in his appearance and, once 
again, he begins to hypothesise about their possible reasons:
H ad Agnes called them too? Ridiculous, especially since he couldn’t imagine that Jerome 
or Samira, who were bogged down with work, would allow anyone to explain the roles that 
they’d have to play in an idiotic joke. Unless, strictly out o f  necessity, they might have 
said, <(A ll right”, and wouldn’t give it another thought, but upon his arrival, surely they 
would have shown their surprise. Was it simply that they didn ’t notice anything?
(Carrere 1998: 184, my emphasis)
The protagonist constructs a number of hypothetical worlds here (italicised), some with 
a stronger epistemic commitment attached to them than others (compare ‘they might 
have said’ with ‘surely they would have shown their surprise’). This fluctuation 
provides a reminder of the real logical status o f the narration and can be seen to be 
reminiscent of the confused, negatively-shaded narrations o f Molloy and The Third 
Policeman, discussed in section 4.1.0 above. The conspiracy theory is also becoming 
less and less convincing the more people are drawn into the situation. The focaliser’s 
own admission of this, I would argue, creates further epistemic distance between him 
and the reader.
As if in answer to the possibility of an increasingly doubtful reader, the protagonist 
returns home and rummages through his dustbin, searching for the discarded remains of 
his moustache. He finds it and confronts Agnes again. Her reaction is as ambiguous as it 
was to his presentation of their holiday photos, as she comments that he has shown her, 
‘Hair... hair from your mustache. What do you want me to say?’ (Carrere 1998: 194). 
Initially, her husband appears reassured of his own vindication, as he storms out of their
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bedroom and spends the night on the sofa. By morning, however, following a passionate 
reconciliation with Agnes, it seems that his true state of mind has changed little:
. .. the first part o f  the day went by without any incident. If  things were actually what they 
seemed, he was suffering from hallucinations, maybe on the verge o f  a nervous breakdown.
It would be better not to tell anyone, to avoid encouraging sympathetic whispers behind his 
back like, “Poor guy, he’s going o ff the deep en d ...” The whole business would be settled, 
he was sure o f  it, as long as it didn’t get spread around, didn’t follow  him into the office, 
wasn’t heard among the clients -  his reputation as a sick person, a reputation he’d have a 
hard time getting rid o f  afterward. So he guarded him self from committing any sort o f  
blunder.
(Carrere 1998: 201)
Acute insecurity and paranoia are now evident, once again in the occurrence of a series 
of conditional constructions (for example, beginning ‘If things were actually as they 
seem ed...’), each setting up a hypothetical modal world in which the focaliser is 
mentally ill. Such explicit doubts may lead many readers to begin a re-evaluation of 
their mental representations of earlier scenes in the novel; another example of the 
strategies of world-repair which I put forward in section 4.1.0 above.
Determined to keep his fears from his friends and colleagues, the protagonist seeks an 
objective, external opinion by approaching a young woman in the street. He pretends, 
somewhat unconvincingly, to be blind and unsure whether the identity card he is 
carrying is his own. He asks the woman to verify whether the man in the photograph is 
wearing a moustache:
“O f course,” the young woman said once again, and he felt her slipping the rectangle o f  
folded cardboard between his outstretched fingers. “W ell,” he insisted, putting all his cards 
on the table, “I don’t have one!”
“Yes, you do.”
He started to tremble, and opened his eyes without thinking. The young woman continued 
to push the empty carriage, without even looking at him. She wasn’t as young as he’d 
thought from far away. “Are you really sure,” he quavered, “that in this photograph I have a 
mustache? Look again.” He waved the identity card in front o f  her nose to incite her to 
answer, but she jerked her hand away and suddenly screamed, “That’s enough! I f  you keep 
it up, I’m going to call the police!”
(Carrere 1998: 209)
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This time, the protagonist does not miss the ambiguity of the exchange, furthering the 
distance between himself and the reader by again admitting the possibility of a number 
of interpretations:
. .. he kept on running all the way to the Place de la Republique, went into a cafe, and 
collapsed in a booth, out o f  breath... He forced him self to reconstruct the exact content o f  
the confrontation... H e’d been unable to tell whether she was referring to the photo or to 
him as well, since he’d been standing right in front o f  her. But maybe she considered a 
mustache to be the black fuzz that during the last two days had started to grow on his upper 
lip. Maybe she didn’t see that well. Or maybe he’d dreamed it, he’d never shaved o ff his 
mustache, it was still there, nice and thick.
(Carrere 1998: 209)
Such paranoia has now become so prevalent in the text of The Mustache that it is worth 
examining how the worlds created by this narrative voice have been structured in more 
detail. Figure 4 f below shows how, on his arrival in the cafe, the protagonist’s thoughts 
flash back to his meeting with the young woman on the street as he attempts to 
reconstruct his conversation with her. This is shown as an FBK world embedded within 
the epistemic modal world of the main focalised narrative. A series of hypotheticals 
then follow, marked HYP in Figure 4f, as the character considers a number of possible 
interpretations of the young woman’s response to his questions.
The diagram makes clear the epistemic distance of this mental activity from the reader’s 
discourse world. As I have already mentioned, in the first half of the novel the exclusive 
reader-focaliser relationship diverts the reader’s attention from the logical 
inaccessibility of the main body of the narrative. As the story progresses and the 
protagonist becomes increasingly paranoid, however, his admissions to his own mental 
instability present a serious threat to any trust previously placed in his perspective by 
the reader. This does not mean, however, that the information provided by the focaliser 
necessarily ceases to be incremented into the Common Ground of the discourse. 
However paranoid and deluded the protagonist may prove to be, he remains the reader’s 
only point of access to the world-building and function-advancing elements of the text.
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Figure 4 f  The Paranoid Narrative Voice in The Mustache
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It seems likely, then, that many readers may continue to sympathise with his distress 
and consider the numerous hypotheses he now presents as perfectly possible 
explanations for his situation.
Eventually, the protagonist decides to interpret the young woman’s response to his 
questions as supporting his original belief that he used to have a moustache. His opinion 
does alter, however, on Agnes’ role in the current confusion. He decides that it is, in 
fact, she who is mentally ill and he resolves to help her in any way he can, planning a 
quiet dinner out for them both later that evening. The modality of the narrative also 
shifts accordingly:
He vacillated between anger and a nauseating tenderness for Agnes, poor Agnes, his wife,
Agnes, totally fragile, delicately put together, a sly fox, with a fine line between an active 
mind and the irrationality that had begun to consume her. In retrospect, the warning signs 
had made themselves clear: her flamboyant dishonesty, her excessive appetite for 
paradoxes, the stories on the phone, the brick walls, the radiators, the double personality, so 
sure o f  herself during the day, in the presence o f  a third person, and sobbing in his arms at 
night, like a child. He should have interpreted these warning signs earlier... he’d be there, 
always, and he’d always help her to be herself. H e’d have to continue to behave that way, 
solid as a rock so she could lean on him. He couldn’t let h im self be thrown o ff  track and get 
involved in her craziness; otherwise it would be a lost cause.
(Carrere 1998:210-211)
The protagonist’s conviction of his wife’s instability is shown in his use of perception 
modality, ‘the warning signs had made themselves clear. .. ’, and his sense of duty in the 
deontic modality of the final sentences: ‘He should have interpreted these warning signs 
earlier’, ‘H e ’d have to continue to behave that way’, ‘He couldn V let himself be thrown 
off track’. Whether the reader now shares this point of view is debatable.
Further questions are raised by the events which take place during dinner, where the 
protagonist had planned to broach the subject of Agnes getting treatment for her mental 
illness. As he presents his identity card while paying for their meal, Agnes snatches it 
from him and scratches the photograph until the spot on his face where his moustache
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would be is completely removed. She then hands it back to him, accusing him of having 
defaced the card by drawing a moustache on with a black marker. Throughout the 
ensuing fight the protagonist sticks to his conviction that Agnes is crazy, even 
explaining the black mark left by the photograph on her finger as having been put there 
deliberately before they went out. The modality of his narrative remains categorical as 
he attempts to deal with what he perceives as Agnes’ elaborately destructive madness. 
The following disturbing exchange, however, may force the reader into further re- 
evaluation and world-repair:
“The photos,” he said.
“What photos?”
She took a sip o f  coffee, slowly, looking at him from over the curved rim o f  the cup.
“The ones from Java.”
“W e’ve never been there.”...
“What about the other photos?”
“You really want to see them?”
She shook her head, as i f  reproaching herself for acquiescing to such childishness, but got 
up, went into the bedroom, and came back with a heap o f  color prints, which she placed on 
the floor... in every single one he was wearing a mustache. He held one out to her.
“All I want to hear you say is that I don’t have a mustache in this picture. Then I’ll stop.”
She sighed.
“Say it,” he insisted, “So that at least it’s clear.”
“You don’t have a mustache in that picture.”
“Or in any o f  the others?”
“Or in any o f  the others?”
“Fine.”
He rested his head on the back o f  the sofa and closed his eyes. It was, in fact, clear; all he 
could do now was be treated.
(Carrere 1998: 238)
In a sudden epistemic turnaround, the protagonist puts his trust entirely in his wife’s 
perspective and concludes that he must be suffering a mental breakdown. The potential 
pitfalls of incrementing the contents of a character-accessible world, laid out by Werth, 
are thus realised, as the focaliser suddenly accepts a version of his reality that he has 
fervently resisted up until this point. So why, then, should any reader pursue this 
deluded narrative any further?
Once again, I would argue that Werth’s logical distinction between participant- and 
character-accessibility is simply not adequate to account for the way that many readers
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might process this text. It seems difficult to believe that entire sum of propositions 
contained within the character-accessible narrative of The Mustache have simply been 
‘stored for possible future processing’, as Werth (1999: 213) argues. Rather, the 
exclusive relationship so intimately constructed between the reader and the focaliser in a 
fixed focalised narration diverts our attention from the true logical status o f the text so 
successfully that a text world can be built on even the shakiest of conceptual 
foundations. Hence in The Mustache, despite the mounting evidence o f the focaliser’s 
unreliability, despite the epistemic distance created by his own admissions of insecurity 
and his final acceptance of his insanity, the empathetic relationship with the reader may 
nevertheless still prevail, even as the text world continues to disintegrate yet further.
Agnes offers to call her husband’s parents and cancel a lunch they had planned:
“While you’re at it,” he said, “Don’t you want to cancel with Serge and Veronique? I’d 
prefer it.”
N o answer. He repeated his request, certain that she wouldn’t protest. In his state, the 
need for solitude was perfectly natural. Agnes was standing behind him, near the sofa; the 
neutrality o f  her voice alerted him, as her silence wore on, he understood.
“Cancel with whom?”
Everything was falling apart. He made an effort to articulate, emphasizing each syllable.
“Serge and Veronique Scheffer, our friends. With whom we had dinner on Thursday, 
when all o f  this started...You don’t know Serge and Veronique, is that what you’re telling 
me?”
She shook her head.
(Carrere 1998: 239-240)
His panic rising, the protagonist asks his wife to confirm the existence of a number of 
their other friends, his profession, her name, her profession and finally:
“You phoned my parents ten minutes ago to say we wouldn’t be going to lunch, right?”
He sensed her hesitation.
“I phoned your mother, yes.”
“But w e were supposed to have lunch at my parents’, like w e do every Sunday, isn’t that 
right?”
“Your father died,” she said, “last year.”
(Carrere 1998: 242)
This final revelation proves to be the final straw for the protagonist, and he leaves the 
apartment and heads for his parents’ house. He arrives in the street where he believes 
they live, only to discover that he cannot remember in which building or on which floor.
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This downward spiral eventually leads the protagonist to the airport, where he picks a 
flight at random and flees to Hong Kong. This dramatic geographical change is matched 
by a change in narratorial style, as the dizzying pace of the highly function-advancing 
Paris narration is replaced by a much slower world-building in the Far East:
Nathan Road, the big, noisy avenue adjacent to his hotel, was illuminated like the Champs- 
Elysees at Christmastime. The traffic was flowing beneath arches o f  red lanterns with 
dragons on them. He walked aimlessly in the dense, indifferent crowd; there was a slightly 
stale odor o f  steamed vegetables, and at times, dried fish. Farther down, the stores became 
more luxurious. They mostly sold electronic equipment tax-free, and a large number o f  
tourists were doing their shopping. He finally reached the end o f  the avenue, where there 
was a large square that opened onto the bay. Extending along the other side was a 
shimmering chaos o f  skyscrapers set against the side o f  a mountain, its peak obscured by 
the night fog.
(Carrere 1998: 272)
Though the surrounding streets of Hong Kong are full of hustle and bustle, the 
protagonist seems to have discovered a new form of inner tranquillity, signified by a 
striking reduction in mental activity. He considers the problems he has left behind him 
relatively infrequently, slipping quickly into his calm but highly-structured new 
lifestyle. His days become based around routine: sleeping, waking, shaving, swimming 
and repeated trips across the harbour on the local ferry. This new Zen-like state brings 
with it, when contemplation is entered into, a philosophical sense of perspective on the 
events that have happened to him:
... he knew he was o f  sound mind; most crazy people were convinced o f  the same thing, 
nothing could make them change their minds, and he was aware that in the eyes o f  society a 
misadventure like his could only signify lunacy. But in reality, he now perceived that 
everything was more complicated. He wasn’t crazy. Neither were Agnes, Jerome, or the 
others. It was just that the order o f  the world had been thrown out o f  whack, it was both 
abominable and discreet, it had passed unnoticed by everyone but him, which put him in the 
position o f  being the only witness to the crime, which consequently had to be fought. 
Besides, in his case, nothing suspicious was going on anymore, and for that matter, nothing 
was in its right order; decidedly, rather than the padded cell, he’d take the monotonous, 
dreary, but voluntarily chosen reprieve o f  life on the ferry.
(Carrere 1998: 283)
The protagonist’s opinions are presented either in epistemically non-modal categorical 
assertions (‘He wasn't crazy\ ‘nothing was in its right order\ and so on) or with 
positive epistemic commitment (‘he knew he was of sound mind’), backed up with
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perception modality {'he was aware’, 'he now perceived’). The protagonist thus appears 
at ease with his fate: a solitary but solid existence, a regained sense of control.
Yet the roller-coaster ride of The Mustache is far from over, as the protagonist discovers
on his return to the hotel one afternoon:
On the board where he usually left it, his key was missing. The receptionist, an old Chinese 
man whose wispy frame was draped in a large white nylon shirt, said to him, smiling, “The 
lady is upstairs,” and he felt a chill go down his sunburned back.
“The lady?”
“Yes, sir. Your wife. Didn’t she like the beach?”
(Carrere 1998:313)
He enters his room to find Agnes laying on the bed, suntanned and reading a magazine, 
chatting as though she had been there with him the whole time. In the horrific sequence 
which follows, not a single embedded sub-world occurs, not a hint of thought or 
contemplation. The protagonist simply makes his way to the bathroom, takes out his 
razor and slowly, methodically slices off his entire face, bleeding to death ‘appeased by 
the certitude that now it was over, everything was back in place’ (Carrere 1998: 318).
4.2.1 Analysis Review
The Text World Theory analysis of The Mustache in section 4.2.0 above has shown the 
narrative structure of the novel as initially developing along realist lines; progressing 
cooperatively and chronologically, providing the reader with abundant world-building 
and function-advancing information. As such, The Mustache, like The Music o f  Chance, 
could be seen to fit into Weinberg’s (1970: 10) category o f ‘more realistic than stylized’ 
Absurdism. The ‘hopelessly ineffectual victim-hero’ (Weinberg 1970: 10) of Carrere’s 
novel struggles to rationalise two dramatically conflicting world-views: his own and 
that of his wife and friends. Indeed, textual evidence that the protagonist might share 
such a view of himself has been identified in his conceptualisation of his recurring
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fights with his wife through a sustained ARGUMENT is WAR megametaphor. A series of 
metaphors connected by an extended Zen theme have also been detected, surfacing at 
various points in the text, through which the protagonist understands his own mental 
stability or lack thereof.
The application of Text World Theory has also allowed the predominant sense of panic 
and paranoia in The Mustache to be traced to the abundant conditional and hypothetical 
modal worlds in which the protagonist’s worst fears are constructed and played out. The 
reader’s possible identification with these fears, however, was less easy to account for 
under Werth’s framework. Once again, it has been argued that the logical notions of 
participant- and character-accessibility, which form the basis of the sub-world layer of 
Text World Theory, do not provide a sufficient explanation of the structure of many 
fictional texts. The narrative of The Mustache, like that of The Third Policeman, 
remains fixed with the perspective of the main male character throughout. The 
protagonist’s consciousness, then, forms the reader’s only access route to the world- 
building and function-advancing elements of the text. As such, even though this filtered 
narration actually constitutes an epistemic sub-world which is only character-accessible 
under Werth’s framework, the reader has little choice but to accept its contents as a 
reliable representation of events.
This fact, along with the supporting evidence found in the analysis o f The Third 
Policeman and presented in section 4.1.0 above, can be seen to justify the further 
modifications to Text World Theory put forward in this section. The dominance of the 
focalised world which forms the main body of the narrative of The Mustache has been 
argued to present a serious challenge to Werth’s classification of such conceptual
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structures as sub-worlds. As a result, I have now dropped the hierarchical sub- prefix 
from the description of all modal worlds. Indeed, I have argued that the reader’s 
dependence on the protagonist’s point of view is not only inevitable but essential to the 
progress and development of the story of The Mustache. I have shown that the exclusive 
reader/focaliser relationship promotes such a strong sense of empathy as to divert the 
reader’s attention from the character-accessible status of the narration. Commitment to 
the task of constructing a coherent mental representation of the protagonist’s 
increasingly surreal and disturbing world is thus ensured, as the pursuit of 
understanding is carried beyond reason into terror and despair. Section 4.3.0 now goes 
on to examine a third Absurd novel in order to explore further the viability and wider 
implications of the modifications to Text World Theory put forward in this chapter so 
far.
4.3.0 Slaughterhouse-Five
Slaughterhouse-Five follows the life of Billy Pilgrim, a New York optometrist who 
serves as a chaplain’s assistant in the United States army during World War Two. Billy 
is taken prisoner by German soldiers in 1944 and is held in an underground meat locker 
(the eponymous ‘Slaughterhouse-Five’) in Dresden, where he survives the Allied 
bombing of the city. During that same year, Billy also becomes ‘unstuck h r tim e ’ 
(Vonnegut 1991: 17) and begins to experience life without chronological order, visiting 
and re-visiting episodes from his past, present and future, apparently at random. What is 
more, during one of these episodes, in 1967, Billy is kidnapped by an alien race from 
the planet Tralfamadore. He is placed in a Tralfamadorian zoo, where he is displayed 
alongside another earthling, former movie starlet Montana Wildhack. During their 
captivity, Billy and Montana fall in love and have a child. Billy also develops a close
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friendship with the Tralfamadorians and is particularly affected by their philosophical 
opinions on life and death, of which he himself becomes an advocate on his eventual 
return to Earth.
The main bulk of literary criticism on Slaughterhouse-Five appeared in the period 
immediately following the novel’s publication, being at its most abundant in the late 
1960s and 1970s. For the most part, this work is united in its recognition of the Absurd 
content of the text (e.g. Giannone 1977, Ketterer 1978, Schatt 1976, Somer 1973, Wood 
and Wood 1973), with Billy Pilgrim described as suffering from ‘heartsickness and 
deadened spirit’ (Giannone 1977: 96), but nonetheless proving himself to be ‘a hero 
who can survive with dignity in an insane universe’ (Somer 1973: 230). A number of 
critics have also paid particular attention to Vonnegut’s use of science fiction in 
Slaughterhouse-Five and its possible connection to the existential themes present in the 
text. Ketterer (1978), for example, offers the following hypothesis:
Characteristically, science fiction presents a universe without God, a universe in which men 
aspire to be gods. Such a universe can easily slip into the sort o f  absurdist universe which 
we often appear to live in ... my essential point is that man’s philosophical position in an 
absurd cosmos is one that translates freely into science fiction, as does the concomitant 
human reaction o f  black humour... A sense o f  the absurd makes possible the humorous 
science fiction o f  Kurt Vonnegut and prevents it from being classified as fantasy... 
absurdist science fiction belongs among those works which present the present world in 
other terms by virtue o f  an extreme philosophical reinterpretation o f  the nature o f  reality.
(Ketterer 1978: 82-83)
Wood and Wood (1973) echo this opinion, viewing science fiction as ‘primarily social 
criticism, usually veiled in the remoteness of time and space’ (Wood and Wood 1973: 
136) Furthermore, they argue that Vonnegut ‘uses the absurdity of time travel to reflect 
the absurdity of the universe in which Billy Pilgrim is bouncing around’ (Wood and 
Wood 1973: 155).
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More recently, Cordle (2000) has linked the absurdity of Billy Pilgrim’s plight with the
unconventional structure of the narrative:
Vonnegut seems to be playing with the notion that human life is both determined and 
meaningless: events are fixed in advance, but there is no meaning or direction to the 
changes that take place over time.
Because he is investigating this possibility, it is entirely appropriate that he should shun a 
traditional narrative form that invests human lives with a significance they do not have.
(Cordle 2000: 176)
Unfortunately, Cordle provides little textual evidence to support this argument, yet the 
narrative oddities he mentions here are easily identifiable in the opening paragraphs of 
the novel, which appear as follows:
1
ALL THIS HAPPENED, more or less. The war parts, anyway, are pretty much true. One 
guy I knew really was shot in Dresden for taking a teapot that wasn’t his. Another guy I 
knew really did  threaten to have his personal enemies killed by hired gunmen after the war.
And so on. I’ve changed all the names.
I really did  go back to Dresden with Guggenheim money (God love it) in 1967. It looked 
a lot like Dayton, Ohio, more open spaces than Dayton has. There must be tons o f  human 
bone meal in the ground.
I went back there with an old war buddy, Bernard V. O ’Hare, and we made friends with a 
cab driver, who took us up to the slaughterhouse where we had been locked up at night as 
prisoners o f  war. His name was Gerhard Muller. He told us that he was a prisoner o f  the 
Americans for a while. We asked him how it was to live under Communism, and he said it 
was terrible at first, because everybody had to work so hard, and because there wasn’t much 
shelter or food or clothing. But things were much better now. He had a pleasant little 
apartment, and his daughter was getting an excellent education. His mother was incinerated 
in the Dresden fire-storm. So it goes.
(Vonnegut 1991: 1)
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this opening is the emphasis it places on the 
truthfulness of what is to follow, foregrounded by the italicised verbal auxiliaries in 
‘was shot’, ‘did threaten’ and ‘did go’. There are a number of other features in the 
passage, however, which appear to contradict this stress. More specifically, the 
emphasis placed on actuality by the italicised auxiliaries seems at odds with the 
qualification of the opening categorical assertion, ‘All this happened’, with the 
adverbial phrase, ‘more or less’. The modality of the second sentence of the same 
paragraph is a further inconsistency, as the narrator’s epistemic commitment to the truth 
status of the narration is weakened yet further as we are told that, ‘The war parts, 
anyway, are pretty much true’ (my emphasis).
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Nevertheless, although the first person narrator remains nameless throughout the text,
many literary critics (e.g. Chabot 1981, Klinkowitz 1982, Matheson 1984) have made
the assumption that the T  in Slaughterhouse-Five is a direct textual counterpart o f the
real-world Kurt Vonnegut. This may be due, in part, to the textual exaggerations
identified above, but may also be encouraged by the narrator’s explicit and repeated
references to the text at hand:
I would hate to tell you what this lousy little book cost me in money and anxiety and time.
When I got home from the Second World War twenty-three years ago, I thought it would be 
easy for me to write about the destruction o f  Dresden, since all I would have to do would be 
to report what I had seen. And I thought, too, that it would be a masterpiece or at least make 
me a lot o f  money, since the subject was so big.
(Vonnegut 1991: 2)
The use of the proximal deictic, 'this lousy little book’, can be seen to create a 
conflation of two separate levels of Text World Theory, since it nominates an item in 
the discourse world (i.e. the book that the reader is reading) as also present in the text 
world. If the text of Slaughterhouse-Five spans two conceptual levels, then, it seems 
reasonable to assume that its real-world author also has a text world counterpart, taking 
the form of the narrative voice. Such an assumption is further supported by the 
additional details the narrator adds about his life as the chapter progresses. He describes, 
for example, his education in Chicago, his work for General Electric in New York and 
his relationship with his publisher, Seymour Lawrence. Any one of these details may 
correspond with the reader’s existing frame-knowledge of Kurt Vonnegut. A number of 
other characters and locations are also introduced which many readers may recognise as 
having real-world counterparts. The narrator describes himself, for example, as ‘a writer 
on Cape Cod’ and Bernard O ’ Hare as ‘a district attorney in Pennsylvania’ (Vonnegut 
1991: 3). He describes their trip to Dresden in detail, his subsequent decision to write a 
book about his war experiences, as well as his meeting with 0 ’Hare’s wife, Mary, to
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whom he makes a promise that he will write an unglamourised account of World War 
Two, without ‘a part for Frank Sinatra or John Wayne’ (Vonnegut 1991: 11).
The resulting initial text world of Slaughterhouse-Five, then, is one which departs only 
minimally from the real world. Its world-building elements are either clearly defined, 
with some dates and locations being explicitly mentioned, or are otherwise easily 
inferred from existing background knowledge. Although the narrator’s exact temporal 
location is not specified, for example, it seems reasonable to assume that, if  he is a 
textual counterpart of the author of the novel, his present tense assertions refer to 1969, 
the year Slaughterhouse-Five was written in the real-world. It could also be argued that 
many readers’ trust in those assertions will be greatly increased by the narrator’s 
association with a discourse world entity. As already discussed in section 3.4.1, a real- 
world author is likely to occupy a far higher position on Werth’s scale of perceived 
authority, shown in Figure 3d above, than a fictional character would normally be 
expected to hold. However, such issues of authority and reliability are complicated in 
Slaughterhouse-Five by the fact that the narrator, as well as being a counterpart of one 
of the discourse world participants, is also a participating character in the story 
unfolding in the world of the first chapter.
Once again, Simpson’s (1993) modal grammar of narrative fiction, set out in section
4.1.0 above, provides a systematic means of discussing such narrators. The opening 
chapter of Slaughterhouse-Five fits comfortably into Simpson’s Category A, since it 
has, like The Third Policeman, a first person narrator who also happens to be a 
participating character. It is less clear, however, which type of modal shading the 
chapter exhibits. The verba sentiendi normally associated with a positive narration are
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occasionally present, as the narrator reveals, for example, that Mary O’Hare had trained 
as a nurse, ‘which is a lovely thing for a woman to be’ (Vonnegut 1991: 9, my 
emphasis). At another point he also makes reference to the Biblical tale of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, telling how Lot’s wife looked back at the crumbling cities as she fled God’s 
wrath and was immediately turned to a pillar of salt. Here, the narrator comments, ‘I 
love her for that’ (Vonnegut 1991: 16, my emphasis). On the whole, however, there is 
little evidence o f the foregrounding of either deontic or boulomaic modality. Rather, the 
irregular scattering of emotive phrases is balanced by an overall lack of narratorial 
evaluation, which, it might be argued, gives the text a neutral shading. However, if we 
return to the opening paragraphs o f the novel, quoted at the beginning of this section, it 
is possible to identify some quite conspicuous negative features also present in the text. 
There, the reader may recall, the narrator revealed how the mother o f a German cab- 
dri ver was ‘incinerated in the Dresden fire-storm’. He then adds some rather extreme 
‘words of estrangement’ as he comments, ‘So it goes’ (Vonnegut 1991: 1). A more 
detailed analysis of this phrase, which is repeated exactly one hundred times throughout 
the course of the novel, is provided later in this section. For the moment, however, it is 
sufficient to note the further shift into negative shading its presence in this passage 
creates.
This fluctuating modality, of course, bears a strong resemblance to that identified both 
by Simpson (1993: 51-53) in Samuel Beckett’s Molloy and in the text o f The Third 
Policeman in section 4.1.0 above. Simpson claims that such modal structures 
communicate ‘uncertainty, bewilderment and alienation’ (1993: 53). Indeed, the 
narrative of Slaughterhouse-Five complicates yet further as the novel moves into 
Chapter Two. The first chapter of the text closes as follows:
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People aren’t supposed to look back. I’m certainly not going to do it anymore.
I’ve finished my war book now and the next one I write is going to be fun.
This one is a failure, and had to be, since it was written by a pillar o f  salt. It begins like 
this:
Listen:
Billy Pilgrim has come unstuck in time.
It ends like this:
Poo-tee-weet?
(Vonnegut 1991: 16)
Despite the fact that the current chapter was headed *1* (rather than ‘Preface’ or 
‘Introduction’, for example) and has featured two ‘old war buddies’ and their memories 
of Second World War Dresden, the narrator states explicitly here that his ‘war book’ has 
not yet begun. Chapter Two then opens as follows:
LISTEN:
BILLY PILGRIM has come unstuck in time.
Billy has gone to sleep a senile old widower and awakened on his wedding day. He has 
walked through a door in 1955 and come out another one in 1941. He has gone back 
through that door to find himself in 1963. He has seen his birth and death many times, he 
says, and pays random visits to all the events in between.
He says.
Billy is spastic in time, he has no control over where he is going next, and the trips aren’t 
necessarily fun. He is in a constant state o f  stage fright, he says, because he never knows 
which part o f  his life he is going to have to act in next.
(Vonnegut 1991: 17)
If the narrator is to be believed, then, the repeated first lines of Chapter Two signify the 
‘real’ start o f the story, which begins in the manner o f a face-to-face conversation at the 
discourse world level. The opening phrase, ‘Listen’, foregrounds the narrator’s cross­
world existence and suggests an immediacy to a communication which, as discussed in 
section 3.4.1 above, is necessarily split between the author’s discourse world and the 
discourse world of the reader. We are then told that ‘Billy Pilgrim has come unstuck in 
time’. The present perfect tense of this function-advancer indicates that, despite the 
introduction of a new character, Billy Pilgrim, no change has occurred in the temporal 
setting of the text world. Since no variation in its spatial parameters has been mentioned 
either, Billy can be assumed to exist and be ‘unstuck in time’ in the same world as the 
narrator. This is confirmed later on in the passage when the narrator switches to the
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simple present and states that ‘Billy is spastic in time... he is in a constant state of stage 
fright’ (Vonnegut 1991: 17).
Apart from an instance of indirect speech, which is discussed in more detail later in this 
section, the opening lines of Chapter Two lack any other textual feature that would, 
according to Werth’s framework, cause a new world to be built. Yet the passage 
contains a number of other elements that alter the structure o f the text world 
dramatically. The first person narration used throughout Chapter One, for example, has 
disappeared and the story is now being told from a perspective external to the main 
character’s consciousness. This takes the new chapter into Simpson’s (1993: 55) 
Category B, narratorial mode, since the narrator no longer appears to be participating 
directly in the function-advancing events being described. Indeed, the narrator’s role is 
transformed into one of external observer for almost the entire remainder o f the novel, 
as the narrative of Slaughterhouse-Five retains its focus on the character of Billy 
Pilgrim for the next one hundred and seventeen pages. No further reference is made to 
such initial world-builders as Bernard O’Hare, Seymour Lawrence and Cape Cod during 
all that time. Furthermore, the switch in the focus of the text world is accompanied by 
the introduction of science fictional time travel and a corresponding disruption in the 
temporal structure of the narrative as a whole. As already mentioned above, the central 
time-zone of Chapter One can easily be identified as 1969, the year o f the novel’s 
creation. Although a number of deictic alternations occur throughout the course of the 
chapter, as the story flashes back to the narrator’s time as a student, for example, each 
of these sub-worlds eventually reverts back to the temporal parameters of the original 
text world. From Chapter Two onwards, however, the narrative’s default time-zone 
becomes more and more difficult to pinpoint.
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In the opening paragraphs of Chapter Two, quoted above, for example, the narrative 
makes three temporal shifts in the space of just half a dozen lines, as Billy Pilgrim is 
described as travelling in time from 1955 to 1944 and again to 1963. Following this 
series o f brief time leaps, the narrative settles down for a short while, as Billy’s personal 
history is briefly but chronologically explained in the simple past tense: from his 
upbringing in New York, to his enrolment in and eventual honourable discharge from 
the U.S. army, to his later business success and the accidental death of his wife in 1968. 
The narrative then flashes back to Billy’s experiences during the Second World War 
and the event of his coming ‘unstuck in time’ while on manoeuvres in South Carolina in 
1944:
Billy had stopped in the forest. He was leaning against a tree with his eyes closed. His head 
was tilted back and his nostrils were flaring. He was like a poet in the Parthenon.
This was when Billy first came unstuck in time. His attention began to swing grandly 
through the full arc o f  his life, passing into death, which was violet light. There wasn’t 
anybody else there, or any thing. There was just violet light -  and a hum.
And then Billy swung into life again, going backwards until he was in pre-birth, which 
was a red light and bubbling sounds. And then he swung into life again and stopped. He 
was a little boy taking a shower with his hairy father at the Ilium Y.M.C.A. He smelled 
chlorine from the swimming pool next door, heard the springboard boom.
(Vonnegut 1991: 31)
Figure 4g below shows the various worlds created by the time leaps in this passage, 
numbered and arranged according to the non-chronological order in which they appear 
in the text.
As already discussed in section 3.3.3 above, under Werth’s framework the deictic 
parameters first created in any text subsequently occupy a superordinate position in the 
narrative structure as a whole. Any variation of these temporal or spatial parameters 
creates a sub-world which, the terminology suggests, may be considered to be in some 
way sub-ordinate to or dependent upon its originating world. Each of the worlds, shown 
in Figure 4g below, would therefore be categorised as sub-worlds of the main text world 
established in Chapter One of Slaughterhouse-Five. This system for the classification of
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deictic shifts in narrative fiction can be seen to share many of the problems identified in 
Werth’s categorisation of modal worlds, discussed in the preceding two sections of this 
chapter. To view the spatial and temporal parameters of the initial world of 
Slaughterhouse-Five as superordinate to all those alternations that follow seems 
similarly inappropriate, considering the virtual disappearance of that initial world for the 
vast majority o f the novel. As already mentioned above, many of the characters and 
locations that formed the deictic foundations of Chapter One are not referred to again. 
Rather, it is Billy’s time leaps that form the main bulk of the narrative, each one 
transporting the reader further and further away from the spatial and temporal text world 
boundaries established at the beginning of the novel. For this reason, they are 
represented in the diagram as rectangular text worlds in their own right, rather than as 
the rounded-edged sub-worlds specified in Werth’s (1999: xvi-xvii) taxonomy.
FA:
death —> violet 
light 
and a 
hum
t: after death 
1: nowhere 
c: Billy Pilgrim
WB:
WORLD NO 2
womb ->  red
FA:
t: pre-birth 
1: womb 
c: Billy Pilgrim
WB:
WORLD NO 3
light
and
bubbling
sounds hears springboard
FA:
Billy
smells chlorine
t: childhood 
1: Ilium, N.Y. 
c: Billy, father
WB:
WORLD NO 4
comes unstuck 
in time
leans against a 
tree
FA:
Billy
t: 1944 
1: S. Carolina 
c: Billy Pilgrim
WB:
WORLD NO 1
Figure 4g. Billy Pilgrim ’s Time Leaps
I have also suggested in section 3.3.3 that Emmott (1997) may once again provide a 
possible alternative terminology for this type of world structure. I argued that her notion
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of a ‘frame switch’ (Emmott 1997: 147-158) does not carry the same hierarchical
connotations as Werth’s sub-worlds and, as such, would appear to offer a more accurate
description of the temporal shifts so far identified in the narrative of Slaughterhouse-
Five. As Emmott explains:
Within a frame, time may move at different speeds... the presence o f  the characters can be 
assumed until the text mentions their departure, despite the different speeds at which time 
moves. For practical purposes, then, this can be classed as a single temporal setting... 
Sometimes, however, time will move in such a way that the reader cannot expect the same 
grouping o f  characters to be there any longer. The narrative may move backwards in time 
or there may be a leap into the future (e.g. the following day, week, month, or year) which 
suggests that the frame that has been monitored may no longer be primed and that it may be 
necessary to switch to a new frame.
(Emmott 1997: 150)
This description of a simple switch of temporal focus, without the need to relegate the 
new subject of attention to a subordinate position within the narrative structure, seems 
to offer a more precise account of the multitude o f time leaps that Billy Pilgrim 
undergoes during the course of the novel. Indeed, given the substantial flaws so far 
identified in Werth’s ‘deictic sub-world’ category, both in this section and in section 
3.3.3 above, it would seem wise to replace it entirely with the less problematical term 
world-switch, in a direct development from Emmott’s (1997) model. This new category 
would encompass all those spatial and temporal alternations originally grouped under 
Werth’s ‘deictic sub-world’ heading, together with any instances of direct speech or 
direct thought representation. The main advantage of the new ‘world-switch’ category 
over Werth’s original terminology, however, would be its capacity to account for 
readers’ ability to follow shifts in the temporal and spatial settings o f a narrative without 
having to refer to an overarching conceptual hierarchy.
As Slaughterhouse-Five continues to track Billy Pilgrim’s erratic journey through time 
and space, it becomes clear that time is a central thematic, as well as structural, concern
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in the novel. As Billy explains in a letter written to the Ilium News Leader on his return 
to Earth:
‘The most important thing I learned on Tralfamadore was that when a person dies he only 
appears to die. He is still very much alive in the past, so it is very silly for people to cry at 
his funeral. All moments, past, present, and future, have always existed, always w ill exist.
The Tralfamadorians can look at all the different moments just the way we can look at a 
stretch o f  the Rocky Mountains, for instance. They can see how permanent the mountains 
are, and they can look at any moment that interests them. It’s just an illusion that we have 
here on Earth that one moment follows another one, like beads on a string, and that once a 
moment is gone it is gone forever.’
(Vonnegut 1991: 19-20)
Billy appears to have been greatly affected by his experiences with the Tralfamadorians. 
Indeed, it would seem that he has even gone as far as adopting a Tralfamadorian view of 
the world himself, as one of the most famous sequences of the novel demonstrates. Billy 
is at home in Ilium on the night of his daughter’s wedding. It is 1967, he is forty-four 
years old and about to be kidnapped by a flying saucer. Because he is unstuck in time, 
Billy knows that this is about to happen, having already experienced this and every 
other moment in his life. He is having trouble sleeping and goes downstairs into his 
living room, turns on his television and watches a film about American bomber planes 
in the Second World War:
American planes, full o f  holes and wounded men and corpses took o ff backwards from an 
airfield in England. Over France, a few German fighter planes flew at them backwards, 
sucked bullets and shell fragments from some o f  the planes and crewmen. They did the 
same for wrecked American bombers on the ground, and those planes flew up backwards to 
join the formation.
The formation flew backwards over a German city that was in flames. The bombers 
opened their bomb bay doors, exerted a miraculous magnetism which shrunk the fires, 
gathered them into cylindrical steel containers, and lifted the containers into the bellies o f  
the planes. The containers were stored neatly in racks. The Germans below had miraculous 
devices o f  their own, which were long steel tubes. They used them to suck more fragments 
from the crewmen and planes. But there were still a few wounded Americans, though, and 
some o f  the bombers were in bad repair. Over France, though, German fighters came up 
again, made everything and everybody as good as new.
When the bombers got back to their base, the steel cylinders were taken from the racks and 
shipped back to the United States o f  America, where factories were operating night and 
day, dismantling the cylinders, separating the dangerous contents into minerals. 
Touchingly, it was mainly women who did this work. The minerals were then shipped to 
specialists in remote areas. It was their business to put them into the ground, to hide them 
cleverly, so they would never hurt anybody ever again.
(Vonnegut 1991: 53-54)
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The narrative switches to reflector mode (see section 4.1.0 above) for the duration of 
this episode, with the narrator briefly taking advantage of his omniscient ability, 
entering the mind of the main character and describing the film from Billy’s inverted 
perspective. According to the modifications to Text World Theory suggested in the 
preceding sections of this chapter, this instance of focalised narration creates an 
epistemic modal world which, while only ‘character-accessible’ under Werth’s 
framework, is the reader’s only means of access to the text world at that point. The 
reader must therefore also construct their initial mental representation of the film in 
reverse, creating a world whose backwards function-advancing transforms a story of 
death and destruction into one of protection and peace. Only a retrospective act of world 
repair (see section 4.1.0) will reveal the original violence of the bombers’ mission.
A number of other textual features can be identified in Slaughterhouse-Five which, 
along with the fluctuating modality and temporal disruptions so far discussed, may 
place a further strain on the reader’s ability to process and understand the text. Billy’s 
time leaps vary greatly in length and detail and do not appear to be caused by any 
particular common element. However, those worlds whose development is most 
frequently restricted are generally those situated in Second World War Germany. The 
following description of Billy’s train journey to Dresden as a prisoner of war provides a 
typical example:
To the guards who walked up and down outside, each car became a single organism which 
ate and drank and excreted through its ventilators. It talked or sometimes yelled through its 
ventilators, too. In went water and loaves o f  blackbread and sausage and cheese, and out 
came shit and piss and language.
Human beings in there were excreting into steel helmets, which were passed to the people 
at the ventilators, who dumped them. Billy was a dumper. The human beings also passed 
canteens, which the guards would fill with water. When food came in, the human beings 
were quiet and trusting and beautiful. They shared.
Human beings in there took it in turns standing or lying down. The legs o f  those who stood 
were like fence posts driven into a warm, squirming, farting, sighing earth. The queer earth 
was a mosaic o f  sleepers who nestled like spoons.
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N ow  the train began to creep eastward.
Somewhere in there was Christmas. Billy Pilgrim nestled like a spoon with the hobo on 
Christmas night, and he fell asleep, and he traveled in time to 1967 again -  to the night he 
was kidnapped by a flying saucer from Tralfamadore.
(Vonnegut 1991: 51)
Once again, the narration switches to reflector mode for the initial section o f this 
episode. However, this time the reader is not afforded a closer insight into Billy’s 
thoughts and feelings, but is placed at a greater epistemic distance from him as the 
boxcar in which the prisoners are travelling is described from the perspective of the 
German guards. Even when the narrative switches its focus back from this epistemic 
modal sub-world to the inside of the boxcar, it takes on an estranged, negative modal 
shading. With the exception of a single verba sentiendi, ‘beautiful’, in the last line of the 
second paragraph, the passage is overwhelmingly distant, with the superordinate term 
‘human beings’ being repeatedly used to refer to Billy and his fellow prisoners. 
Furthermore, compounding the reader’s difficulties in constructing a coherent mental 
representation of Billy’s inner thoughts and feelings, just as the text world focuses in on 
the sleeping protagonist, he is transported to an entirely separate location, some twenty 
years in the future.
In places, the reader’s estrangement from the main character is increased yet further by 
interjections from the narrator which explicitly question Billy’s sanity and reliability as 
a Reflector of the fiction. The opening paragraphs of Chapter Two, quoted again here 
for the reader’s convenience, provide a typical example:
LISTEN:
BILLY PILGRIM has come unstuck in time.
Billy has gone to sleep a senile old widower and awakened on his wedding day. He has 
walked through a door in 1955 and come out another one in 1941. He has gone back 
through that door to find him self in 1963. He has seen his birth and death many times, he 
says, and pays random visits to all the events in between.
He says.
Billy is spastic in time, he has no control over where he is going next, and the trips aren’t 
necessarily fun. He is in a constant state o f  stage fright, he says, because he never knows 
which part o f  his life he is going to have to act in next.
(Vonnegut 1991: 17)
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Having begun an apparently neutral presentation o f Billy Pilgrim’s predicament, made 
up solely of categorical assertions, the narrator qualifies his report by subordinating the 
information initially presented to the reporting clause ‘he says’. As a result, the 
description of Billy’s time travels is, like all indirect speech, relegated to an epistemic 
modal world. The inaccessibility of that world is further emphasised by the repetition of 
the reporting clause in the next sentence, which is also foregrounded through its 
graphological isolation.
Slaughterhouse-Five offers only occasional glimpses into the mind of its main 
character, as the narrator remains steadfastly fixed outside Billy’s consciousness for the 
majority of the novel. Not only do the frequent leaps from world to world make any 
identification with the protagonist almost impossible, but the extreme contrast between 
those situations that are juxtaposed as a result exaggerates the narrative’s disorienting 
effect:
The naked Americans took their places under many showerheads along a white-tiled wall.
There were no faucets they could control, they could only wait for whatever was coming.
Their penises were shriveled and their balls retracted... Billy zoomed back in time to his 
infancy. He was a baby who had just been bathed by his mother. N ow  his mother wrapped 
him in a towel, carried him into a rosy room that was filled with sunshine... And then Billy  
was a middle-aged optometrist again, playing hacker’s go lf this time -  on a blazing summer 
Sunday morning... Billy went momentarily dizzy. When he recovered, he wasn’t on the 
go lf course any more. He was strapped to a yellow contour chair in a white chamber aboard 
a flying saucer, which was bound for Tralfamadore.
(Vonnegut 1991: 60-61)
Here, the reader is faced with four separate text worlds, three of which depart only 
minimally from the real world, describing realistic situations which involve easily 
believable function-advancing events. The final world-switch, on the other hand, which 
takes Billy on board the Tralfamadorians’ flying saucer, can be seen as a massive 
departure from the real-world in comparison to the preceding three shifts. The reader of 
Slaughterhouse-Five, then, is forced to cope with two conflicting sets o f world-rules at 
once: one set which appears to correspond to those governing the reader’s own
209
discourse world, and one in which time travel and contact with alien life forms are 
possible events.
Many of the textual features identified in Slaughterhouse-Five so far could be argued to 
present a significant challenge to Werth’s ‘principles o f discourse’ (Werth 1999: 49-50, 
see also section 3.1.1 above). The notion that co-operation forms the basic underlying 
principle of all communication would seem to be undermined by the behaviour of the 
novel’s author. According to Werth, readers should expect all discourses ‘to be 
purposive, and to be efficient in prosecuting their purposes’ (Werth 1999: 49). They 
should also expect that their co-participant will not introduce information into the 
Common Ground superfluously and that the Common Ground itself will be jointly and 
cooperatively negotiated. In Slaughterhouse-Five, however, Kurt Vonnegut places a 
multitude of obstacles in his reader’s path and would at least appear to be unconcerned 
with the ‘efficiency’ of his communication. The novel’s frequent world-switches, along 
with its instances of backward narration and contrastive mix of realistic and science 
fictional content, can all be seen to complicate the world-building process. Furthermore, 
the frequently negative modal shading of the text and general lack of epistemic modal 
worlds relating to Billy Pilgrim’s consciousness deny the reader access to the main 
character’s thoughts and feelings and result in a somewhat two-dimensional text world 
structure. We have also seen how, at certain points, the narrator even calls the reliability 
of Billy’s story into question, raising the possibility that the entire text may qualify as 
‘superfluous information’.
Yet, despite its structural anarchy, the world-wide popularity of Slaughterhouse-Five 
would appear to suggest that an uncooperative text such as this should not necessarily
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be dismissed as uncommunicative on all levels. The challenging structure of Vonnegut’s
novel has not prevented countless readers and literary critics from processing and
interpreting its contents and, indeed, may even have boosted its position within the
contemporary literary canon. As already discussed in section 3.1.3 above, Text World
Theory’s fully-contextualised approach to discourse analysis offers the following
explanation of how coherent text worlds may still be constructed from even the most
minimal textual information:
In text-processing, each Current Proposition (CP) is linguistically interpreted, the final 
stage o f  which is the coherence mechanism which relates the ‘raw proposition’ to the 
inferencing mechanism and the knowledge-base, and specifically, knowledge o f  the 
accumulated CG. Increm entation then adds the current CP to the current CG, together 
with the additional ‘annotation’ o f  evoked knowledge.
(Werth 1999: 131, original emphasis retained)
Werth places far greater importance here on the interpretative ability of the reader, 
drawn from the background knowledge they bring with them to the language event, than 
on the communicative nature of the text itself. Thus, in the event o f one of the discourse 
participants violating the principles of co-operation, the readerly process of inferencing 
fills any gaps in the information needed to construct a world, as meaning is sought out, 
or even created anew, wherever it may be lacking in the text (see Charolles 1983, 1989; 
de Beaugrande 1980; Eikmeyer 1989 and Stockwell 1992 for related discussions).
In the case of Slaughterhouse-Five, this inferencing process is aided by a number of 
textual clues to the possible reasons for the novel’s taxing composition. A reported 
discussion between Billy Pilgrim and the Tralfamadorians, which takes place after Billy 
asks for something to read on his long trip across space, is one such incident which may 
throw some light on the chosen structure of the text:
Billy couldn’t read Tralfamadorian, o f  course, but he could at least see how the books were 
laid out -  in brief clumps o f  symbols separated by stars. B illy commented that the clumps 
might be telegrams.
‘Exactly’, said the voice.
‘They are telegrams?’
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‘There are no telegrams on Tralfamadore. But you’re right: each clump o f  symbols is a 
brief, urgent message -  describing a situation, a scene. We Tralfamadorians read them all at 
once, not one after the other. There isn’t any particular relationship between all the 
messages, except that the author has chosen them carefully, so that, when seen all at once, 
they produce an image o f  life that is beautiful and surprising and deep. There is no 
beginning, no middle, no end, no suspense, no moral, no causes, no effects. What we love 
in our books are the depths o f  many marvelous moments seen all at one time.
(Vonnegut 1991: 64)
As a collection of briefly constructed, disparate text worlds, assembled in no perceptible 
order, Slaughterhouse-Five appears to be based on a structure similar to that of the 
Tralfamadorian books described here. Furthermore, its predominantly negatively- 
shaded, estranged narrative also seems to share the Tralfamadorian texts’ ‘moral-free’ 
style.
Further evidence of a connection between the structure o f Slaughterhouse-Five and that 
of the fictitious Tralfamadorian novels can be found in the narrator’s repeated use of the 
phrase ‘So it goes’. As already mentioned above, this expression appears a total of one 
hundred times during the course of the novel. The following description of Billy’s 
experience of the Allied bombing of Dresden provides a typical example:
He was down in the meat locker on the night that Dresden was destroyed. There were 
sounds like giant footsteps above. Those were sticks o f  high-explosive bombs. The giants 
walked and walked. The meat locker was a very safe shelter. All that happened down there 
was an occasional shower o f  calcimine. The Americans and four o f  their guards and a few  
dressed carcasses were down there, and nobody else. The rest o f  the guards had, before the 
raid began, gone to the comforts o f  their own homes in Dresden. They were all being killed 
with their families.
So it goes.
The girls that Billy had seen naked were all being killed, too, in a much shallower shelter 
in another part o f  the stockyards.
So it goes.
A guard would go to the head o f  the stairs every so often to see what it was like outside, 
then he would come down and whisper to the other guards. There was a fire-storm out 
there. Dresden was one big flame. The one flame ate everything organic, everything that 
would bum.
It wasn’t safe to come out o f  the shelter until noon the next day. When the Americans and 
their guards did come out, the sky was black with smoke. The sun was an angry little 
pinhead. Dresden was like the moon now, nothing but minerals. The stones were hot. 
Everyone in the neighborhood was dead.
So it goes.
(Vonnegut 1991: 129)
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The neutral report of the destruction of Dresden, told from the point of view of Billy 
Pilgrim and his fellow captives in the underground meat locker, is interspersed with the 
narrator’s generic commentary. Not only does the description lack any epistemic modal 
worlds, through which the reader might gain some insight into the characters’ internal 
responses to the attack, but the narrator’s estranging catchphrase also appears to 
encourage an interpretation of the experience as unexceptional and inconsequential.
Since such a reaction is likely to conflict with many readers’ frame-based knowledge of 
war and its effects on human beings (however second-hand that knowledge might be), 
the negative modal shading of the narrator’s comments could be seen as a highly 
uncooperative communicative strategy on the part of the author. However, the wider 
context of the novel as a whole reveals both the origins of ‘So it goes’ and a 
corresponding alternative interpretation of its repeated use throughout the text:
‘When a Tralfamadorian sees a corpse, all he thinks is that the dead person is in bad 
condition in that particular moment, but that the same person is just fine in plenty o f  other 
moments. Now, when I m yself hear that someone is dead, I simply shrug and say what the 
Tralfamadorians say about dead people, which is “So it goes”.’
(Vonnegut 1991: 20)
In this passage, Billy Pilgrim explains the Tralfamadorian perspective on life and death 
in a letter to the Ilium News Leader and, in doing so, presents the reader with a possible 
source of information from which to infer a cooperative meaning to Slaughterhouse- 
Five. Both Billy’s letter and his literary discussion with the Tralfamadorians could be 
read as evidence, not of a troublesome, uncooperative author, but rather of an extended 
s l a u g h t e r h o u s e - f i v e  is A t r a l f a m a d o r i a n  NOVEL metaphor running throughout the 
text.
An examination of each interjection of ‘So it goes’ throughout the narration confirms 
that the phrase does indeed always appear following incidents o f violence and death:
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At each place was a safety razor, a washcloth, a package o f  razor blades, a chocolate bar, 
two cigars, a bar o f  soap, ten cigarettes, a book o f  matches, a pencil, and a candle.
Only the candles and the soap were o f  German origin. They had a ghostly, opalescent 
similarity. The British had no way o f  knowing it, but the candles and soap were made from 
the fat o f  rendered Jews and Gypsies and fairies and communists, and other enemies o f  the 
state.
So it goes.
(Vonnegut 1991: 69)
The phrase even accompanies the description of Billy Pilgrim’s own demise:
At that moment, B illy’s high forehead is in the cross-hairs o f  a high-powered laser gun. It is 
aimed at him from the darkened press box. In the next moment, Billy Pilgrim is dead.
So it goes.
(Vonnegut 1991: 104)
Rather than impeding the joint negotiation of a Common Ground, then, the disjointed 
structure and negative modal shading of Slaughterhouse-Five can be seen to provide an 
additional, megametaphorical layer to the text world. When read as micro-metaphorical, 
surface manifestations of an overarching sl au gh terh o u se -f ive  i s  a  t r a l f a m a d o r i a n  
n o v e l  metaphor, these features allow the reader to infer that the aliens’ philosophy on 
life, death and literature is shared, not only by Billy Pilgrim, but also by the narrator. 
Furthermore, such a revelation could also be seen to expose the existence of a closer 
relationship between Billy and the narrator than may originally have been suggested by 
the negatively-shaded, estranged narration. In particular, the doubt cast by the narrator 
on the reliability of Billy’s story would seem to be contradicted by his subsequent 
adoption of a phrase used by the aliens Billy claims to have met.
Furthermore, the mapping of the narrator’s apparent sympathetic connection with Billy 
Pilgrim onto the author himself is encouraged, in the final chapter of Slaughterhouse- 
Five, by the re-emergence of some of the main world-building elements o f the novel’s 
initial text world:
Robert Kennedy, whose summer home is eight miles from the home I live in all year round, 
was shot two nights ago. He died last night. So it goes.
Martin Luther King was shot a month ago. He died, too. So it goes.
And every day my government gives me a count o f  corpses created by military service in 
Vietnam. So it goes.
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My father died many years ago now -  o f  natural causes. So it goes. He was a sweet man.
He was a gun nut, too. He left me his guns. They rust.
On Tralfamadore, says Billy Pilgrim, there isn’t much interest in Jesus Christ. The 
Earthling figure who is most engaging to the Tralfamadorian mind, he says, is Charles 
Darwin -  who taught that those who die are meant to die, that corpses are improvements.
So it goes.
(Vonnegut 1991: 154)
The start o f this passage signals yet another dramatic world-switch, from the zoo on 
Tralfamadore (the scene of the preceding text) to 1969 Cape Cod. The narration also 
shifts back to the Category A, reflector mode in which it opened and the re-appearance 
of textual entities with real-world counterparts (Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King, 
Jesus Christ, Charles Darwin) minimises the departure of the closing pages of the novel 
from the parameters of the reader’s discourse world. This final reconnection with reality 
provides a timely reminder of the factual basis of many of the events described in the 
novel, adding greater authority to the narrator’s account. Furthermore, the strong 
affiliation between the author and the narrator makes this a two-way process. Just as the 
narrator’s perceived reliability may be increased by his association with a real-world 
entity, the author’s own reputation as a cooperative discourse participant may be 
restored by his connection with his text world counterpart. However troublesome and 
demanding the narrator may appear on the surface, a fully-contextualised examination 
of Slaughterhouse-Five nevertheless reveals his communication of a truly alien 
perspective on the human condition.
4.3.1 Analysis Review
In the course of the preceding analysis, I have shown that Slaughterhouse-Five contains 
numerous textual elements that complicate the construction of a coherent mental 
representation of the world of Billy Pilgrim. In particular, the fragmented temporal and 
spatial structure of the narrative, as it follows Billy’s frequent leaps through time and 
space, means readers must negotiate their way through a series of highly contrastive
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worlds; some of which depart only minimally from the rules of the discourse world, and 
some of which involve the suspension of considerable disbelief I have also argued that, 
since the world initially constructed in the first chapter of Slaughterhouse-Five 
essentially disappears for the rest of the novel, Werth’s ‘deictic sub-world’ category 
cannot be considered an appropriate description of the worlds which subsequently form 
the vast majority of the text. Just as the removal of the sub- prefix from the description 
of modal worlds was suggested in section 4.2.0, the term world-switch, developed from 
Emmotf s (1997) related notion of a ‘frame-switch’, has been suggested in this section 
as an alternative categorisation of any change in the deictic signature of a world. This 
allows for a more accurate, non-hierarchical description of those shifts in the spatial or 
temporal focus of a world which do not involve the subordination of one world to 
another.
I have also shown that the behaviour of the narrator of Slaughterhouse-Five creates a 
number of further problems for the reader of the text. The modal shading of the 
narrative can be seen to fluctuate between apparently neutral reportage and a highly 
estranged, negative mode. In the neutral sections of the text, the reader is given no 
evaluative guidance in the interpretation of the actions and events unfolding in the story. 
Meanwhile, in the negatively-shaded parts of the text, the narrator’s repeated use of the 
catchphrase, ‘So it goes’, following scenes of violence and death, challenges the 
reader’s existing frame-knowledge on the effects of war and destruction in the real 
world. No insight is offered into the inner thoughts of the main character for the entire 
duration of the novel and, in places, the narrator can even be seen to cast serious doubt 
on the truth value of the story he is relaying to the reader. An emerging trend in the 
modal structures o f Absurd prose can now be identified according to this evidence. It
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would seem, both from Simpson’s (1993) analysis of Samuel Beckett’s Molloy and the 
analyses of The Third Policeman, The Mustache and Slaughterhouse-Five in this thesis, 
that the fluctuating modality associated with negatively-shaded narratives is a common 
feature of Absurd texts.
Despite his troublesome conduct, however, the narrator’s association with a real-world 
entity, namely the author, adds to his perceived authority and encourages the inference 
of a cooperative meaning to the text. Even the most cursory examination of the content 
of Slaughterhouse-Five reveals a close correspondence between the structure of the 
novel and those written and read by the Tralfamadorian aliens which feature in its 
pages. Furthermore, Slaughterhouse-Five shares the Tralfamadorian texts’ moral-free 
style, achieved through the fluctuating modality identified above, and the narrator’s use 
of the ‘So it goes’ catchphrase is a further direct borrowing from the aliens. Each of 
these correlations adds to the validity of a reading of Slaughterhouse-Five in which the 
narrator’s behaviour is interpreted, not as disruptive and uncooperative, but as the 
metaphorical communication of an objective, philosophical perspective on life and 
death. The final section of this chapter, however, examines a text for which the 
inference of cooperation and the construction of a coherent text world is even more 
problematical than for Vonnegut’s novel, and which tests Werth’s ‘principles of 
discourse’ (Werth 1999: 49-50) to their absolute limits.
4.4.0 Snow White
The background knowledge of the reader of Donald Barthelme’s (1996) Snow White 
(originally published in 1967) is immediately brought into play in the discourse process 
on contact with the novel’s title. The majority of contemporary western readers will
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recognise the proper name it contains, which subsequently acts as a header for a cultural 
knowledge-frame formed as a result of recurrent lifelong contact with both traditional 
and contemporary versions of a popular fairy tale. Many readers, then, will carry with 
them into the discourse world of their reading of Barthelme’s text a considerable store 
of preconceived ideas of the sorts of world-building and function-advancing elements 
they might expect to find within its pages. The first paragraphs of the text, however, are 
unlikely to match most people’s ‘Snow White’ prototype exactly:
SHE is a tall dark beauty containing a great many beauty spots: one above the breast, one 
above the belly, one above the knee, one above the ankle, one above the buttock, one on the 
back o f  the neck. All o f  these areas are on the left side, more or less in a row, as you go up 
and down:
The hair is black as ebony, the skin is white as snow.
(Barthelme 1996: 9)
As well as containing some unconventional graphology, this introduction lacks the 
‘Once upon a time’ opening typical of many fairy tales, beginning instead with a 
description of an unnamed female. Many readers will nevertheless be able to repair the 
passage’s central reference chain, linking the third person reference that opens 
Barthelme’s novel with the character of Snow White, perhaps aided in part by the direct 
borrowing of the’Brothers Grimm’s more familiar description of her: ‘The hair is black 
as ebony, the skin is white as snow’.
This correlation aside, however, little else in the text which follows bears such a direct 
resemblance to any previous version of the Snow White story. For instance, seven men 
are mentioned on the page that follows that quoted above. The reader may infer from
their number that these characters fill the traditional roles of the seven dwarves. The 
men’s names, however, are given, not as Sleepy, Happy, Dopey, Sneezy, Bashful, 
Grumpy and Doc, as in Walt Disney’s adaptation of the fairy tale, but as Bill, Kevin, 
Edward, Hubert, Henry, Clem and Dan. A further deviation from tradition can be 
identified in the temporal setting of Barthelme’s text. Although not explicitly 
mentioned, a contemporary backdrop can, once again, be inferred from certain culture- 
specific references. There is mention, for example, o f a ‘shower room’ (Barthelme 
1996: 10), a ‘typewriter’ (Barthelme 1996: 15), ‘Chairman Mao’ (Barthelme 1996: 22), 
‘Mars Bars’ (Barthelme 1996: 27) and ‘Charlton Heston’ (Barthelme 1996: 27). 
Furthermore, the narrative structure of Barthelme’s text can also be seen to deviate from 
the prototypical framework set by its predecessors. Snow White is divided into three 
main parts, each of which is further separated into numerous passages, varying in length 
from one line to several pages. The content of these sub-sections also ranges in form, 
from conversations to dreams, from extended speeches to letters, from mock 
questionnaires to public addresses by the President of the United States.
The majority of literary critics writing on Snow White (e.g. Coutrier and Durand 1982, 
Ditsky 1975, Klinkowitz 1991, Morace 1984, Trachtenberg 1990) devote at least part of 
their attention to certain linguistic incongruities also contained within Barthelme’s text. 
Most, however, appear to lack the terminology necessary to discuss such features in any 
systematic or even comprehensible way, as demonstrated in the following fairly typical 
commentary:
. .. more central to the Barthelme version is the value o f  the story itself, recovering surprise 
available in the linguistic vitality o f  popular oral forms, a vitality, the novel suggests, that 
has been lost through self-conscious substitution o f  language for either feeling or 
understanding and through the consequent continuing need for novelty to insure interest.
(Trachtenberg 1990: 167)
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An earlier stylistic analysis by McNall (1975), however, offers a more rigorous 
examination of the language of Snow White. The main focus o f McNall’s work lies in 
the identifiable patterns of lexical repetition in Barthelme’s text. However, she also 
makes some mention of the characters’ actions in the novel, or, rather, the lack of them. 
She comments that
the speakers in Snow White are engaged characteristically in plans, meditations, speeches, 
sermons, fantasies... commonly they fail to bring these off. The plans do not materialize, 
the meditations do not lead to realizations, the speeches and sermons do not convince, and 
fantasies are, after all, fantasies.
(McNall 1975: 85-86)
McNall also notes that removing the novel’s ‘description assertions’, which she defines 
as ‘a sentence with the copula for main verb’ (McNall 1975: 82), removes the greater 
part of the narrative; the vast majority of the text being made up of primarily mental 
and/or emotional activity. This observation remains relatively underdeveloped in 
McNall’s essay, however, and thus provides a useful starting point for a Text World 
Theory analysis of Snow White.
McNall’s comments on the peculiarity of action in Barthelme’s text are drawn, in 
particular, from her examination of the following episode and its numerous 
consequences:
SNOW WHITE let down her hair black as ebony from the window. It was Monday. The 
hair flew out o f  the window. “I could fly a kite with this hair it is so long. The wind would 
carry the kite up into the blue, and there would be the red o f  the kite against the blue o f  the 
blue, together with my hair black as ebony, floating there. That seems desirable. This motif, 
the long hair streaming from the high window, is a very ancient one I believe, found in 
many cultures, in various forms. Now  I recapitulate it, for the astonishment o f  the vulgar 
and the refreshment o f  my venereal life.”
(Barthelme 1996: 86)
The first thing to note about this passage, quoted here in full, is the minimal world- 
building information it contains. The character of Snow White is apparently the only 
entity present, at a window nominated by a definite article, yet otherwise indistinct. 
Perhaps even more strangely, the reader is told the precise day on which the incident
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takes place, but not the date or the hour. The only physical action in the passage takes 
place in its first sentence, as its function-advancing proposition tell us that ‘Snow White 
let down her hair’. The entire remainder of the episode is devoted to Snow White’s 
speech about her motivations for, and feelings about, her behaviour. The text world 
structure of the passage is represented in Figure 4h below, which makes evident the 
imbalance between the detail contained in the episode’s initial world, in which Snow 
White lets down her hair, and that contained in the world-switch created by her direct 
speech.
The originating text world, shown to the left o f the diagram, can be seen to contain only 
one function-advancing proposition (‘Snow White let down her hair’), set against a 
minimalistic background, constructed according to the sparse world-building 
information provided. The speech world, on the other hand, contains not only Snow 
White’s direct assertion o f her reasons for her actions (‘for the astonishment o f the 
vulgar and the refreshment of my venereal life’), but also three further embedded modal 
worlds. The first o f these is epistemic in nature and results from Snow White’s 
construction of a hypothetical situation in which she flies a kite in her hair. The origins 
of this world are shown in the diagram as an HYP frame embedded within the speech 
world. The second modal world, also epistemic, occurs as a result o f the perception 
modality contained in her comment that such an event would ‘seem desirable’. This is 
shown in the diagram as the uppermost EPS frame in the speech world. The latter part 
of the same sentence, of course, consists of a boulomaic modal adjective, which creates 
a further embedded boulomaic modal world (BOUL). A final epistemic world is then 
constructed around Snow White’s comments on the cultural significance of what she 
has done, as she states that she believes the hair ‘m otif to be ‘a very ancient one’. The
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motif is also, of course, one which belongs in an entirely different fairy tale, namely that 
of Rapunzel.
The letting down of Snow White’s hair, which occurs about half way through Snow 
White, is followed by a number of episodes headed ‘Reaction to the hair’. The following 
is a reproduction of one of them, in full:
Reaction to the hair: “Well, that certainly is a lot o f  hair hanging there,” Bill reflected.
“And it seems to be hanging from our windows too. I mean, those windows where the hair 
is hanging are in our house, surely? Now  who amongst us has that much hair, black as 
ebony? I am only pretending to ask m yself this question. The disgraceful answer is already 
known to me, as is the significance o f  this act, this hanging, as well as the sexual meaning 
o f  the hair itself, on which Wurst has written. I don’t mean that he has written on the hair, 
but rather about it, from prehistory to the present time. There can be only one answer. It is 
Snow White. It is Snow White who has taken this step, the meaning o f  which is clear to all 
o f  us. All seven o f  us know what this means. It means that she is nothing else but a 
goddamn degenerate! is one way o f  looking at it, at this complex and difficult question. It 
means that the ‘not-with’ is experienced as more pressing, more real, than the ‘being-with’.
It means she seeks a new lover. Quelle tragedie! But the essential loneliness o f  the person 
must also be considered. Each o f  us is like a tiny single hair, hurled into the world among 
billions and billions o f  other hairs, o f  various colours and lengths. And if  God does exist, 
then we are in even graver shape than we had supposed. In that case, each o f  us is like a 
tiny mote o f  pointlessness, whirling in the midst o f  a dreadful free even greater 
pointlessness, unless there is intelligent life on other planets, that is to say, life even more 
intelligent than us, life that has thought up some point for this great enterprise, life. That is 
possible. That is something we do not know, thank God. But in the meantime, here is the 
hair, with its multiple meanings. What am I to do about it?”
(Barthelme 1996: 98-99)
The structure of this passage can be seen to be greatly similar to that which caused it 
and is illustrated in Figure 4i below. Where Snow White’s reflections on her hair took 
up five sentences, Bill manages to extend his to a total of twenty-three. Furthermore, 
Bill takes no physical action, apart from the speech itself, during the entire episode. The 
world-building elements of his text world are also even more minimalistic than those 
which defined Snow White’s surroundings in the earlier passage. Since his remarks are 
directed at Snow White’s hair, however, we can assume fairly safely that he is 
positioned within roughly the same spatial and temporal parameters as she was: below a 
window in their house, on a Monday.
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Once again, far greater detail goes into the construction of the world of Bill’s speech 
than that of his immediate location. Once again, the direct speech world-switch is 
followed by a further four embedded modal worlds. The first is created as a result of 
Bill’s somewhat reluctant epistemic commitment to location of the window from which 
the hair is hanging, as he relegates his assertion, ‘those windows where the hair is 
hanging are in our house’, to a question; ‘surely?’ This qualification positions the 
information contained within Bill’s initial statement at a greater epistemic distance, both 
from Bill and the reader, in an embedded epistemic modal world. A second modal 
world, also epistemic in nature, is then created as Bill goes on to speculate about the 
existence of God, in the conditional construction beginning ‘And if  God does exist...’. 
This protasis, of course, sets up a remote world in which the apodosis portion o f the 
conditional (‘we are in even graver shape than we had supposed... each of us is like a 
tiny mote of pointlessness, whirling in the midst of a dreadful free even greater 
pointlessness’) is the case and, thus, constitutes the function-advancing element of that 
world. A similar construction forms the next remote world to be embedded in Bill’s 
monologue, as he pursues a further hypothetical, ‘unless there is life on other planets’. 
A final world is then created as Bill adds a modalised comment, expressing his opinion 
on the likelihood of the hypothetical situation he has constructed: ‘That is possible’. The 
same state of affairs (life on another planet) is then recreated in a completely separate 
epistemic modal world, according to the speaker’s altered epistemic commitment to it.
An emphasis on the speech of the characters, rather than on their actions or their 
surroundings, is typical of each of the ‘Reaction to the hair’ episodes. This feature is 
not, however, confined to these sections alone. Throughout Snow White, McNall points 
out, ‘any act is given far less prominence than its problematical motives, and/or the
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problematical reactions to it’ (McNall 1975: 83). A later episode, for example, appears 
as follows:
Lack o f  Reaction to the hair: Dan sat down on a box, and pulled up more boxes for us, 
without forcing us to sit down on them, but just leaving them there, so that if  we wanted to 
sit down on them, we could. “You know, Klipschom was right I think when he spoke o f  the 
‘blanketing’ effect o f  ordinary language, referring, as I recall, to the part that sort of, you 
know, ‘fills in’ between the other parts. That part, the ‘filling’, you might say, o f  which the 
expression ‘you might say’ is a good example, is to me the most interesting part, and o f  
course it might also be called the ‘stuffing’ I suppose, and there is probably also, in 
addition, some other word that would do as well, to describe it, or maybe a number o f  
them ...”
(Barthelme 1996: 102)
Although categorised as a ‘Lack of reaction to the hair’, this description of Dan’s 
speech does at least contain one physical action, as Dan pulls up boxes for his audience. 
Yet again, however, who exactly that audience is remains unspecified, as does the 
precise nature of their surroundings. The speech itself, however, continues far beyond 
those lines quoted above, as Dan muses, ironically, over linguistic ‘stuffing’ for a 
further two pages, creating numerous embedded modal worlds as he goes, making this 
one of the longest episodes in the entire novel.
Indeed, the vast majority of the text of Snow White is made up of its characters’ verbal 
and mental contemplations. Almost the entire first half of the novel is devoted to the 
dwarves’ speculations about what might be bothering the apparently depressed and 
dissatisfied Snow White, interspersed by her own commentary on the situation. Snow 
White has taken to writing poetry and also throwing tantrums, although the dwarves’ 
main concern is her recent loss of sexual appetite. In an attempt to reawaken her interest 
in them, the dwarves purchase a fancy new shower curtain. The episodes relating to 
Snow White’s thoughts and feelings, however, reveal that her attention has been 
distracted by another character, Paul. His role in the story is made clear in the following 
episode:
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“I AM princely,” Paul reflected in his eat-in kitchen. “There is that. At times, when I am 
‘down’, I am able to pump m yself up again by thinking about my blood. It is blue, the 
bluest this fading world has known probably. At times I startle m yself with a gesture so 
royal, so full o f  light, that I wonder where it comes from ...”
(Barthelme 1996: 33, original typography retained)
Once again, Paul’s reflections on his princeliness extend somewhat further than the 
lines quoted here, which, once again, occur against deictic parameters that remain only 
minimally-constructed (‘in his eat-in kitchen’). Like all the other characters in the novel, 
Paul does not quite conform to the role ascribed him by previous versions of the Snow 
White fairy tale. He has no grand late arrival and, if  he does own a white stallion, he 
certainly makes no mention of it. He remains, instead, sporadically present throughout 
the novel, often talking from either his kitchen or his bathtub.
However, Paul does, at least, manage to save Snow White from being poisoned by a 
character named Jane, who we may infer, if only from this attempted act, fulfils the role 
of the Evil Queen. Paul’s method of salvation, however, is somewhat less heroic than 
that used by his Walt Disney and Brothers Grimm counterparts:
JANE gave Snow White a vodka Gibson on the rocks. “Drink this,” she said. “It w ill make 
you feel better.” “I don’t feel bad, physically,” Snow White said. “Emotionally is another 
story o f  course.” “Go on”, Jane said. “Go on drink it.” “No I w on’t drink it now,” Snow  
White said. “Perhaps later. Although something warns me not to drink it at all. Something 
suggests to me that it is a bad scene, this drink you proffer. Something whispers to me that 
there is something wrong with it.” “Well that’s possible,” Jane replied. “I didn’t make the 
vodka m yself you know. I didn’t grow the grain myself, and reap it myself, and make the 
mash myself. I am not a member o f  the Cinzano Vermouth Company. They don’t tell me 
everything. I didn’t harvest the onions. I didn’t purify the water that went into these rocks.
I’m not responsible for everything. All I can say is that to the best o f  my knowledge, this is 
an ordinary vodka Gibson on the rocks. Just like any other. Further than that I w ill not go.”
“Oh well then”, Snow White said. “It must be all right in that case. It must be all right i f  it 
is ordinary. If it is ordinary as you say. In that case I shall drink it.” “This drink is vaguely 
exciting, like a film by Leopoldo Torre Nilson,” Paul said. “It is a good thing I have taken it 
away from you, Snow White. It is too exciting for you. If you had drunk it, something bad 
would probably have happened to your stomach. But because I am a man, and because men 
have strong stomachs for the business o f  life, and the pleasure o f  life too, nothing will 
happen to me. Lucky that I sensed you about to drink it, and sensed that it was too exciting 
for you, on my sensing machine in my underground installation, and was able to arrive in 
time to wrest it from your grasp, just as it was about to touch your lips. Those lips that I 
have deeply admired, first through the window, and then from my underground installation.
Those lips that -  ” “Look how he has fallen to the ground Jane!” Snow White observed.
“And look at all that green foam coming out o f  his face! And look at all those convulsions 
he is having! Why it resembles nothing else but a death agony, the whole scene! I wonder if  
there was something wrong with that drink after all? Jane? Jane?”
(Barthelme 1996: 180-181, original typography retained)
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Once again, this episode is quoted here in full, in order that the multitude of worlds 
embedded within it might be properly examined. In previous versions of the fairy tale, 
the scene of Prince Charming’s rescue of Snow White, usually from a poison-induced 
sleep, forms the romantic climax of the story and is, thus, of central importance in the 
narrative as a whole. In Barthelme’s adaptation, however, the episode is given no 
particular prominence over the rest of the novel. In its text world structure, at least, it is 
in no way distinct from the episodes which precede it.
Paul, Jane and Snow White are the only world-building elements in their own text 
world. No other objects or entities are nominated as present and the temporal and spatial 
parameters o f the world remain similarly unspecified. Apart from the characters’ 
speech, four main actions can be seen to propel the story forward in this episode: Jane 
gives Snow White a poisoned vodka Gibson on the rocks, Paul takes it from her, drinks 
it himself and then falls to the ground. Only one of these actions, though, is explicitly 
described in the passage: ‘Jane gave Snow White a vodka Gibson on the rocks’. The 
reader must infer all the other plot-advancing information from what the characters say. 
The world-switch this speech creates is shown to the right of Figure 4j below, with the 
originating world shown to the left. Since the characters are all contained within the 
same spatio-temporal parameters and are interacting with one another, the focus of the 
text stays with the first switch made by Jane’s introduction of a present tense command 
into the past tense narrative: ‘Drink this’. Both Snow White’s and Paul’s speeches retain 
the same temporal signature as Jane’s and, therefore, do not create further world- 
switches.
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Figure 4j. Embedded Worlds in the Poisoning Scene
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There are, however, a number of modal worlds embedded into the speech world, arising 
as a result o f a number of modalised and conditional constructions. The first o f these 
embedded worlds is epistemic in nature and occurs as Jane admits that the vodka she is 
offering may be poisoned: ‘Well that’s possible’. This world is shown in Figure 4j as an 
EPS frame embedded in the world-switch of Jane’s direct speech. Snow White then 
creates a second epistemic modal world with her conditional construction, ‘If it is 
ordinary as you say. In that case I shall drink it’. Paul then takes the drink from her, 
speculating on what might have happened to Snow White had he not, thus creating a 
further epistemic modal world with his own conditional construction: ‘If you had drunk 
it.. . ’. As her prince writhes in agony in the final throes of death, Snow White closes the 
passage with a final epistemic modal world, arising from her speculation, ‘I wonder if 
there was something wrong with that drink after all?’
Each of the three diagrams presented in this section so far, Figure 4h, Figure 4i and 
Figure 4j, can now be compared directly with one another to reveal the strikingly 
similar structure of their separate text worlds. In each episode, an initial world is 
constructed according to minimal world-building information and containing similarly 
limited function-advancing actions or events. In each episode, far greater emphasis is 
placed upon the speech of one or more of the characters present, causing the imbalance 
between the left and right hand sides of each of the diagrams above. Though the title of 
Dan’s speech alerts us immediately to the static nature of his public sermon (‘Lack of 
reaction to the hair’), the reader might reasonably expect the remaining two example 
episodes to contain a substantial amount of action. The contrastive title of the ‘Reaction 
to the hair’ passage advertises it explicitly, while the poisoning scene draws on readers’ 
background knowledge of previous versions of the tale to lead them to expect a typical
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action-packed climax here too. In both cases, however, a distinct lack o f action, more in 
line with our expectations of Dan’s episode, can be found. Despite textual claims of 
varying content, the text world structure of all three episodes is practically identical.
As I have already mentioned above, the prominence of speech worlds throughout Snow 
White means that, for much of the discourse process, the reader must rely on the 
characters to provide the world-building and function-advancing information necessary 
to construct a coherent mental representation of the text. On occasion, this proves to be 
a reasonably straightforward exercise, particularly when the characters make direct 
reference to their surroundings, as with Snow White’s exclamations about Paul’s 
collapse in the episode quoted above. At other times, the reader may have to work 
slightly harder to make inferences that will enhance the detail o f their text world of 
Snow White. The inference made about Bill’s proximity to Snow White during his 
‘Reaction to the hair’ speech, discussed earlier in this section, is one such example. A 
great deal o f the time, however, the characters offer practically no help in the 
construction of the reader’s text world and can even be seen to actively complicate the 
process. In the following extract, Bill is defending himself in court, where he apparently 
stands charged with having delusions of grandeur. This has led Bill, the judge explains, 
to throw a six pack of beer through the windscreen of a car belonging to two complete 
strangers, named Fondue and Maeght:
“You cherished for those two, Fondue and Maeght, a hate.” “More o f  a miff, your 
worship.” “O f what standing, in the time dimension, is this miff?” “Matter o f  let’s see 
sixteen years I would say.” “The m iff had its genesis in mentionment to you by them o f  the 
great black horse.” “That is correct.” “How old were you exactly. At that time.” “Twelve 
years.” “Something said to you about a horse sixteen years ago triggered, then, the 
hurlment.” “That is correct.” “Let us make sure we understand the circumstances o f  the 
hurlment. Can you disbosom yourself very briefly o f  the event seen from your point o f  
view .”
(Barthelme 1996: 165)
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Bill’s explanation of events is far from brief, however, and offers no clarification of 
either the significance of the black horse or the reasons behind his violent outburst at 
Fondue and Maeght, who remain similarly vague figures throughout the scene. Instead, 
in a manner reminiscent of The Third Policeman, the judge and Bill continue their 
exchange of bizarre neologisms (e.g. ‘hurlment’, ‘disbosom’, ‘sensorium’, ‘cutaneous 
injurement’, ‘scoutmysteries’, ‘self-gratulation’) for a further four pages, in a highly- 
infelicitous conversation without apparent aim or conclusion.
Bill and the judge are not alone in their linguistic eccentricity. The other characters, too, 
have a persistent habit of coining peculiar or meaningless words and phrases. At one 
point, for example, Snow White exclaims, ‘I am tired of being just a horsewife!’, a term 
which is subsequently also adopted by the dwarves:
Additional reactions to the hair: “To be a horsewife,” Edward said. “That, my friends is my 
text for today. This important slot in our society, conceptualized by God as very nearly the 
key to the whole thing as Thomas tells us, has suffered in recent months and in this house a 
degree o f  denigration. I have heard it; I have been saddened by it. So I want today if  I can 
to dispel some o f  these wrong ideas that have been going around, causing confusion and 
scumming up the face o f  the truth. The horsewife! The very base bone o f  the American 
plethora! The horsewife! Without whom the entire structure o f  civilian life would 
crum ble!...”
(Barthelme 1996: 105)
Snow White’s initial play on words, then, rapidly becomes a social institution in the 
hands of the rest of Barthelme’s characters, one which Edward defends passionately in 
his lengthy sermon. Such appropriations, however, do little to aid the efficiency of the 
reading process, with the majority of the characters’ coinages remaining obscure and 
unexplained following their initial use.
Faced with such impenetrable communication between the characters, the reader might 
reasonably expect clearer direction from Snow White's implied authorial voice. As we 
have already seen, however, the prominence of speech in the majority o f the novel’s
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episodes means that the reader has very little contact with this omniscient textual entity. 
More often than not, the information he provides about the text world that contains 
Snow White, the dwarves, Paul and Jane is so scant that the reader must rely entirely on 
the references those characters make to their surroundings in order to form any coherent 
mental representation of them. On those rare occasions when the omniscient narrator 
does make an extended appearance, he has little to offer in the way of an explanation of 
the characters’ incoherent ramblings:
THE H ORSEW IFE IN H ISTO RY
FAM OUS H ORSEW IVES
THE HORSEW IFE: A SPIRITUAL PO RTRAIT
THE HORSEW IFE: A CRITICAL STUDY
FIRST M OP, 4000 BC
VIEW S OF ST AUG USTINE
VIEW S OF THE VENERABLE BEDE
EM ERSON ON THE AM ERICAN H O RSEW IFE
O XFORD COM PANION TO THE AM ERICAN  
H ORSEW IFE
INTRODUCTION OF BON AM I, 1892
H ORSEW IVES ON H O RSEW IFERY
ACCEPT ROLE, PSYCH O LO G IST URGES
THE PLASTIC BAG
THE GARLIC PRESS
(Barthelme 1996: 67)
This particular interjection, which appears to be part bibliographical list and part 
newspaper headline (‘ACCEPT ROLE, PSYCHOLOGIST URGES’), follows an 
episode in which the dwarves attempt to glean some information from Snow White 
about a poem she has written. Rather than providing an objective external opinion on 
the subject of the dwarves’ consternation (i.e. Snow White’s discontentment with both 
her personal relationships and her wider social role), the narrator adopts the same
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nonsensical discourse used by the characters, compounding potential processing 
difficulties rather than helping to alleviate them.
Such interruptions occur regularly throughout the text, often sharing the graphological 
distinctiveness of that reproduced above. On occasion, the information they offer can be 
seen to be of slightly greater use in the discourse process than that contained in the list 
above:
PAUL HAS N EV ER  BEFORE REALLY SEEN SNO W  W HITE AS A  W O M AN
(Barthelme 1996: 156)
Here, at least, some insight, however brief, is allowed into the mind of one of the 
characters. More often than not, however, the reader is faced with an obscure list o f 
apparently unconnected words or phrases:
EBONY
EQUANIM ITY
ASTONISH M ENT
TRIUM PH
VAT
DAX
BLAGUE
(Barthelme 1996: 101)
Despite sporadic instances of cooperative communication, the senselessness of repeated 
episodes like this one may undermine the trust of many readers in the reliability of the 
authorial voice.
There are numerous sections of Snow White, however, that are not filtered through the 
perspective of the omniscient narrator. The text frequently shifts from narratorial to 
reflector mode (see section 4.1.0), as certain episodes are narrated from the point of 
view of one of the characters:
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THERE is a river o f  girls and women in our streets. There are so many that the cars are 
forced to use the sidewalks. The women walk in the street proper, the part where, in other 
cities, trucks and bicycles are found. They stand in windows too unbuckling their shirts, so 
that we w ill not be displeased. I admire them for that. We have voted again and again, and I 
think they like that, that we vote so much. We voted to try the river in the next town. They 
have a girl-river there they don’t use much. We slipped into the felucca carrying our 
baggage in long canvas tubes tied, in the middle, with straps. The girls groaned under the 
additional weight. Then Hubert pushed o ff and Bill began beating time for the rowers. We 
wondered whether Snow White would be happy, alone there. But if  she wasn’t, w e couldn’t 
do anything about it.
(Barthelme 1996: 21, original typography retained)
The precise identity of the focaliser of this section of the text is unclear, since a proper
name is not disclosed. The reader can, at best, narrow ten possibilities (Snow White,
Paul, Jane and the seven dwarves) down to seven, assuming that, since they are referred
to in the story by their proper names, the focaliser is not either Hubert, Bill or Snow
White. The repeated use of second person nominative and possessive plural pronouns
(‘We have voted again and again... we vote so much... we slipped into the felucca
carrying our baggage... we wondered whether Snow White would be happy... we
couldn’t do anything about it’), coupled with Hubert and Bill’s apparent inclusion in
that collective, suggests that the focaliser may be one of the dwarves. Beyond that,
however, no further inference is possible. Furthermore, according to the modification to
Text World Theory I have put forward in the preceding sections of this chapter, this
passage, like all focalised narration, forms an epistemic modal world. As also already
discussed above, the contents of this world, under Werth’s approach, are only
‘character-accessible’. Since the passage represents the contents of the mind of a
character and since those contents cannot be assessed for reliability, the reader cannot
increment them into the Common Ground without further evidence of their truth value.
As in The Mustache, however, such evidence is not forthcoming, as the narrative of 
Snow White slips in and out of various characters’ perspectives, none of which are
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explicitly endorsed by the omniscient narrator. Perhaps most prominent of all of these 
perspectives is that in which the identity of the focaliser is blurred yet further:
THEN we went out to wash the buildings. Clean buildings fill your eyes with sunlight, and 
your heart with the idea that man is perfectible. A lso they are good places to look at girls 
from, those high, swaying wooden platforms: you get a rare view, gazing at the tops o f  their 
red and gold and plum-colored heads. Viewed from above they are like targets, the plum- 
colored head the center o f  the target, the wavy navy skirt the bold circumference... We are 
very much tempted to shoot arrows into them, those targets. You know what that means.
But we also pay attention to the buildings, gray and noble in their false architecture and 
cladding.
(Barthelme 1996: 14)
The narrative voice of this passage is slightly different from that of the ‘river of girls’ 
description above, in that it remains in the second person throughout and makes no use 
of proper names, by which certain characters might be eliminated from the list of 
possible focalisers. This is a truly collective perspective. Furthermore, although it is not 
a focalisation with which the narrative of Snow White remains fixed for the entire 
duration of the novel, it nonetheless constitutes that which is most frequently used in the 
text. Compared to the unhelpful voice of the omniscient narrator, it also contains the 
most detailed and consistent world-building and function-advancing information offered 
outside the characters’ speech worlds. As such, the focalised epistemic modal world of 
the ‘we’ narration is comparable to the fixed focalisation identified in The Mustache. 
Despite its character-accessible nature, it nevertheless forms the basis of the majority of 
the reader’s incrementation of information into the Common Ground.
In the preceding analyses in this chapter, I have shown how, in such circumstances, the 
reliability of a focaliser and, thus, of the information he or she provides, may be 
assessed according to the same criteria by which the reliability o f a fellow discourse 
participant is determined. Despite the logical ‘inaccessibility’ of the mind of the 
focaliser of The Mustache, for example, the reader is nevertheless able to gauge his 
approximate position on Werth’s ‘scale of authority’ (see Figure 3d above), both by
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considering his behaviour and by comparing the version of events he describes with the 
speech and actions of other characters. Werth’s sliding scale, though, is based on the 
social roles of individuals. Quite how one might assess the authority of several textual 
entities at once remains unclear. If we begin by comparing the versions of events put 
forward by the dwarves and those put forward by other characters, there are no apparent 
discrepancies. However, it is worth noting that the second person narration often relates 
episodes which no other entities were present to witness. There are also no dissenting 
voices within the collective, though, and no contradictions arise from the occasional 
input of first person narration, as in the ‘river of girls’ passage above. Rather, the 
multiple identity behind the ‘we’ narration is precisely what reinforces its authority. The 
perspectives and opinions of seven individuals are united in one voice, the confidence of 
which is further emphasised by its proclivity for generic statements: ‘Clean buildings 
fill your eyes with sunlight, and your heart with the idea that man is perfectible’.
However self-assured the dwarves’ narration may appear when examined in isolation, 
however, under Text World Theory’s fully-contextualised approach to discourse study, 
the potential interaction between it and the rest of the novel must also be considered. 
Although the collective voice may always express itself clearly and confidently, the 
frequent lapses into incoherence made by its individual members in both subsequent and 
preceding episodes would seem at odds with such positivity. The reader’s trust in the 
information put forward in such lucid passages as that quoted above, which are 
substantially furnished with world-building and function-advancing elements, may be 
undermined by the confused and chaotic ramblings of other sections of the text. 
Furthermore, though the second person narration may add authority to those passages in
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which it is used, it also adds to a cumulative confusion of identity emerging throughout 
the rest o f the novel:
“Informal statements the difficulties o f  owner­
ship and customs surprises you by being Love
exchanges paint it understanding brown
boys without a penny I was bandit-head-
gear And the question o f  yesterday wait­
ing members clinging clear milk o f
wanting fever hidden melted constabu­
lary extra innings o f  danger hides under
the leg resume clip chrome method decision
o f  the sacred Rota muscular dream basket
gesture Kiss the paper with it tufts more 
interesting than children painful texture o f  inter­
esting children offensive candor lesion hang­
ing mirror They only want window boxes
moving with clean, careful shrubs Manner in
which the penetration was Excited groans stifled
under blankets upset A parliament o f  less-
favored glass doors closed extra”
(Barthelme 1996: 109)
This episode is one of several to appear in this graphologically fragmented style, 
without any indication as to who may be speaking or, indeed, thinking. Whichever 
character may be responsible, though, the apparently random collection of words and 
phrases represents a textual foundation upon which it is almost impossible to build a 
coherent text world. Some of the words used may act as frame headers for some readers 
and may, thus, cause a reactivation of mental representations o f particular areas of their 
existing knowledge. Beyond this, however, it is difficult to see how the text could 
possibly be considered to be an example of efficient and purposive communication.
Nevertheless, such behaviour by a character still does not pose any threat to Werth’s 
notion of cooperation as a basic underlying principle of all discourse, since that 
character is not bound by the same ‘principles of discourse’ that bind the participants at 
the discourse world level. Only the author and the reader are expected to communicate 
in a fully cooperative manner under Werth’s framework. However, it is important to 
remember that the author is still responsible for the creation of those characters whose
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speech, thought and actions present such challenges to the reader throughout Snow 
White. He is also both responsible for and inextricably linked to the authorial voice in 
the text. The tendency of that textual counterpart to confound and confuse the reader, 
with bizarre interjections of seemingly unconnected words and phrases, has already 
been discussed. Further processing problems may also arise from the following textual 
interruption:
QUESTIONS:
1. Do you like the story so far? Yes ( )  No ( )
2. Does Snow White resemble the Snow White you remember? Yes ( )  N o ( )
3. Have you understood, in reading to this point, that Paul is the prince-figure? Yes ( )
N o ( )
4. That Jane is the wicked stepmother-figure? Yes ( )  N o ( )
5. In the further development o f  the story, would you like more emotion ( ) or less
emotion ( )?
6. Is there too much blague in the narration? ( )
Not enough blaguel ( )
7. Do you feel that the creation o f  new modes o f  hysteria is a viable undertaking o f  the 
artist o f  today? Yes ( )  No ( )
8. Would you like a war? Yes ( )  No ( )
9. Has the work, for you, a metaphysical dimension? Yes ( )  N o ( )
10. What is it (twenty-five words or less)?
11. Are the seven men, in your view, adequately characterized as individuals? Yes ( )
No ( )
12. Do you feel that the Author’s Guild has been sufficiently vigorous in representing 
writers before Congress in matters pertaining to copyright legislation? Yes ( )  No ( )
13. Holding in mind all works of fiction since the War, in all languages, how would you 
rate the present work, on a scale of one to ten, so far? (Please circle your answer) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
14. Do you stand up when you read? ( )  Lie down? ( )  Sit? ( )
15. In your opinion, should human beings have more shoulders? ( ) Two sets of 
shoulders? ( )  Three? ( )
(Barthelme 1996: 88-89)
This questionnaire appears about half way through Snow White, at the close of Part One 
of the text. Questions 3 and 4 may aid certain inferences already in process, confirming 
that Paul is intended to fill the traditional role of Prince Charming and that Jane is the 
wicked stepmother. This information aside, however, the majority of the questionnaire
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is, at worst, nonsensical (‘Is there too much blague in the narration?’) or, at best, 
unrelated to the main narrative (‘Do you feel that the Author’s Guild has been 
sufficiently vigorous in representing writers before Congress. . ‘should human beings 
have more shoulders?’). Those questions that do relate to the reading of Snow White do 
so by foregrounding the fictionality of the text. When question 13 asks, ‘how would you 
rate the present work, on a scale of one to ten’, for example, emphasis is placed on the 
discourse world relationship between the reader and author. The author’s potential 
ability, yet ultimate failure, to create rounded, believable characters and a coherent plot 
structure are thus also brought to the reader’s attention.
While readers of Slaughterhouse-Five may have had to invest substantial processing 
effort in order to make sense of the information contained in the text, that effort is at 
least rewarded with the construction of a reasonably coherent, if  somewhat fragmented, 
mental representation of the worlds of Billy Pilgrim. Barthelme’s readers, on the other 
hand, are provided with considerably less world-building information than those of Kurt 
Vonnegut and must attempt to construct the greater part of their text world of Snow 
White based on information put forward in the speech and thought of some remarkably 
unreliable characters. Not only is the author responsible for populating his text with 
entities who are rarely either ‘purposive’ or ‘efficient’ in their communication, but he 
also employs an omniscient narrator who either abandons the reader entirely, offering 
no additional direction in the processing of the text, or makes active use of the same 
nonsensical discourse as the rest of the novel’s characters. As such, Snow White would 
seem to fit Werth’s description of a ‘pathological case’ (Werth 1999: 50, see also 
section 3.3.1 above), since one of the discourse participants, namely the author, appears
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to be attempting to introduce certain propositions into the Common Ground 
superfluously.
Unlike in Slaughterhouse-Five, it is not always possible for the reader of Snow White to 
draw a metaphorical or otherwise cooperative inference from this violation of the 
‘principles of discourse’. Certain passages of the text, many of which have been 
examined in this section, offer no possibility whatsoever of the construction of an 
associated text world. Does Barthelme’s text, then, represent a truly uncooperative 
discourse, or can the reader still recover some form of meaning, however abstract, from 
its pages? Although the novel does contain a substantial amount o f fully-formed world- 
building and function-advancing elements, it is certainly possible that some readers 
might find the process of understanding Snow White arduous enough to abandon their 
reading of it all together. However, perhaps as many, if  not more, readers will formulate 
an interpretation of the text in which its very uncooperativeness is viewed as an indirect 
communication in itself. The chaotic structure o f Snow White can thus be thematised 
and mapped directly onto the reader’s own experience o f reality (see Turner 1997). 
Indeed, this truly megametaphorical mapping would seem to be at the core of the 
process identified by Weinberg (1970), by which ‘the absurdity found in life is 
transcribed through surreal descriptions’ (Weinberg 1970: 10).
4.4.1 Analysis Review
Although the title, and some of the characters, of Barthelme’s Snow White may share 
their names with those of a popular fairy tale, my application of Text World Theory to 
the novel in section 4.4.0 has shown the extent to which its structure departs from such 
traditional narrative forms. In particular, though some of the original story’s central
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plot-advancing elements also remain (e.g. Jane’s attempt to murder Snow White; Snow 
White’s subsequent narrow escape), their focalisation through the questionable 
perspectives of the novel’s characters transform a tale of family turmoil and romantic 
love into one of personal and social discontent. Furthermore, I have shown that the 
negotiation of a Common Ground according to the information presented in the text is 
far from straightforward, due mainly to the uncooperative behaviour of the reader’s co­
participant in the discourse world. The author of Snow White can be seen to reject 
persistently his obligations to communicate clearly and efficiently, as he creates both a 
troublesome textual counterpart for himself and numerous other text world entities with 
similarly uncooperative tendencies.
More specifically, the reader is provided with only minimal world-building information 
with which to establish the spatial and temporal parameters o f the text world. Much of 
the time, this information must be inferred from references made by characters to their 
surrounding situation, since the omniscient narrator is particularly reluctant to divulge 
such details. Indeed, we have also seen that the vast majority of the text of Snow White 
is made up of the representation of characters’ speech and thought. Very little physical 
action takes place in the text world and the greater part of the novel’s function- 
advancing takes place within speech-initiated world-switches and embedded epistemic 
modal worlds. The contents of these worlds, though only ‘character-accessible’ under 
Werth’s version of Text World Theory, must nevertheless form the basis o f much of the 
reader’s world-building process.
Our comprehension of Snow White is then further complicated by the fact that a great 
deal of what the characters say and think is, at best, long-winded and irrelevant
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rambling and, at worst, utterly nonsensical. No additional guidance is offered by the 
authorial voice in the text, which often adopts the same senseless discourse itself and 
provides only minimal insight into the characters’ feelings and motivations. Together 
with the persistent blurring of identity in Snow White, usually caused by the focalisation 
of the narrative through the collective perspective of the seven dwarves, these factors 
combine to produce a truly challenging narration which many readers may find 
impossible, or at least unsatisfactory, to process. However, it has also been argued that, 
for some readers, the complex and chaotic structure of the novel may actually form the 
basis of their interpretation of its meaning. A reading of Snow White as a cooperative 
text is still possible through the megametaphorical mapping of its structural absurdity 
onto the day to day experience of human existence.
4.5 Review
The four practical case-studies presented in this chapter have allowed the boundaries of 
Werth’s Text World Theory framework to be explored in detail. Both the benefits and 
drawbacks of Werth’s approach to discourse study have been discussed and a number of 
modifications to the original version of Text World Theory have been suggested. The 
findings of each of the preceding separate analyses are brought together in the next and 
final chapter of this thesis. The modifications to Werth’s framework suggested during 
the course of these applications are also further formalised in Chapter Five. Finally, the 
wider practical and theoretical implications of both the proposed new Text World 
Theory model and the thesis as a whole are discussed in full.
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Chapter Five Conclusions
5.0 Preview
This chapter begins with a discussion of the main findings of the applications of Text 
World Theory to a series of Absurd novels, undertaken in Chapter Four. Section 5.1 
below brings together the conclusions of each of the text world analyses, previously 
summarised separately in sections 4.1.1, 4.2.1, 4.3.1 and 4.4.1, in order to present a 
unified synopsis of the central conclusions o f the present study. The section also 
includes a schematisation of the modifications to Text World Theory suggested 
throughout the course of this thesis. Section 5.2 then goes on to explore some of the 
directions in which the present project might be expanded and developed in the future, 
examining and discussing the ways in which other academic disciplines might benefit 
from the employment of a text world methodology. The thesis is concluded in section 
5.3, which provides a final summary of the wider implications of this thesis.
5.1 Text World Theory Augmented
The aim of the preceding chapter was to provide an extensive exploration of the benefits 
and boundaries of Werth’s version of Text World Theory. It was argued in section 3.5 
that the analyses o f extended metaphor in literary texts undertaken by Werth himself 
(e.g. Werth 1994 and 1999) constituted only limited applications of the text world 
approach, both in terms of the areas of the theory actually utilised and in terms of the 
length of the texts examined. With these limitations in mind, I selected four Absurd 
novels for a full-length analysis using the complete range of methodological tools 
available in Text World Theory. As already explained in section 1.1, the chosen texts
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can be seen to represent a cline of literary experimentalism, against which the analytical 
capabilities of Werth’s framework can be properly assessed.
The first novel to be examined in Chapter Four was Flann O ’Brien’s The Third 
Policeman. The initial world this text constructs immediately creates problems for Text 
World Theory. In section 4.1.0 I showed that the focalised nature o f the narrative 
renders the text world level of Werth’s framework essentially redundant, since the 
world-building and function-advancing elements o f the text are presented through the 
perspective of one of the characters. Furthermore, because the narration of The Third 
Policeman is ‘fixed’, in Genette’s (1980) terms, this point of view remains the reader’s 
only point of access throughout the course of the novel. I therefore suggested that it 
seems unlikely that readers of the text would necessarily suspend incrementation of the 
information presented in the focalised world simply because of its character-accessible 
logical status (see section 3.3.0). Werth’s classification of focalised narratives as ‘sub­
worlds’ was also questioned, since this choice of terminology would appear to suggest 
that, despite their inevitable dominance in the text, such narratological structures still 
occupy a sub-ordinate position in Werth’s conceptual hierarchy. Indeed, I went on to 
demonstrate that the reader/focaliser relationship in The Third Policeman is o f central 
importance to the success of the novel’s final twist. Finally, I proposed the term world- 
repair as a possible addition to Text World Theory. Drawn from Emmott’s (1997) 
framework for narrative comprehension, this term provides the means to describe how 
readers might deal with such unexpected narratological developments.
The analysis of Emmanuel Carrere’s novel The Mustache, in section 4.2.0, provided 
further justification for the removal of the sub- prefix from Werth’s description of
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worlds created by modalised propositions, indirect speech and thought representation, 
conditional constructions, hypotheticality and focalised narration. Once again, the 
perspective through which the world-building and function-advancing elements of the 
text are presented was shown to remain fixed for the duration of the entire novel. 
Although The Mustache is narrated in the third rather than the first person, the 
omniscient narrator makes no external judgement or comment on the focaliser’s point of 
view. Simpson (1993) was shown to provide a useful classification o f this type of 
narration as being in ‘reflector’ mode (see section 4.1.0 above). Once again, then, the 
text world level o f Werth’s framework remains redundant throughout the discourse 
process, as the character-accessible world of the main character’s perspective forms the 
reader’s only source of information upon which to build a mental representation of the 
text. I also showed that the maintenance of this exclusive reader/focaliser relationship is 
of equal importance to that developed in The Third Policeman, since, without it, the 
reader would be unable to sustain any sympathy for the main character’s predicament. 
Were any of the other characters’ perspectives represented, any number of the 
unanswered questions over the protagonist’s mental stability that propel the story 
forwards might be settled at the outset, a change which would transform The Mustache 
into an entirely different literary experience.
Thus, based both on these findings and on the discussion of Werth’s limited account of 
modality in section 3 .3 .2 ,1 have modified Werth’s categories of attitudinal sub-worlds 
and epistemic sub-worlds to create a new inclusive classification o f modal worlds. This 
term covers all those conceptual spaces created by deontic, boulomaic and epistemic 
modality, conditionality, hypotheticals, the indirect representation of speech and thought 
and all instances of focalised narration. Crucially, this is a non-hierarchical term, in
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recognition of the now proven fact that some remote or modalised worlds may occupy a 
dominant position in any given discourse, often extending throughout the course of an 
entire literary text, as has been demonstrated above.
My modifications of Werth’s hierarchical terminology were further extended as a result 
of the text world analysis of Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five in section 4.3.0. 
Once again, the initial world constructed by the opening chapter o f that novel disappears 
for almost the entire duration of the rest of the text, this time as a result of the main 
character’s frequent leaps through space and time. Just as I suggested the term modal 
worlds as a non-hierarchical alternative to Werth’s classification of remote sub-worlds, 
in section 4.3.0 the term world-switch was put forward as a new means of describing the 
frequent shifts in spatial and temporal focus which occur both throughout 
Slaughterhouse-Five and in countless other literary and non-literary texts. Once again, 
this modification to Werth’s text world framework is a direct development from 
Emmott’s (1997) discourse model, in which the term ‘frame switch’ is used to describe 
the same textual phenomenon. Slaughterhouse-Five presented further problems for Text 
World Theory, however, as a result of the apparently uncooperative behaviour of the 
novel’s omniscient narrator. The frequently negatively-shaded narration was shown to 
create particular distance between the reader and the protagonist, Billy Pilgrim, at times 
of great trauma, with the estranged commentary, ‘So it goes’, most often appearing after 
descriptions of death and violence. This textual feature was shown to complicate greatly 
the reader’s construction and maintenance of a sympathetic relationship with the 
characters. The questions I initially raised in section 3.1.1 over Werth’s insistence that 
all discourse is based on an underlying cooperative principle arose again at this point in 
the discussion. I argued, however, that, disturbing as the narrator’s behaviour may be, it
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does not constitute a significant threat to the reader’s overall processing of the 
discourse. As was shown in section 4.3.0, it is possible for the reader to reach a 
metaphorical interpretation of the structure of Slaughterhouse-Five, rather than being 
forced to dismiss the text as an uncooperative form of communication.
Donald Barthelme’s Snow White, however, is somewhat more problematic. This highly 
experimental piece of fiction, analysed in section 4.4.0 above, was shown to provide the 
reader with only minimal world-building information upon which to construct a mental 
representation of the text. Once again, the novel is narrated mainly through the 
perspectives of the participating characters, whose contributions to the discourse have 
been shown to consist most frequently o f existential ramblings which are, at best, long- 
winded and, at worst, utterly irrelevant. A persistent blurring of the identities of separate 
textual entities into a collective narratorial voice was also detected during the text world 
analysis of Snow White, as was the presence of an extremely uncooperative participant 
in the discourse world. I demonstrated that the textual counterpart Barthelme creates for 
himself provides little help for the struggling reader of the text, often compounding 
confusion with the interjection of nonsensical lists, questionnaires and statements. 
Nevertheless, a cooperative interpretation of even the heightened absurdity of Snow 
White, as a megametaphorical textual representation of the absurdity of life itself, was 
argued to be still possible.
The modifications I have made to Text World Theory over the course of this thesis are 
fully formalised in Figure 5a below, which shows both the new terminology suggested 
and its corresponding diagrammatic notation. The top section of the diagram relates to 
the ‘world-switch’ category and includes both spatial and temporal alternation in
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WORLD-SWITCHES
SPATIAL ALTERNATION
SA
TEMPORAL ALTERNATION  
FLASHBACK FLASHFORWARDS
FBK FFW
DIRECT SPEECH DIRECT THOUGHT
DS DT
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ALTERNATION  
COMBINED
FBK FFW
MODAL WORLDS
DEONTIC
DEO EPISTEMIC
EPS
BOULOMAIC
BOUL
FOCALISATION INDIRECT 
SPEECH
INDIRECT HYPOTHETICAL CONDITIONAL 
THOUGHT
FOC IS IT HYP IF
Figure 5a. Modifications to Text World Theory
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various forms. Not all of the possible types of world-switch have been dealt with in 
detail in this thesis. Certain kinds of temporal switch, such as flashbacks (shown as 
FBK worlds in Figure 5 a) and the direct representation of speech and thought (shown as 
DS and DT worlds, respectively), were discussed both in section 3.3.3 above and 
throughout the text world analyses in Chapter Four. My analysis of Slaughterhouse- 
Five in section 4.3.0 has also shown that it is possible for narratives to flash forwards as 
well as backwards in time. Such instances are given an FFW notation in Figure 5a. 
Alternations in just the spatial parameters of the text world, however, did not occur in 
any of the novels examined in that chapter. Such spatial world-switches are given the 
notation SA in Figure 5a. Furthermore, I noted in section 3.3.3 that many temporal 
alternations, whether flashbacks or flashforwards, will also involve a change in the 
spatial parameters of the text world. Indeed, almost all of the world-switches I identified 
in Chapter Four can be seen in retrospect to constitute a combination of spatial and 
temporal change. However, Werth’s (1999: xvi-xvii) text world notation does not offer 
a means of signalling such dual world-switches. Figure 5a therefore contains a possible 
means o f indicating combined alternations in both the spatial and temporal boundaries 
of text worlds in the future. The FBK and FFW worlds at the bottom of the world- 
switch section of the diagram have a double outline to show that the world-switch 
concerned has a different location in both time and space from its originating world.
The bottom section of Figure 5a contains all those worlds which can be classified as 
‘modal worlds’ under the modified version of Text World Theory put forward in this 
thesis. Following the discussion of Werth’s limited account of modality in section 3.3.2, 
those worlds which are created as the result o f the use of deontic, boulomaic or 
epistemic modality are shown in the diagram as DEO, BOUL and EPS worlds,
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respectively. As can be seen in Figure 5a, however, it is possible to divide the category 
of epistemic modal worlds yet further. The EPS notation applies only to instances of 
epistemic modalisation, including the use of perception modality, such as ‘she must 
have been lying’, ‘he seemed upset’, ‘they might have been arguing’, and so on. 
However, in my new Text World Theory framework I also allow the further 
specification of other textual manifestations of epistemic distance. As shown at the very 
bottom of Figure 5a, focalised narration (FOC), the indirect representation o f both 
speech and thought (IS and IT), hypotheticals (HYP) and conditional constructions (IF) 
are each given their own separate form of notation under the modified text world 
approach. With each of the additions and changes made to Werth’s original version of 
Text World Theory now explained in full, section 5.2 below goes on to examine some 
of the ways in which the central proposals put forward in the present thesis might be 
developed further in future work.
5.2 Future Directions
This thesis has provided the first detailed exploration of Text World Theory since 
Werth’s full account of his framework was originally published in 1999. It has taken the 
first steps towards establishing the advantages and limits of the text world approach to 
discourse study by testing the extreme boundaries of the approach first. My applications 
of Text World Theory to a selection of Absurd prose fiction have tried the farthest limits 
of Werth’s discourse model and made the initial modifications necessary for the text 
world approach to be utilised and further developed in the future. The resulting adapted 
framework, detailed in section 5.1 above, can be seen to have addressed and solved 
some of the most substantial problems identifiable within Werth’s initial methodology. 
It offers a broad outline of Text World Theory as a viable system for stylistic analysis.
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The framework as it now stands links linguistic form with cognitive effects in a rich and 
complex way. Its approach is principled, yet does not fall into the hard formalist linkage 
of form and meaning. In this way, Text World Theory provides an explanatory 
framework that encompasses both the broad cultural readings of interpretative 
communities and individual interpretations. It might even be argued to provide a final 
realisation of the long-standing discoursal aspirations of preceding stylistic models. 
Perhaps above all else, however, Text World Theory offers a practical and systematic 
means of exploring language as a fully contextualised phenomenon.
Assessing Text World Theory’s suitability as a means of examining more isolated 
linguistic features has remained beyond the parameters of the present project. Hidalgo 
Downing (2000), for example, uses only selected areas of Text World Theory to explore 
specifically the conceptual processes associated with instances of negation in Joseph 
Heller’s Catch-22. In the present thesis, however, such concentrated analysis has been 
rejected in favour of a wider survey of the mechanics of Text World Theory as a whole. 
The applicability of Werth’s model of discourse processing to areas o f linguistic study 
other than stylistics also remains to be established. As already mentioned in section 1.0, 
Werth claims to have devised a methodological framework capable of accounting for all 
aspects of human communication. However, a full appraisal of the possible advantages 
the use o f Text World Theory might have for such linguistic sub-disciplines as 
pragmatics, for example, or how the text world approach might be used to explain or 
describe phonological phenomena, or grammatical form, has been beyond the scope of 
this thesis.
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Nevertheless, one body of work which would seem to present itself immediately as a 
potential positive beneficiary from the addition of a text world methodology is that 
which is typically associated with the discipline of critical discourse analysis (see, for 
example, Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996; Fairclough 1989, 1995a and 1995b; 
Fowler 1981, 1986 and 1991; Kress and Hodge 1979). The central focus of this area of 
linguistic study has consistently been the examination of discourse, in much the same 
sense as Werth defines that term: both the text and its related context of production and 
reception. In particular, critical discourse analysis is interested in the covert ideologies 
which control that contextual environment and, specifically, in revealing their 
manifestation in the popular texts of a given society. The methodological tools its 
practitioners have traditionally employed towards that end have been those offered 
within Halliday’s (1985) systemic functional linguistics. The consistent emphasis placed 
on the central importance of context in human language behaviour throughout 
Halliday’s work gives systemic functional grammar an obvious appeal for those 
interested in the hidden ideologies at work within everyday communication. In practice, 
however, the deployment of the model, by both Halliday and the majority of critical 
discourse analysts, more often than not amounts to little more than the labelling of 
grammatical components in a particular text, since no systematic means is provided for 
the explanation of the wider contextual elements involved in the discourse situation.
Text World Theory, on the other hand, places the context surrounding a particular 
discourse situation at the very heart of its model of language production and processing. 
It specifies an inextricable link between the pragmatic and conceptual processes which 
govern the behaviour of the participants in the discourse world and those which inform 
the construction and maintenance of the text world. The fundamentally cognitive basis
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of the text world approach offers the possibility of accounting for the social and cultural 
factors which underlie a particular communication as rigorously and accurately as those 
textual elements upon which the structure of the discourse itself is built. We can 
imagine a future ‘critical text world analysis’, then, beginning with a detailed 
examination of the main social and cultural components which make up the discourse 
world surrounding the production and interpretation of a particular text: a daily 
newspaper, for example. Like the discourse worlds o f most written communication, this 
world would be split, with the participants most likely occupying separate spatio- 
temporal points. In a critical text world analysis, however, the exact nature of this split 
would be of central importance to the study, since it would define the precise points at 
which the producer and receiver of the text either differ or correspond. Thus, a text 
world methodology would allow the individual belief systems (the ‘ideologies’, in 
critical discourse analysis’ terms) which influence and inform the behaviour of each of 
the participants in a discourse situation to form the essential starting point of the entire 
critical procedure.
A future critical text world analysis could conceivably concentrate solely on a 
comparative analysis of the individual nature of different types of discourse worlds, 
examining, for example, how the immediate situation surrounding the production and 
reception of a daily newspaper differs from that of a political speech, and to what 
eventual effect in both the text world and the discourse world. Perhaps even more 
productive, however, would be to trace the personal and cultural knowledge identified 
as a controlling factor in the discourse world through to its further manifestation at the 
text world level. It is at this conceptual layer that the majority of previous critical 
discourse analyses have been located, concentrating almost entirely on the stylistic
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features o f social discourse. Text World Theory, however, would allow the same close 
analysis of the textual characteristics of a particular social ideology but would situate 
the discussion firmly within a consistent terminology which links the text with its 
originating context. Werth’s principle of ‘ text-dri venness’ (see Werth 1999: 149-153 
and section 3.1.2 above), of course, ensures the generation and maintenance o f the bond 
between the participant’s background knowledge and their experience o f the discourse. 
It seems highly likely, then, that this specific area of the framework would form the 
central focus of any future amalgamation of Text World Theory with existing critical 
discourse practice.
Each of the text world analyses undertaken in the course of this thesis could quite easily 
be developed into critical text world analyses by a simple switch in emphasis from the 
examination of the stylistic features of the texts to a discussion of the nature of the 
discourse worlds which produced them. The parameters of this study, set out in Chapter 
One, however, have prevented the pursuit of this particular line in the present case. 
Nevertheless, the field of critical discourse analysis would seem a fertile ground upon 
which to base the further development and testing of Text World Theory, not least 
because of the apparent receptivity of some of its main proponents to new approaches 
and methodologies:
Textual analysis presupposes a theory o f  language and a grammatical theory, and one 
problem for critical discourse analysis is to select from amongst those available. I have 
referred at various points to systemic linguistics, which has a number o f  strengths from the 
perspective o f  CDA... While systemic linguistics is thus a congenial theory to work with, in 
the longer term critical discourse analysis should, as Kress has argued (1993), be informing 
the development o f  a new social theory o f  language which may include a new grammatical 
theory.
(Fairclough 1995a: 10)
For Fairclough, then, the selection of Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics as a 
methodological basis for the exploration of social discourse would appear to be based 
simply on the convenience of the approach at that time. Following more recent
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developments in cognitive linguistics (detailed in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 above), 
however, it is possible that a more suitable, more context-centred, system for analysis 
has now evolved elsewhere.
It may be that, with further development, Text World Theory might offer some 
contribution to the ‘new social theory of language’ Fairclough deems necessary for the 
long-term development of critical discourse analysis. It offers a framework which is 
both broad enough to encompass a discussion of the socio-political factors at work 
within all human communication and detailed enough to account for the precise textual 
manifestations of those wider cultural relationships. Thus, a critical discourse practice 
based on Text World Theory would re-centre its analyses on the participants’ 
deployment of background knowledge and experience during a given discourse. It 
would examine the way in which the text-driven nature of that process allows the 
stylistic features of a particular text to be traced back to their originating ideology in this 
discourse world. It would discuss the distribution and location of the main function- 
advancers of a particular text world in relation to its participating characters, taking into 
account the means by which the reader’s epistemic distance from or proximity to a 
given piece of information is manipulated by their co-participant in the discourse. By 
these means, the development of a truly context-sensitive model for discourse analysis 
is a foreseeable possibility, as is the further evolution o f Text World Theory into a more 
socially-conscious critical practice.
5.3 Thesis Review
Section 5.2 above outlined some of the directions in which the work begun in this thesis 
might be further developed in the future, paying particular attention to the possible
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benefits a text world approach might hold for the field of critical discourse analysis. 
However, the synthesis o f these separate approaches to discourse study has remained 
beyond the parameters of the present project, as has the testing of Text World Theory 
against forms of human communication other than literary prose. Nevertheless, 
alongside the key objectives of the thesis, set out in section 1.0, a number of additional 
developments within the wider fields of both linguistic and literary critical practice can 
be seen to have also evolved during the course of the present project. This section will 
close the thesis with a final synopsis of some of these advances.
Firstly, the modified version of Text World Theory, which has been developed as a 
direct result o f the detailed exploration and application of Werth’s model over the 
course of the preceding chapters, can be seen to provide a rigorously tested and 
consequently improved methodology for the analysis of the stylistics of literary texts. 
As detailed in section 5.1 above, a number of problematic areas in the original version 
of Text World Theory have now been addressed, with solutions for each flaw proposed 
and assessed in turn. More specifically, key changes have been made to the model’s 
handling of, among other things, modalised propositions, focalisation, spatial and 
temporal narrative shifts, participant co-operation and unreliable narration. Crucially, 
however, despite the identification o f numerous imperfections in Werth’s initial 
framework, none of the problems presented by the challenging linguistic data of The 
Third Policeman, The Mustache, Slaughterhouse-Five and Snow White have proved 
insurmountable. Rather, Text World Theory has emerged as an adaptable and broad- 
ranging framework which, with a few minor adjustments, has offered numerous 
invaluable insights into the conceptual structures at work within the reader’s processing 
of the selected texts.
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Indeed, the application of Text World Theory to the Absurd novels in Chapter Four, 
originally intended to establish the boundaries of Werth’s approach, has coincidentally 
also added to our understanding of certain key areas of literary criticism and 
narratology. The construction and maintenance of an empathetic relationship between 
the reader o f a novel and its main focaliser, for example, has been shown to be of 
central importance to the success of a number of narratological devices. The creation of 
a substantial twist at the end of a novel, for instance, depends on the reader sustaining 
patience and interest throughout the preceding text (see section 4.1.0). The effective 
communication of a particular focaliser’s mental state and the encouragement of 
sympathy for that textual entity has also been shown to be determined by the 
construction of a world in which only his or her thoughts and perceptions are presented 
to the reader (see section 4.2.0). In both cases, the reader’s incrementation of the 
information presented in the epistemic modal world of the focalised narrative, often in 
spite of numerous discouraging signs, is essential to the success o f the narrative feature 
in question.
The modification of Text World Theory to provide a more complete account of 
modality has also, in turn, added a cognitive dimension to that traditional area of 
linguistic and stylistic study. The occurrence of modalised propositions in literary texts 
has been shown to initiate the construction of an entirely separate conceptual space. 
Simpson’s description of those texts which contain a high degree of fluctuation between 
epistemically modalised and non-modalised forms, as narratives of ‘bewilderment, 
uncertainty and alienation’ (Simpson 1993: 53, see also section 4.3.0 above), can now 
be more fully understood in terms of their construction o f a multitude o f remote 
conceptual spaces which many readers may find difficult to track and comprehend.
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Indeed, the creation of a host of often conflicting modal worlds has emerged as a feature 
common to all o f the texts examined during the course of Chapter Four. It seems 
increasingly likely, then, that further applications of Text World Theory to other 
examples of Absurd prose fiction might reveal the heavy concentration of modal 
worlds, compared with the frequently minimalistic world-building and function- 
advancing information provided at the text world level, to be a defining stylistic feature 
of this literary genre.
Although the analyses undertaken in the course o f this thesis can by no means be 
considered a comprehensive survey of the stylistics of all Absurd literature, the 
application of Text World Theory to just a selection of novels here has proved 
productive enough to encourage further exploration o f the text worlds o f the Absurd in 
the future. Alongside Text World Theory’s revelation of the prevalence of modal worlds 
in Absurd texts, detailed above, abundant world-switches, unreliable or uncooperative 
narration and a frequent need for world-repair have also been identified as key features 
of the Absurd discourse examined. The contribution Text World Theory has made to 
current understanding of this genre of literature, simply as a by-product o f this thesis’ 
main aims and objectives, would suggest that some significant results might be expected 
from the deliberate application of the framework to Absurdism as a whole. Furthermore, 
on the basis of the evidence presented within this thesis, Text World Theory would 
seem to offer a useful means of approaching the issue of literary genre in general, 
through the comparative analysis o f the differing structures of the worlds created within 
the boundaries of individual generic types.
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Throughout the course of this thesis my central intention has been to offer some 
contribution to the emerging field of cognitive poetics, already outlined in section 1.3 
above. It is hoped that both the critical exposition and development of Werth’s text 
world framework and the initial exploration into the stylistics of Absurd prose fiction 
undertaken during the course of this study might be seen to further the evolution of this 
academic discipline. At the very heart of both the present project and the ongoing task 
of cognitive poetics as a whole is the fundamental belief that the cognitive processes 
which govern our production and interpretation of literary texts also form the basis of 
our understanding of our everyday existence. It is hoped, therefore, that the deeper 
comprehension of the structure of Absurd literary worlds, reached over the course of the 
preceding pages, might also allow the absurdity of the real world to be at least a little 
more comprehensible.
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